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Abstract 
The relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reward and corporate performance 
has been widely investigated in recent years. The determinants and moderators of this 
relationship have also been examined extensively. However, despite the now vast body of 
research in this area, the evidence on the association between CEO reward and firm 
performance remains inconsistent and inconclusive. To this end, this thesis empirically tests 
and critically analyses strnctnral and economic models of CEO cash reward determination, 
encompassing the effects of firm, ownership, and board strnctnral characteristics, using a 
system generalised method of moments. (GMM) approach to estimation. Using aggregate 
time-series analysis on an open cohort of firms included in the Standard and Poor's 
(S&P)/Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 500 list over the period 1999 to 2006 inclusive, 
the thesis presents a number of important finding with wide-ranging fJ?plications for research, 
corporate governance policy, and pra_ctice. 
First, using_ a system GMM approach to estimation, the stndy finds that there is no lagged or 
contemporaneous association between CEO total cash reward, and various measures of firm-
level performance. Even more compelling is the finding that the reported performance-based 
CEO cash reward is insensitive to firm-level performance measures purportedly used by 
boards to determine these Oljtcomes. 
Second, the stndy finds that board strnctnral characteristics - most notably, board 
'independence' - do not directly influence the level of CEO cash reward, nor do they 
positively moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. The stndy 
identifies two main theoretical perspectives on CEO r~ward and performance: Agency Theory 
and the Managerial Power perspective. The Agency Theory perspective assumes that boards 
make rational and economic choices and decisions that. align CEO reward to firm-level 
performance. The Managerial Power perspective assumes that socio-political forces and the 
distribution of power between the board and the CEO influence the way the board manages 
the CEO reward-performance relationship. Both Agency Theory and Managerial Power 
Theory identify various corporate governance structures and institutions as solutions to CEO 
excess. Common to both perspectives is the assumption that board structural characteristics 
and configurations are critical, intervening variables in the effective management of CEO 
reward and performance. Board structural characteristics that are said to be associated with 
director 'independence' are assumed to limit managerial discretion and thus to constrain 
managerial opportunism and sub-optimal/excessive reward levels -or 'rent extraction', to use 
the preferred Managerial Power terminology. While this institutional presupposition has 
become the edifice of corporate governance codes of best practice within, and beyond 
Australia in recent times, it is a premise that remains empirically untested, certainly in the 
Australian context. The results presented in this thesis suggest that these structures have had 
no impact on the level and performance sensitivity of CEO cash reward in Australia over the 
period 1999 to 2006. Consistent with prior research, firm size, firm total risk, and ownership 
concentration are found to directly influence CEO cash reward levels, rather than to positively 
moderate the relationship between CEO cash and performance. 
Finally, this thesis has important methodological implications for research investigating the 
longitudinal sensitivity between CEO reward and performance. This thesis demonstrates and 
critically assesses the. potential sources of contamination associated with using a fixed effects 
OLS approach to dynamic panei model estimation. The study show's that in overlooking the 
potential for endogeneity, higher-order autocorrelation, and dynamic missspecification, 
existing research in this·area, has limited inferential validity. 
These findings hold considerable significance for both governance theory and regulatory 
practice. While theory and best practice prescriptions have. contjnued to centre on board 
structural characteristics - most notably, board independence - as predictors of board 
monitoring and decisional effectiveness, there is no evidence that these prescriptions have led 
to CEO cash rewards becoming more performance-contingent. In essence, the widely 
embraced assumption that boards exhibiting greater structural independence may be more 
effective 'stewards' of owner interests may be 'too good to be true'. Finally this thesis 
questions whether Australian boards use CEO cash rewards efficiently as an additional 
performance incentive mechanism to equity-based long-term incentives. 
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1.1 Thesis Aims and Approach 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reward and performance have traditionally been theorised 
and researched within the Agency Theory paradigm. Agency Theory suggests that the 
separation of ownership and control of the firm precipitates goal conflict between appointed 
manager-agents, and the principals of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory 
reinforces the importance of executive incentive contracts - or executive reward for 
performance - as the primary mechanism to protect the firm against managerial opportunism 
and effort and risk aversion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). From this perspective, it follows 
that the greater the sensitivity of executive rewards to firm performance, the stronger the 
alignment between owner/principal and executive/agent interests (Fama, 1980). 
Further, Agency Theory posits that dispersed principals delegate the responsibility to 
manage the potential for goal conflict to the board of directors. Thus, the board is the apex 
decision-making in the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and is 
authorised to hire, fire, motivate, control and reward the CEO and other top executives. 
Agency Theory casts the board of directors as stewards of dispersed owners; charged with 
task of managing CEO reward and performance in ways that optimise owner interests. 
Contrary to the Agency Theory perspective, some authors suggest that executive reward and 
incentive contracts may exacerbate rather than ameliorate goal conflict; that is, that board 
attitudes to executive reward determination may actually be part of the governance problem 
rather than the solution (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Thus the Managerial Power perspective 
explains escalating levels of CEO total reward, and the observed decoupling of reward from 
measures of fmn-level performance, in terms of power dynamics between the board and the 
incumbent CEO. Bebchuk and Fried, (2004) suggest that CEO reward is an outcome of CEO 
power, which, by implication, constrains board rational choice in the management of CEO 
reward and performance. 
While the two theoretical perspectives at first glance offer contrasting explanations of the 
relationship between CEO reward and performance, there is a critical commonality that has 
hitherto been largely overlooked. Upon closer examination, the two theoretical perspectives 
are complementary in their advocacy of strnctural reforms to enhance the board's 
effectiveness in managing CEO reward and performance. Eminent Agency Theorists Fama 
and Jensen (1983), along with Eisenhardt (1989), make the implicit assumption that board 
structural arrangements determine the board's effectiveness in managing and controlling the 
relationship between CEO reward and corporate performance. They suggest that 'outside: 
directors are ·in a better position to exercise independent judgement when appraising CEO 
performance (see also Fama, 1980). Similarly, the Managerial Power perspective suggests 
that exorbitant and performance-decoupled CEO rewards are attributable to poor board 
governance regulation and policy and board structural configurations. This institutional-
structural logic represents a point of convergence between these_ two major theoretical 
perspectives. 
The tenets of Agency Theory have precipitated an abundance of research examining the 
sensitivity of top executive reward to measures _of firm-level performance. Yet there js still 
no conclusive evidence to suggest that stronger alignment between CEO or top executive 
reward and firm-level performance has- as yet materialised. There is however, consistent 
evidence that CEO .rewards continue to outpace growth in .employee wage ·and salary 
earnings (Shields, 2005), and that across the developed world the level of CEO reward 
continues to escalate, driven primarily by the proliferation: of executive stock options 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen, Wruck and Murphy, 2004). It is worth noting that the 
cash component of CEO total reward continues to increase (see Shields, 2005). 
At the sa~e time, recent years have seen the advent of coqiorate governance codes of best 
practice intended to improve board monitoring and decisional processes through specific 
board structural arrangements, especially in critical areas such as executive incentive 
contracts. Corporate governance codes of best practice in Australia (as elsewhere) are 
predicated on the assumption that board structural characteristics and configurations enhance 
the board's ability to monitor and reward the CEO effectively. These interventions have 
involved greater mandatory disclosure of executive reward, increased pressure on _boards to 
make executive reward more performance contingent, and board governance structures 
purported to enhance the board management of executive rewards. The institutional 
presuppositions, which are shared by both major theoretical perspectives outlined above, 
have become the edifice of corporate governance codes of best practice within and beyond 
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Australia in recent times. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that: in the context of this 
corporate reform agenda, Australian boards would have bec·ome more ·efficient and effective 
in managing CEO reward and performance. 
Growth in CEO reward continues to attract considerable attention from the media, as well as 
outraged shareholder associations. This interest has also precipitated a deluge of empirical 
research examining the sensitivity between CEO reward and performance, which has 
produced ambiguous findings. The purpose of this thesis is to empirically test and critically 
evaluate the various corporate governance practices and institutions identified liy both 
Agency Theory and the Managerial Power literatures as potential solutions to CEO reward 
'excess'. Corporate governance 'best practice' discourse continues to promulgate an 
essentially untested and un-interrogated causal logic, emanating from both ·the Agency 
Theory and Managerial Power. To this end, one of the primary aims of this thesis is to 
empirically test and critically analyse the institutional presupposition that board stroctural 
arrangements improve the management of the relationship between CEO reward and 
performance. To facilitate these research objectives, this thesis investigates longitudinally 
various structural and economic determinants of CEO reward identifieil in extant theory and 
research. Specifically, the thesis tests the main and moderating effects of three categories of 
determinants of CEO cash reward determination. The first category is firm characteristics, 
the second is ownership characteristics, and the third and final category is board structural 
characteristics. 
An additional aim of the thesis is to use a more sophisticated approach to estimating the 
relationship between CEO reward and ·performance; an approach that has been little used in 
the extant empirical literature. This study contends that the inconsistencies in the empirical 
research examining the relationship between CEO reward and performance are in part 
methodologically driven. In their review of studies on executive reward, Devers, Canella, 
Reilly, and Yoder (2007) note the prevailing inconsistencies in the empirical specification of 
the executive reward and performance relationship, particularly the variation in the 
specification of covariates, and measures of performance and reward. An examination of the 
executive reward for performance literature indicates methodological isomorphism with 
respects to parameter estimation and a strong predilection for fixed effects estimators. This 
latter approach, however, attenuates the validity of causal inference especially when used in 
relation to dynamic paneldata (see Sayrs, 1989). Recent Australian studies examining the 
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relationship between CEO reward and performance have also employed this approach. 
Merhebi et a/., (2006) report a statistically significant relationship between CEO total cash 
reward and both market and accounting return measures of company performance. However 
such findings should be regarded with caution given that the estimates that they report fail to 
account for the dynamic and. complex error structure of the empirical model used. The 
forthcoming chapters provide a further explication of these shortcomings. For our purposes, 
it is important to recognise that errors in estimation lead invariably to errors in inference. 
Therefore, in using a system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach to 
parameter estimation alongside a .commonly used fixed effects OLS approach, this thesis 
makes an important contribution by investigating the relative efficiency of a system GMM 
approach to estimation. With these general points in mind, this thesis provides a detailed 
critical review of the literature on executive reward and performance with a view to identify 
associated methodological and theoretical problems. As a more rigorous and sophisticated 
approach to parameter estimation, the system GMM stands. to buttress the validity of causal 
inference in research examining the relationship between executive reward and performance. 
Finally, after demonstrating the relative efficiency of the system GMM approach to dynamic 
panel estimation, and empirically testing and critically evaluating the structural determinism 
and institutional logic implicit ..in extant theory, the thesis concludes by proposing• a new 
avenue for future theory and research. In doing so, the study offers some speculative 
explanations for the growth and performance insensitivity of CEO cash reward and that have 
potential in terms. of shifting the locus of enquiry to the role of board decisional processes 
and capabilities. 
It is .important, at the outset, to explain why this thesis is localised to an analysis of CEO 
cash reward component of CEO total reward, even though the value of equity-based reward 
has been instrumental in driving increases in CEO total reward in recent times. Unlike 
researchers in the USA and UK, those working with Australian data do not have reliable and 
consistent time-series data on the value of new annual executive stock option grants1• 
1 E-databases such as Compustat's Execucomp, OneBanker, and Datastream provide consistent valuations of 
grant-date value share option and equity-based long-term incentive plans. This study has used the volume 
rather than the grant-date value of stock option and or share rights grants for two reasons. The first is that only 
recently· have Australian companies been required to disclose the fair value of new Stock optiOn and other 
equity-based long term incentive plans following the enactment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004. The second reason is that a survey of the 
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Before 2004, legislative disclosure requirements did not require companies to reveal the 
value of equity based long-term incentive plans. Since the enactment of CLERP9 in the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
2004, which amended the disclosure requirements in .the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
publicly listed companies have been legally required to report on such plans (see s. 
300A(l)(e)). As such, Australian researchers face a significant challenge in not having 
access to reliable large sample time-series estimates of CEO total reward before 2004. Even 
after this time, the reporting of the values of these equity based incentive plans is not 
methodologically consistent from company to company. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect CEO cash reward - which remains a significant 
proportion of ·total CEO reward - to co-vary with market and non-market firm-level 
performance criteria. This assumption is justified because since 1998 the Australian 
Corporations Law required publicly listed companies to comment on the linkages between 
executive remuneration and company performance (sees. 300A(l)(b) of Schedule I of the 
Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth), now found in the same section of the Corporations 
Act 2001). 
From an Agency Theory perspective executive cash reward for performance is a· necessary 
requirement in managing 'moral hazard', irrespective of CEO-agent ownership and stock 
options (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). Thus, while it is important to recognise the 
escalation in equity-based executive incentives, it is equally important to acknowledge that 
incentive plans that focus on short-term performance remain largely cash-based. More 
importantly still, rewards flowing from short-term casl] incentive plans shouJd, by definition, 
be more directly amenable to board determination and .review than are rewards arising from 
long-term equity-based incentive plans. As such, in the absence of reliable time series data 
on total reward levels, it is appropriate that this study of the Australian experience should 
focus on reported cash reward and its main constituents, including cash incentives. However, 
the study by no means overlooks the importance of equity-related reward, with CEO equity 
holdings being modelled as a lagged moderator of the cash reward-performance relationship. 
valuation techniques used be Australian· companies reveals inconsistencies in the methods used to arrive at 
these valuations (see Shields, 2005). 
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The study thus represents a critical departure from the existing theorisations of CEO reward 
and performance that cast board structural characteristics as critical indicators of board 
monitoring and task performance effectiveness. It also advances knowledge and research on 
CEO reward and performance by promoting a more efficient approach to the parameier 
estimation of CEO cash reward ·and performance relationship. It is hoped that these 
conceptual and methodological advancements will enable the formulation of other structural 
models encapsulating the decision processes governing other components of CEO total 
reward, particularly equity-based rewards. 
1.2 Overview· of Thesis Structure and Findings 
The thesis. comprises II chapters ·that, in combination, seek' to systematically advance the 
theoretical specification, empirical specification, and parameter estimation of the CEO cash 
reward and performance relationship in the Australian context. 
Chapter Two provides a criiical overview of the theoretical literature on CEO reward and 
performance. Much of this literature is grounded within either Agency Theory or Managerial 
Power postulates. Agency Theory provides an economic model of CEO reward 
determination, whereas the Managerial Power literature provides a socio-political 
explanatory model of CEO reward determination. Despite these differences, both bodies of 
literature advance essentially the same institutional solutions· to perceived CEO reward 
excess. This chapter provides a much needed critique of the institutional presuppositions 
underpinning these prescriptions. 
Chapter Three surveys the empirical research examining the. relationshil' between CEO 
reward and performance, on the one hand, and the factors that may moderate this 
relationship, on the other. In essence, it suggests that the extant empirical evidence is 
inconsistent and contradictory and that there has been surprisingly little attempt to reconcile 
these inconsistencies. Rather, the entire issue has been·mired in a highly normative debate 
about the appropriateness, or otherwise, of executive reward level and composition. Chal'ter 
Three offers a critique of both sides of this conceptual divide. 
Chapter Four presents and explicates an hypothesised structural and economic model of 
CEO cash reward determination developed for the purpose of empirically testing the causal 
logic and institutional presuppositions underpinning extant theory on CEO reward 
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determination. This model integrates finn, ownership, and board structural characteristics 
indentified in both Agency Theory and Managerial Po~er literatures as influencing CEO 
reward determination. Finn characteristics include accounting and market-return 
performance, finn size, and total finn risk. Ownership characteristics include the 
concentration of issued capital held by the top shareholder, top20 shareholders, and the 
CEO. Board structural characteristics include the presence of a nominati~m and remuneration 
committee, the presence of the CEO on these board sub-committees, the percentage non-
executive directors on the board, and the presence of a non-executive chairperson on the 
board. This chapter thus proposes a broader causal system encapsulating the main and 
moderating effects of research-driven structural and economic "factors including finn size, 
firm total risk, executive ownership, and ownership concentration. 
Chapter Five describes the sample, data, and research methods used to examine CEO cash 
reward and performance, and hypothesised determinants, using an open cohort of firms 
included in the Standard & Poor's! Australian Securities Exchange (S&P/ASX) 500 list over 
the period 1999-2006, inclusive .. Building on the discussions advanced in Chapter Four, this 
chapter presents an alternative approach to both the empirical specification and parameter 
estimation of the CEO cash reward and performance relationship. It argues that the 
predominant approach to model specification oversimplifies the determination of CEO 
reward. It also claims that the dominant approach· to parameter estimation " a fixed effects 
approach - does not adequately ameliorate the nature and structure of the disturbance term of 
a dynamic panel model. The chapter makes a case for applying a multi-equation system 
GMM approach to ameliorate common sources of contamination in .fixed effects estimates. 
It concludes that the generalisability of published research based on fixed "eff~cts estimates is 
highly problematic; recent research in the Australian context being no exception. 
Chapter Six reports both descriptive and inferential results from analyses examining the 
relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. The annual descriptive results 
indicate an increasing trend over the period 1999 to 2006 in. CEO total cash rewards. They 
also demonstrate that the CEOs sampled enjoyed concomitant increases in both the level of 
CEO fixed cash rewards and reported performance-based CEO cash rewards. Inferential 
multivariate regression results reveal that CEO cash reward measures are unrelated to 
separate and composite measures of finn-level performance. These results also indicate that 
CEO reward for performance estimates were not robust across different approaches to 
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parameter estimation. Fixed effects OLS estimates of the association between CEO cash 
reward and performance are significant in some model specifications and non-significant in 
others. These significant effects disappear when a system GMM approach to estimation is 
espoused. These inconsistencies lend credence to the charge that much of the research 
examining the association between CEO reward and performance may be methodologically 
flawed. Further, specification tests identify that a multi-equation approach to parameter 
estimation is a more efficient approach to examining CEO reward' and performance 
relationships. 
Chapter Seven examines the relationships between other firm characteristics and CEO cash 
reward. Consistent with the extant empirical literature, Chapter Seven investigates whether 
firm size and total firm risk as being important foci or bases of board deliberations on CEO 
cash reward level and composition. The moderator effects of firm size and firm risk on the 
relationship between these CEO cash reward outcomes. and measures of firm-level 
performance are also analysed. Contrary to expectations, and irrespective of the performance 
measures used, it finds that there are no significant moderator effects. However, firm size 
has a robust positive effect on both· the level of CEO total cash reward and the level of CEO 
reported performance-based reward. 
According to extant theory CEO share ownership may be an important consideration in 
board deliberations pertaining to CEO cash reward, especially when balancing CEO-agent 
incentives and risk (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Thus, Chapter Eight examines the main 
and moderating effect of lagged executive share ownership and participation in other equity-
based long-term incentive plans, on the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
performance. Assuming that boards make strategic choices when determining the level and 
performance~ontingency of CEO cash reward, the chapter predicts that ownership will 
negatively moderate the relationship between CEO ·cash reward and performance in general. 
A subsidiary prediction, made on the basis of Lambert and Larcker's (1987) insights, is that 
CEO ownership will have a more salient, positive, moderating effect on the relationship 
between CEO cash reward and accounting measures of firm-level performance. Contrary to 
prediction, lagged CEO stock option and share rights holdings do not appear to significantly 
moderate this relationship. Against expectations, CEO share ownership does not ·influence 
the level of reported performance based reward. However, this finding should be interpreted 
with circumspection, especially in view of the finding that reported CEO performance-based 
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cash reward are unrelated to measures commonly used by the board to determine CEO cash 
reward. 
Chapte-r Nine examines the main- and moderator effects of another type of ownership -
external ownership - on CEO cash reward and performance. Ownership concentration 
among the top shareholder and the top '20 shareholders, operationalised as a continuous 
variable, is expected to positively moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
measures of firm-level performance. The empirical results indicate that, consistent with this 
prediction, the percentage of company shares held by the largest shareholder, significantly 
and positively moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and market-return 
pe-rformance. Results also indicate that as ownership concentration among top 20 
shareholders increases, the total level of CEO total cash reward significantly decreases. 
A imniber of interventions targeting board governance practice and structural characteristics 
have been increasingly promulgated in corporate governance codes of best practice. In terms 
of their implications for the management and control of CEO cash reward and performance, 
such codes are said to allow boards to buttress the alignment between CEO and executive 
reward and fiim-level performance. In addition, boards have been required to establish task 
specific remuneration and nomination committees dominated by 'independent' directors (see 
ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). According to proponents - and consistent with 
the tenets of Agency Theory - these board governance interventions enhance the board's 
ability to exercise independent judgment and engage in effective monitoring, and thus 
subject CEO behaviour to effective performance incentives. In these respects, the results 
that Chapter Ten presents· are most revealing. -F-irstly, they_ show that the diffusion of 
corporate governance codes of best practice has been far-reaching. Secondly, and 
conversely, the results also show that boards that have adopted these purported board 
governance best practices are no more efficient in aligning CEO cash rewards to measures of 
firm-level performance than are boards that have not done so. Having an independent 
chairperson, a large percentage of non-executive directors (irrespective of their· stock 
holdings), non-executive dominated remuneration or nomination committees, does not 
significantly and positively moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and _firm-
level performance, nor do these factors significantly negatively predict the level of CEO total 
cash reward. From these results, it can be· inferred that mandating board structural 
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independence does not necessarily enhance the board's capability to effectively manage 
CEO cash reward and performance. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter Eleven, considers these empirical findings in light of the 
logic of hypothesised structural and economic model of CEO reward determination proposed 
in Chapter Four. Overall, it is argued that the structural and economic models of CEO 
reward determination lack explanatory power. It also argues that extant empirical 
inconsistencies are in part attributable to the methodological isomorphic predilection for 
using a fixed effects approach to model estimation and specification in extant research in this 
domain. Following on from this discussion, the chapter considers the study's overall 
limitations and implications for theory, _practice, and future. research. Accordingly, further 
research is recommended to ascertain: i) the basis on which the board actually evaluate CEO 
performance: ii) which performance measure(s) are used;_ iii) the extent to which their 
performance judgments are based on these criteria; and iv) the extent to which boards' 
evaluations of CEO performance are then used to determine CEO cash rewards. 
1.3 Conclusion 
This thesis is the first of its kind to rigorously test the effects of various firm, ownership, and 
board structural characteristics on CEO cash reward using a system GMM approach to 
estimation. This thesis empirically tests and critically evaluates the continuing 
preoccupation with board structural characteristics as criterion-valid indicators of board 
effectiveness to manage the association between CEO reward and performance. The 
findings presented in this thesis challenge the supposition in extant corporate governance 
codes of best practice that board structural characteristics can help militate against C:EO 
reward excess. In other words, this thesis questions the presupposition that board structural 
characteristics intended to improve board monitoring and decisional processes necessarily 
moderate the relationship between CEO reward and performance. 
There is no doubt that recent corporate governance interventions and codes of best practice 
in Australia provide an interesting context for examining the conceptual and empirical 
contours of CEO cash reward and performance management. The study represents the first 
attempt to examine longitudinally, and using a more rigorous approach to parameter 
estimation, the main and interactive effects of board structural characteristics; characteristics 
purported to enhance the efficacy of board monitoring and decision-making in relation to 
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CEO reward. The results from the Australian domain indicate that one critical component of 
CEO total reward - cash reward - is insensitive to both past performance and board 
structure. 
These results question whether board structural characteristics necessarily precipitate board 
rational and strategic choice in the management of CEO cash reward and performance. 
Indeed, the findings suggest that board structural characteristics have been ineffectual in 
moderating the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance, and that this 
remains the case. These findings hold considerable significance for both governance theory 
and regulatory practice, and for the structural determinism underpinning both. While 
governance theory and best practice prescriptions have continued to centre on board 
structural characteristics - most notably, board ·independence - as predictors of board 
monitoring and decisional effectiveness, there is no evidence that these prescriptions have 
actually led to CEO cash rewards becoming more performance-contingent. In essence, the 
widely embraced assumption that boards exhibiting greater structural independence may be 
more effective 'stewards' of owner interests may be 'too good to be true'. 
II 
Chapter Two 
Theoretical Perspectives on CEO Reward and Performance: Insights and 
Oversights 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One outlines the underlying rationale and guiding premise of this thesis. While a 
number of studies examine factors that moderate the CEO reward and performance 
relationship, it is argued that a cogent theoretical model is still lacking. Berry (1993) 
suggests that theory acts as a frame of reference for model specification, and parameter 
estimation. He also maintains that theory construction is pivotal for judging model 
specification and estimation, and that any shortcomings identified in a theoretical 
specification can result in the specification of the wrong functional form as well as an 
inefficient approach to parameter estimation. 
To this end, this chapter delineates the theoretical assumptions, prescriptions, predictions, 
and omissions of each of the two dominant theoretical perspectives relating to CEO reward 
and performance. It does so with a view to improving the theoretical specification of CEO 
reward and performance and to develop a more integrated and comprehensive theoretical 
framework on CEO rewards and performance. Following this, it is argued that the distance 
between Agency Theory and the Managerial Power Model may not be as great as the 
protagonists commonly assume and that both approaches have legitimate roles to play in 
enhancing our understanding of the complex internal and external determinants of executive 
reward practice. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
The tenets of Agency Theory have important implications for understanding CEO reward 
determination processes. Agency Theory postulates have also played a pivotal role in both 
research and corporate governance regulation concerning CEO reward and performance, 
particularly in its prescription for a greater emphasis on performance-contingent rewards as 
the antidote for executive agent opportunism and effort aversion (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
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Agency Theory construes the 'firm' as a 'legal fiction which serve[s] as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310), and where 
inputs are coordinated to create outputs that are shared among inputs (Fama, 1980: 290). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the modern corporation is characterised by the 
separation of ownership from control. That is, diversified and dispersed owners delegate the 
day-to-day management Of the firm to hired agents. An AgencyRe/ationship transpires when 
'one or more persons [principals] engage another person [agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent' (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976:308). 
In the large to medium-sized Australian public •companies sampled in this. study, firm 
ownership is separated from the day-to-day control of the company, which is delegated to 
salaried executives. Fama and Jensen (1983), eminent Agency Theorists, argue that it is 
inefficient for diffuse and diversified principals or shareholders to assume direct 
responsibility for their firm's decisions, and consequently, decision.control (monitoring and 
ratifYing) and management (initiating and implementing). By delegating this control to· 
manager-agents, principals thus bear the risks and the wealth effects of agent operational, 
strategic, and financial management and control of the company (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 
304). By extension, principals are deemed the residual claimants of the difference between 
costs and revenue (Fama, 1980), that transpires from manager-agents efforts to coordinate 
inputs from suppliers, creditors, employees, customers and to maximise the firm's present 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Agency Theory posits manager agents are 
more inclined to act in their own interests at the expense of the interests of principals. 
A key premise of Agency Theory is that manager agents are sagacious 'utility maximisers', 
and that they are self-motivated, boundedly rational, and risk-averse (Eisenhardt, 
1989;Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988). Agents are thus considered to derive 
considerable disutility from expending effort and bearing risk in order to advance the 
interests of principals (Fama, 1980). This body of literature assumes that as .controllers of 
organisational information, CEO,agents are able to exploit their knowledge and make 
strategic choices and fmancial decisions that may deviate from principal wealth creation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Behaviours that deviate from principals' interests include 
shirking, manipulating cost. controls, budgets and performance standards, pursuing 
conglomerate mergers and low volatility projects, an over consumption of pecuniary and 
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non-pecuniary benefits, and transferring wealth from stockholders to dept holders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988). 
An added complication is that dispersed principals are not in a position to directly monitor 
and evaluate agents' management and control of the firm. The resultant information 
asymmetry makes it difficult for diversified principals to detect managerial opportunism, or 
to discern suboptimal or optimal· managerial behaviour·and ability (Fama, 1980; Levinthal, 
1988), which, in tum, presents principals with the twin problems of 'adverse selection' (i.e. 
limited knowledge of the potential executive hire's real ability) and 'moral hazard' 
(Holstrom, 1979) - that is, limited information and certainty about, and control over, agent 
behaviour once appointed. Further, this information asymmetry makes it very difficult for 
principals to detect managerial opportunism. This means that principals can only infer moral 
hazard from the difference between costs and revenue, and the firm's value in capital 
markets. Costs of the firm also include costs associated with enforcing mechanisms to 
discipline managerial opportunism, and limit managerial discretion. Agency costs are also 
said to vary from firm to firm, with the degree of cost depending on the. ease with which 
managers can advance their own preferences over those of principals, and the ease and cost 
of devising, monitoring and incentive mechanisms that are designed to limit aberrant 
activities of manager-agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 328). Therefore agency costs not 
only encapsulate residual loss, but also costs involved in designing and implementing 
disciplinary mechanisms to constrain agent opportunism. 
According to Agency Theory, the responsibility to alleviate agency problems is conferred 
upon the board of directors. The board Of directors can align the interests of pFincipals and 
CEO-agents in two ways that essentially encompass CEO reward and performance 
management. Firstly, it can control and discipline agent opportunism .through direct 
monitoring and behavioural observation. Secondly, the board can induce an alignment of 
interests by providing the manager-agents with results-based financial incentives or 
executive incentive contracts to increase shareholder wealth. Agency theory however 
underscores the minimisation of residual loss and agency costs as an important criterion for 
defining the. effectiveness of the board's governance of the agency relationship. Thus 
providing cost-effective performance incentives, as well as controlling the CEO-agent's 
company strategy formulation and execution, and operational and financial management, are 
important requirements for the effective governance of the agency relationship. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) maintain that. the board can maintain control over manager-agents 
by demarcating decision control from decision monitoring. They refer to the board's 
responsibility to ratify and monitor executive decision and strategic management as 
'decision and strategic control' (1983: 308). Executive agents, on the other hand, are 
responsible for the 'strategic and decision management' ofthe company (Fama and Jensen, 
1983: 308). This demarcation of responsibilities enables the board to be 'the apex of the 
'decision control system' and have the power to hire, fire and reward executives an_d the CEO 
in an attempt to prevent them from expropriating the interests of residual claimants (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983: 311): In short, it is the board's responsibility to monitor, motivate and 
discipline agent opportunism. 
Besides monitoring agents, the board of directors is also responsible for managing agent 
rewards by specifying the performance criteria for such rewards, and thus measuring agent 
performance against the criteria specified to determine rewards (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 
310). Agency Theory also considers executive incentive contracts as an 'important 
mechanism to control agency costs, mi.d aligri the interests ,of executive agents and 
shareholders. Agency Theory·in its prescription for executive. incentive contracts, assumes 
that CEO reward is instrumental in ameliorating agent opportunism and risk and effort 
aversion. As suggested earlier however, it is important for the 'board to optimise executive 
incentive contracts. 'Optimal contracting' is the cornerstone of Agency Theory and 
ostensibly a key responsibility of the board. Optimal contracting, which is seen as a product 
of arm's length bargaining and board rationality and strategic choice, occurs when risk-
averse agents are provided ·with cost-effective reward arrangements that incentivise 
shareholder wealth creation. In other words, increasing the level of reward at risk provides 
performance improvements that, through self-funding, offset the cost of any increase in 
incentive reward (Abowd, 1990: 53). 
Agency Theory also assumes that· executive incentive contracts serve as an important 
disciplinary mechanism by virtue of ex post settling up. According to Fama (1980) 
executive incentives contracts reflect ex ante, the expected value of the executive's marginal 
product ( 1980: 299). However, in an attempt to reduce moral hazard, the board is assumed 
to adjust executive rewards according to whether the ex ante expected value of the 
executive's marginal product, specified at the beginning of the performance period, deviates 
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from the ex post measurement of the executive's marginal product (Fama, 1980: 299). 
Further, Agency Theory assumes that anticipated wage revisions, and the potential for 
downward adjustments in executive reward in the event of poor performance, act to optimise 
executive performance. The notion of 'ex post setting up' also implies executiverewards are 
conditional on the executive's measured marginal product (Fama, 1980), and thus it is 
reasonable to predict that CEO rewards will, ceteris paribus, co-vary with firm performance. 
Agency Theory predicts that managerial or executive reward will vary according to firm-
level performance because it.assumes, based on the premise of moral hazard, agent actions 
are unobservable and that the effects of such actions are necessarily inferred from firm-level 
performance. Thus, executive. reward for performance is an important requirement to 
minimise moral hazard, and to provide . effective executive perfornl:ince 'incentives, even 
though the agent may be provided with existing incentives from firm share ownership, and 
firm stock options (Aggarwal and Samwick, l999a: 66-67). 
Agency Theorists also maintain that agent ownership intuitively acts as a more direct 
mechanism to align the interest of agents and principals. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 353) 
suggest that stock options and executive shareholdings maximise joint utility for agents and 
principals by facilitating simultaneous wealth increases. Executive stock options, consistent 
with Agency Theory, are issued on the premise that they align the interests of shareholders 
and agents by providing incentives for agents to raise the value of the underlying stock 
(Oviatt, 1988). Agency Theory does however recognise that agents may have pre-existing 
incentives to manage the company effectively. For example, value destroying agent 
behaviour may be constrained by disciplinary mechanisms emanating from the managerial 
labour market, market for corporate control, and regulatiOn, and reputation costs more 
generally. 
Agency Theory predicts that where incentives are applied, executive reward outcomes will 
be aligned to shareholder wealth ex post. This logic has extended to empirical research 
where the sensitivity between CEO reward and firm-level, market-return performance 
metrics has become an index of optimal contracting. High sensitivity signifies a firm's 
commitment to incentivising shareholder value creation (Lippert and Porter, 1997:127); the 
greater the sensitivity, the greater the alignment of,principal and agent interests. In recent 
times corporate governance reforms have accentuated the pressure on boards to make CEO 
reward more perfoirnance contingent. 
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Agency Theory also makes an implicit assumption that the sensitivity of executive reward is 
conditional on a range of contextual and situational factors negotiated by the board of 
directors, and that in some contexts executive incentive contracts may be less effective. In 
other words, Agency Theory recognises that contextual and situational factors can attenuate 
the sensitivity of executive reward to lagged performance. 
Agency Theory assumes that the board of directors manage the agency relationship with a: 
view to minimise agency costs and prompt tradeoffs between executive incentive contracts 
and direct monitoring. Eisenhardt ( 1989) maintains that in some circumstances the direct 
monitoring and behavioural appraisal of agents may be extremely difficult, thus impelling 
the board to seek to control agent behaviours primarily through results-based financial 
incentives. Eisenhardt ( 1989) further argues that director 'stewards' may seek to manage the 
prospect of residual loss by substituting control mechanisms. For instance, direct monitoring 
is assumed to be more efficient when the CEO's job performance is less complex and 
characterised by low task programmability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Zajac and Westphal (1994: 
121) show that there are 'diminishing behavioural returns' associate with higher levels of 
incentive rewardin.firms where there is a high variance in stock returns. They also suggest 
that firms with complex corporate strategies face diminishing 'behavioural returns' to 
increases in monitoring. Gerhart and Rynes (2003) further suggest that it is even more 
difficult to monitor CEOs, let alone identify desired managerial behaviours, when the firm's 
business is diversified across a range of product and service markets. Tevlin (1996) finds 
that external ownership concentration may precipitate tradeoffs between result-based 
incentives for external monitvring of concentrated shareholders. Notwithstanding these 
decisional challenges, under Agency Theory result-based executive contracts are typically 
deemed to be the preferred solution to overcoming tension inherent in agency relationships 
(Holstrom, 1979). For this reason, Agency Theory has given rise to a torrent of research 
examining the sensitivity of executive reward to market-return performance. 
Agency Theory recognises that the sensitivity of CEO reward to firm-level performance 
depends also on agent risk bearing. According to a behavioural model of Agency Theory, 
risk bearing refers to the agent's perceived risk taking, and the potential for loss of wealth 
(Larraza-Kintina, Wiseman et a/., 2007; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Larraza-
Kintina et a/., (2007: 1002) suggest that agent risk bearing is a positive function of the 
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agent's perceived employment risk, and second, the agent's perceived compensation risk or 
the unpredictability of future earnings. 
Agency Theory postulates that agents are risk averse, and that the efficacy of executive 
incentive contracts in motivating shareholder value creation is contingent on agent risk-
bearing stemming from agent ownership in the firm (Lambert and Larker, 1987; Tevlin, 
1996) and the variance of the firm's performance (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). 
Aggarwal and Samwick imply that in order for the board of directors to account for agent 
risk-bearing in the management of the relationship between reward and performance, they 
would necessarily have to examine the variance of the performance measure (1999a: 77). In 
turn, the highly observed variance of firm performance may require that the agent receive 
additional fixed reward or a risk premium to dissuade them from leaving the company 
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Similarly, Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that lowering the 
'sharing rate' (i.e. the incremental relationship between CEO reward and shareholder gains) 
may provide a stronger incentive effect because a high sharing rate transfers undue 
compensation risk to agents to the point that they may avoid high net present value projects 
(see also Canyon and Sadler, 2001). Since boards are charged with the difficult task of 
balancing agent risk and performance incentives in a cost-effective way, the board has to 
judge whaLievel of executive-reward for performance is sub'optimal in terms ~of agent risk 
preferences, and what level of compensation at risk (incentive reward) will provide agent 
incentives to act in the interests rather than against the interests of principals. 
Overall, such considerations recognise that both the effects of firm-performance measures on 
CEO reward depend on other factors.. In this regard, the theoretical precepts underpinniog 
Agency Theoretic prescriptions both promote and limit the level of results-based executive 
incentives or performance-contingent rewards. As shown in Exhibit 2.1, presents a graphical 
representation of this logic. The sensitivity of CEO reward to measures of finn-level 
performance is indexed by the slope coefficient b. The: steeper the slope and the higher the 
value of b, the lower the intercept, a, is likely to be ·and the greater the sensitivity of reward 
to performance. The intercept represents the average amount of CEO reward that is not 
performance contingent. It follows that while the intercepUerm will always be a positive 
integer, as the intercept term increases, the slope coefficient decreases (Abowd, 1990). In 
light of these considerations above, it seems improbable that a perfect linear relationship 
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exists between CEO reward and performance (i.e. b~J). Consistent with the assumptions of 
linearity,reward cannot be purely performance-based unless the intercept, a, equals zero. 
Exhibit 2.1 Strength of Reward-Performance Sensitivities 
CEO 
Reward 
a 
a 
y 
Shareholder Wealth 
b High sensitivity 
b Low sensitivity 
X 
While Agency Theory promotes executive incentive contracts and direct monitoring by the 
board as important mechanisms to limit agency costs and the residual loss incurred by 
principals, it also recognises that the board of directors may not be effective in the 
governance of the agency relationship. Upon closer examination, Agency Theory is also 
predicated on institutional logic and structural determinism. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
suggest that having internal managers on the board is important in (erms of providing firm-
specific. knowledge and expertise, but highly problematic from manager-agent reward and 
performance management perspective. Fama and Jensen further suggest that 'outside' board 
directors have a pivotal role to play in setting internal manager rewards, and also limiting the 
discretion and influence of internal managers can have on such decisions (1983: 315) 
According to both Fama (1980) and Eisenhardt (1989) 'outside' directors have a stronger 
capability to objectively monitor the CEO, measure and reward CEO performance. By 
extension, Fama (1980) suggests that 'outside' directors have greater incentives to be more 
diligent in monitoring in internal managers because the m]!rket for their services prices them 
according to their performance as 'referees' (1980: 294). 
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In summary, Agency Theory is predicated on the presupposition that board structural 
arrangements are an important boundary condition for executive reward-performance 
sensitivity. Structural characteristics such as having a large proportion of outside directors 
on the board, are associated with objective CEO performance evaluation and ·determination 
of CEO reward to "revive effective governance" (Bilimoria, I 997: 852). This implies that 
structural characteristics enhance the governance of the agency relationship by enabling 
diligent board monitoring, rational and strategic choice, and tum providing the conditions for 
optimal contracting. 
While Agency theory has made a significant contribution to our understanding of CEO 
reward and performance, it has a number of general shortcomings that must be 
acknowledged. 
The first problem relates to structural determination. Agency theory recognises that board 
directors may not always manage and control executive reward and performance effectively, 
and attributes board decisional and monitoring deficits to board structural characteristics. It 
also presupposes that board structural arrangements enable the board to .act dutifully, 
rationally, and make strategic choices and objective judgments. when managing and 
controlling CEO reward and performance relationship. This institutional presupposition has 
become the edifice of corporate governance codes of best practice within and beyond 
Australia in recent times, even though it remains empirically uncorroborated. 
A second and related problem is. that while directors do have a collective legal and ethical 
responsibility to manage the agency problem, and to ratify and monitor agent decision and 
strategic management (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the assumption that they can validly and 
reliably reward CEOs.on the basis of performance may be overly optimistic. This assumes a 
priori, that they have the capabilities to select valid measures against which .they reliably 
evaluate CEO performance. Further, executive incentive contracts are assumed ex post, to 
be predicated on an outcome-based agent performance evaluation. However, it remajns 
unclear to what extent agents are rewarded for performance, how performance is measured, 
whether board judgments are necessarily objective, and finally whether the intended 
incentive effects of results-based incentives are ultimately realised via ex post performance 
improvements. 
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Lambert and Larcker (1987) offer a number of insightful caveats against Agency Theory 
assumptions regarding the board's selection of criterion measures to evaluate CEO 
performance. Agency Theory perpetuates a uni-dimensional construction of performance. 
Performance based compensation contracts, subj eel to agent risk preferences, are assumed to 
induce agent effort, decisions, and actions, which are compatible with principals' interests 
(Lambert and.Larker, 1987). Thus the model suggests that executive incentive contracts are 
a function, in{er alia, of performance ·evaluation. Given the 'noise' attendant. to the 
performance evaluation of agents based exclusively on share performance, it is intuitive for 
boards to specifY additional non-market performance measures to make more attributions 
about agent actions and decisions (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). .Market performance is 
considered .to accord most closely with Agency Theory logic. However, Lambert and 
Larcker suggest that it is difficult to discern, with any rigour or precision, the extent to which 
market performance is attributable to agent actions and decisions. They maintain that boards 
place differential weight on accounting and market-return measures of performance. They 
(I 987: I 07) suggest that the relative weight placed on· accounting versus market measure's is 
a function of: 
i) .evaluations of the sensitivity of performance measures to noise versus agent actions 
and decisions, which involves examining the variance of firm performance ; 
ii) the business cycle of the firm, and its investment activity, such that market measures 
.are preferred when accounting measures do not reflect agent actions and decisions in 
the' performance period; 
iii) executive ownership, given that agent holdings provide incentives to improve 
market performance and may spur the use of alternative measures. 
These. authors allude to the possibility thai. the Agency Theory overlooks the possibility of 
differential sensitivity; that is, specific reward components may be differentially sensitive to 
accounting and market measures. Agency Theory oversimplifies the dimensionality of 
performance and nuances of executive incentive contracts, and thus ignores the possibility 
that different components of total reward can have different performance conditions, and an 
array of incentive effects. Ostensibly, these omissions have important implications for the 
functional fonri and parameter estimators used to' gauge the average sensitivity of executive 
reward to prior performance. This is an important focus of discussion in Chapter Five. 
Agency theory is also problematic in terms of the assumption of ownership dispersion 
among principals, since it does not take cognisance of variation in ownership structure. 
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Ownership concentration may well have implications for the internal governance of the 
board, as well as the board's management of CEO rewards. As we will see in Chapter 
Three, recent research furnishes suggests that external ownership concentration is an 
important determinant of CEO reward level and composition. 
The theoretical literature on CEO reward and performance has been dominated by financial 
economists and legal academics who tend. to assume that external ownership is fairly 
dispersed. It is believed that there may be substantial benefits in conceptualising CEO 
reward and performance from a multi-disciplinary perspective. For example, concepts from 
applied psychology can be used to provide greater insight into the relationship between the 
board and large external block-holders. In a discussion ·of social facilitation theories, 
Haslam (2007) maintains that the performance ·of people being evaluated is invariably 
influenced by the perceived loss of approval or, conversely, the perceived acceptance of 
those monitoring performance. It· is thus conceivable that ownership concentration will 
provide directors with greater incentives to pursue optimal contracting, such that the level of 
performance-insensitive CEO rewards is reduced. As such, a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework of CEO reward determination may require a more multi-disciplinary 
foundation. 
Having examined the key postulates of the Agency Theory, we can now tum to examine the 
second and, to some, the main alternative theoretical perspective on CEO reward and 
performance management, namely Managerial Power Theory. 
2.3 Managerial Power Model: An Alternative. Framework or Extension to Agency 
Theory? 
The Managerial Power model posits that the determination of CEO rewards primarily 
reflects the contours of organisational power and politics, especially power relativities 
between CEOs, board members, and external shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2002; 2004; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein· and Hambrick, 1988; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; 
Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Gumbel, 2006). 
Management Power Theory incorporates two pivotal assumptions, which are purported to 
challenge Agency Theory notions of optimal contracting. Firstly, it emphasises the 
contradictory position occupied by the board itself, its vulnerability to executive influence, 
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and the potential for board complicity in offering overly generous or sub-optimal levels of 
reward.- Secondly the Managerial Power perspective is sceptical of 'arms-length bargaining' 
over the terms and conditions of executive employment. This approach questions whether 
boards either can or wish to exercise sufficient control over the implementation and 
management of reward decisions so. that they do not deviate from shareholder interests. 
USA law academics Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (2002, 2004), contend that persistent 
findings of weak or non-existent reward-performance sensitivity are consistent with their 
view that the determination of incentive contracts and CEO rewards deviate from notions of 
optimal contracting. In essence, they propose.that CEO power (especially relative to that of 
shareholder and non-executive board members) is positively related to. the level of reward 
and to reward performance insensitivity. Bebchuk and Fried (2002; 2004) assert that CEO 
reward can become decoupled from performance, especially when the CEO has power to 
influence both the structure and level in such a way that is suboptimal to shareholders and 
discordant to optimal contracting. 
Thus 'rent extraction~' a central construct in Managerial_ Power Theory, occurs when agents 
appropriate surplus or rents beyond their arm's length negotiations with their company 
boards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2002). In Agency Theoretic terms, this systematic over-reward, 
in the absence of concomitant performance to offset such a cost, exacerbates the moral 
hazard and residual loss incurred by the principals. The claim, in essence, is that CEOs 
exercise undue influence over how their reward is set, constrained only by the possibility of 
shareholder 'outrage' if they are caught extracting rents. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2002; 2004) identify three main features of 'rent extraction' and 'pay 
without performance': (i) 'stealth compensation'; (ii) 'perverse incentives'; and (iii) board 
complicity. Regarding stealth compensation, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) identify 
arrangements by which CEOs are able to extract disguised and deferred income in the form 
of generous sign-on payments (or 'golden hellos'), speciaJ.retirement benefits, retention and 
long-service bonuses, no-interest company loans, post-termination consulting fees, special 
payments for termination following takeover or merger (or 'golden parachutes'), and the 
like. They reserve particular criticism for retirement benefits which are not performance-
linked, which are excluded. from the annual remuneration reports and, hence, from reward-
performance sensitivity estimates, and which thus create false readings of both annual 
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reward level and incentive sensitivity (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005, 848, 851-52). Stealth 
compensation also acts as a risk premium to offset the additional risk stemming from 
increased level of incentive reward. In other words, increasing the level of performance-
based reward exacerbates further residual loss for principals as CEO-agents engage in self-
protecting behaviours that maximise their wealth and minimise 'their risk exposure, and in so 
doing destroy the ex ante purpose of incentives in the first place. 
In this respect, Bebchuk and Fried (2002; 2004) are especially·critical of the widespread use 
imd abuse of executive option plans. In support of their case, they point to the continued 
prevalence of unrestricted option plans in US companies (which deliver undeserved windfall 
gains to option holders in rising markets); option exercise prices set at grant: date market 
prices, options without non-exercise periods (which encourage speculative behaviour by 
allowing executives to unwind holdings at will); plans which allow for the re-pricing of 'out-
of-the-money' options, and the dearth of indexed options which filter out general market 
movements. Further, exponents of the Managerial Power perspective contend that even 
where hurdles are applied, these tend to use absolute rather than relative targets (\Vhich in 
bull markets will deliver windfall gains) and are frequently softened ('retested') to ensure 
payout despite declining firm performance (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Indjejikian and 
Nanda, 2002). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) also highlight ihe use of automatic 'reloading' of 
options following exercise of an existing option holding. Contrary to optimal contracting, 
agents can insulate themselves from downside risk, while boards fail to apply cost effective 
performance incentives: Incentive distortions, by default, contradict the purported ·benefits 
of equity-based long'term incentive plans raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
According to exponents of the Managerial Power perspective, boards are passive and 
compliant in the face of CEO power, and thus help facilitate systematic rent extraction and 
stealth compensation. Conceivably 'over time, CEOs and the Board members may develop 
mutual trust and begin to attach value to the relationship that goes beyond the purely 
economic value created by transaction' (Tosi eta/., 2000: 302). Further, issues of power 
may interfere with, or dilute the performance incentive, designed to ameliorate agency 
problems and thus the enforcement of optimal contracts (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). 
In this regard, CEO reward, far from being an artifact of arm's length contracting per se, is 
essentially a product of Managerial Power. Consequently, Managerial Power inhibits the 
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board's capacity to enforce optimal contracts, and thus to provide effective performance 
incentives. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004)·delineate a number of board governance practices and conditions 
which can facilitate executive 'capture' of board decision-making, whereby an incumbent· 
CEO can hamper the boards diligence in pursuing optimal contracting to the point that it 
induces board complicity in decoupling reward from firm performance. First, dispersed 
external ownership removes external pressure from the board to serve shareholder interests. 
Second, interlocking boards' stand· to remove downward pressure on reward levels. Third, 
CEO/Board chairperson duality -• a common feature of USA corporations - ·confers 
substantial power on the CEO, which makes the board more likely to err on the side of the 
CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2002). Fourth, having a high proportion of inside directors- that 
is, internally recruited directors - stands to enhance Managerial Power precisely because 
such directors are or have been salaried executives of the firm. However, outside directors 
may be beholden to the incumbent CEO in that she/he may have .influenced their 
appointment. CEOs may also influence the nomination of outside directors by supporting 
those candidates who are demographically similar to themselve~ and who are thus less likely 
to engage in oppositional action. Consistent with Agency Theory, the Managerial Power 
perspective posits that different board configurations affect the board's management if the 
relationship between CEO reward and performance. 
The Managerial Power model also posits that the threat of shareholder disapproval 
('outrage') precipitates camouflage practices intended to legitimate high employment and 
post employment reward as necessary. 'retention' incentives or they structure reward to. 
escape transparency of disclosure mandates: 
"We have argued that managers' ability to overpay themselves and to 
decouple their pay from performance, and the magnitude of the 
resulting costs .to shareholders, depends on the extent to which flaws 
in compensation arrangements are widely recognised by outsiders. 
Thus, how much executives can get away with depends on the degree 
to which outsiders are aware of the distortions in compensation 
2 Such as there one CEO serves on the- board of company B and the CEO of firm B serves on the board of 
company A. 
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arrangements. that managers seek to camouflage." .(Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004: 199) 
External reward consultants are said to play a significant role in camouflaging CEO stealth 
compensation. It is suggested that the CEO can control the flow of information to the 
company board by influencing therecommendations of reward consultants (see Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004). It is not atypical for CEOs to be in charge of appointing external compensation 
consultants to provide information to the board's remuneration committee, and, as such, 'the 
information presented and the way it is framed will be chosen with an eye toward 
maximising manager's compensation' (Bebchuk and Fried, 2002: 21). Coffee (2006:1) 
offers some provocative views relating to consultants who inform and advise the board, 
asserting that 'all board directors are prisoners to their gatekeepers': 
"The board of directors in the United States is today composed of 
directors who are essentially part-time prisoners with other demanding 
responsibilities. So structured, the board is blind, except to the extent 
that the corporation's managers or its independent gatekeepers adyise it 
of impending problems." (Coffee, 2006: 7) 
Thus,_ 'independent' reward consultants who are employed by the corporation to procure 
reward proposals and recommendations in conjunction with the top management team for 
directors may actually compromise board independence. Furthermore, as the impenetrable 
prose of many a company annual report/proxy statement attests, the language used by 
professional gatekeepers may serve to confuse board m_embers and shareholders alike, and 
obscure rather than illuminate the true basis of executive reward determination. 
While Agency Theory prescribes result-based performance incentives as a primary 
mechanism to manage the agency relationship, the Managerial Power perspective suggests 
that executive incentive plans are themselves vulnerable to managerial opportunism and do 
not automatically guarantee shareholder alignment. Accordingly, the Managerial Power 
model prescribes corporate governance interventions that aim to buttress the. board's 
capacity to enforce optimal contracts. These interventions .aim to restore director incentives 
to assert shareholder interests over those of the incumbent CEO, and to make directors more 
'independent' primarily through structural reforms. 
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Bebchuk and Fried (2002; 2004) recommend a number ·of governance interventions to 
mitigate rent-extraction and incentive distortion. These prescriptions include: increasing 
shareholder power by allowing them to vote on reward arrangements; using indexed options 
and relative_ performance measures; increasing the transparency of CEO rewards to tighten 
the outrage constraint, especially post-employment arrangements; mandatory and timely 
disclosure of the unloading of shares and options; regular reviewing of the charter of the 
remuneration committee to buttress the· alignment of peifomiance and reward; endowing 
shareholders with greater power to influence board director re'appointment; increasing the 
proportion of independent directors; increasing equity ownership on the board; and removing 
CEOs from remuneration and nomination committees. In addition, exponents of the 
Managerial Power perspective, while acknowledging· the role of the capital markets in 
assessing firm performance and agency costs, argue that these forces are 'too remote to 
withstand managerial opportunism. Indeed, the distal nature of market factors enables 
executives and complicit boards to camouflage rent extniction (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
As such,- and contrary to Agency Theory, the Managerial Power view predicts a positive 
relationship between Managerial Power and the level of CEO peiformance-decoupled 
reward, and by extension a weak relation between reward and performance. By implication, 
the Managerial Power approach predicts continued growth in the level of CEO rewards, and 
a further decoupling of CEO rewards from performance. 
While the Managerial Power approach offers potentially valuable insights on the psycho-
political association between the CEO and board members and the factors that can attenuate 
the relationship between CEO rewards and performance, it too has a number of conceptual. 
and explanatory shortcomings. 
Like Agency Theory, the Managerial Power 'approach assumes principal dispersion, and 
does not evince the ways in which ownership concentration can influence internal corporate 
governance and CEO rewards. As suggested above, external block-holders may have a 
significant role to play in shaping board governance practices as well as influencing the 
board's management of CEO reward and performance. While _the Managerial Power 
perspectives make some progress towards this in its explication of the 'outrage constraint', it 
does not elucidate the impact of ownership concentration on the decisional processes that 
determine CEO reward ouicomes. It may be suggested that this is because, like Agency 
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Theory, the Managerial Power thesis is predicated on.the supposition the extemal.owners are 
widely dispersed. 
The Managerial Power approach attributes the board:s inability to resist managerial 
influence chiefly to compromised board governance practices. Accordingly, exponents 
suggest that CEOs should be removed from remuneration and nomination .committees to 
redress nonnative pressures for board complicity. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) imply that non-
executive directors are positive intermediaries in the principal-agent problem only when 
board structural independence is maintained: by removing CEO from remuneration ~nd 
nomination committee, and by ensuring board chair-CEO role separation. However, this in 
tum overstates the capacity of board structural independence to control growth in CEO 
rewards and to positively moderate the reward performance relationship. Although, even 
where these conditions are met, it is equally plausible. that boards will still not have the 
capability to structure effective incentives for CEOs, or have the requisite skills and abilities 
to reward CEOs on the basis of valid and reliable performance measurement The solutions 
proffered to ameliorate Managerial Power and CEO entrenchment, which focuses on board 
governance structures, assume that 'independent' directors exercise effective management 
and control of CEO reward and performance. The implication is that board practices aimed 
to enhance board independence from executive agents, do not necessarily result in effective 
decisional processes to optimise CEO reward and performance processes is a proposition 
which will be taken up in detail in forthcoming chapters. In this regard, the Managerial 
Power Perspectives shares a number of criticisms levelled against Agency Theory presented 
above. 
Perkins and Hendry (2005) also questions whether boards can themselves scrutinise the 
merits and demerits of different reward proposals, as well as the validity ofreward data and 
survey. According to Murphy (2002), boards favour stock options chiefly because they see 
them as .low-cost and are ignorant of the economic and opportunity costs involved. Murphy 
also advances several reasons for U.S. board reluctance to embrace presents indexed option 
plans. First, they are costly to set up. Second, they lack appeal and incentive effectiveness 
because they ·are perceived by agents to have a low probability of payout Thirdly, 
conventional options are used. more frequently because, having a fixed exercise price, they 
incur no accounting charge (Murphy, 2002: 857). This last point is especially compelling in 
that it suggests that the Managerial Power Thesis is not sufficient to explain the use of 
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conventional option plans. On this basis, the underlying problem may be board financial 
illiteracy rather than executive capture of board processes. 
While it attempts to challenge the postulates of Agency Theory prescriptions, Managerial 
Power prescriptions for ameliorating CEO entrenchment on the board still assume, a priori, 
that board structural characteristics will restore board stewardship and enhance. the ability to 
effectively manage CEO reward and performance. Reward without performance can also be 
explained more simply in complex dynamic board decision processes, where boards appraise 
a myriad of factors in their deliberations pertaining to .CEO reward and performance. Even 
when board governance is based on best practice prescriptions, there· is no guarantee that the 
reward decisions made by 'independent' board members will be valid and reliable. 
Independent directors can still 'get it wrong'. As such, it is equally plausible that 
performance decoupled CEO reward may be a methodological artefact of the 
misspecification of the CEO reward and performance relationship. This contention is 
developed in Chapter Five. 
In sum, the Managerial .Power Thesis is also susc~ptible to similar criticisms to those 
levelled at the Agency Theory. Both perspectives share a number of assumptions. even 
though Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggest otherwise. As highlighted above, Agency Theory 
recognises that potential for internal managers on the board to interfere with the enforcement 
of executive incentive contracts (See Fama and Jensen, 1983). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
overstate the distinctions between these two theoretical perspectives, their postulates, and 
prescriptions, and thus their complementarities. 
2.4 Synthesising Agency Theory and the Managerial Power Approach. 
Despite their interpretative differences, Agency Theory and Managerial Power perspectives 
actually have much in common. Both theories are consistent in terms of theorising CEO-
agents as self-serving and risk averse .. Both recognise that the prospects for greater 'optimal 
contacting' and stronger bi-directional associations between executive reward and firm 
performance lie with the outlook and behaviour of those stakeholders most directly 
responsible and accountable for executive performance·and reward management, namely the 
members of the board. Both approaches advocate greater use of direct share ownership as a 
means of executive reward. Other solutions proffered by Bebchuk and Fried (2002, 2004) 
carry resonances of Agency Theory: increasing shareholder power over directors; exclusion 
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of all but independent directors from board compensation committees; mandatory 
shareholder ratification of all components of top executive reward; use· of indexed options; 
compulsory share ownership; and full disclosure of all post-employment benefits. 
Arguably, the chief value of the Managerial Power model, both descriptively and 
prescriptively, lies in extending analysis of the principal-agent problem to the relationship 
between external shareholders and the board itself: 'there is one agency problem between 
shareholders and the board directors and a further agency problem between the board and the 
CEO' (Gumbel, 2006, 225). Further, the Managerial Power perspective extends the agency 
problem to the determination and management of executive reward itself. Also, while the 
purpose of incentive contracts is to optimise performance, the Managerial Power model 
argues that agents can distort and dilute the ex ante purpose of these incentives, such that the · 
ex post rewards are decoupled from performance. Indeed, Bebchuk & Fried (2002) imply 
that CEO reward is both a chief source of the principal-agent problem and one of its most 
promising solutions. 
As such, an integration of the two models would appear to have much to offer both the 
theory and the practice of CEO reward and performance management. Reconceptualising 
agency and power relationships as being tri-dimensional, as illustrated in Exhibit 2.2, 
provides a means of reconciling the two theoretical perspectives, and creating a more holistic 
conceptualisation of the chief interests, agencies and relational possibilities involved. First, 
as indicated by the first corporate governance dimension in Exhibit 2.2, traditional Agency 
Theory is concerned chiefly "with the relationship between agents/executives and external 
principals/owners. Incentive contracts and moni!oring. are prescribed as remedies for the 
conflict of interest between agents and principals, with responsibility for enforcing these 
remedies lying with the board of directors, who are simply assumed to be effective in 
controlling CEO reward decisions so they do not deviate from principals' interests (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The value of the Managerial Power 
perspective, however, is that it highlights the unintended consequences of using these two 
mechanisms to manage the agency relationship. As indicated by the second governance 
dimension in Exhibit 2.2 •. Managerial Power Theory does this by drawing attention to the 
dynamic psycho-political relationship between board members and executives, particularly 
as a means of explaining observed reward-performance decoupling and rent-extraction. In 
integrative terms, these may best be thought of as secondary agency problems that can be 
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best addressed through internal governance practices to increase board control over the 
incumbent CEO. As shown in Exhibit 2.2, however, these theoretical perspectives still leave 
unacknowledged the relationship involved in a third and no less important dimension of 
corporate governance, namely that between external shareholders and the board. 
Exhibit 2.2 An Integrated Approach to the Agency Relationship 
Agency 
Theory 
Agents/CEO 
Principals/Shareholders 
Managerial 
Power 
Thesis 
Board 
What is being suggested here is that a rounded understanding of the nature of this third 
governance dimension requires the conjoint application of insights derived from both main 
theoretical perspectives. This dimension is the site of a set of tertiary agency problems to do 
with owner monitoring of, and influence over, the ·behaviour and decisions of board 
appointees. At the same time, this dimension is also the site of Managerial Power in that 
board members are themselves caught in a tug-of-influence between executives and outside 
owners. 
Consistent with regulatory interventions designed to increase the role of 'independent' 
directors on company boards, a number of studies have examined the role of board 
composition as either an inhibitor and a facilitator of Managerial Power. Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia (2002) find that the shareholder influence over CEO reward is inversely 
related to the degree of CEO entrenchment on the company board. Entrenchment is said to 
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be greater where the CEO is also the board chairperson, where the board is comprised of 
more internal than external!'independent' directors, and where the CEO is her/himself an 
internal appointee with extensive corporate knowledge. In such situations, it is suggested, a 
CEO is able to neutralize board. monitoring, dominate the flow of organizational 
information, and secure a large reward packet irrespective of firm performance. Yet here, 
too, the available research evidence remains ioconclusive. Murphy (2002) .and Conyon 
(2006) furnish evidencethat boards and remuneration committees with more 'interlocked' or 
'affiliated' directors - that is, non-independent directors who share one or more external 
board positions with the CEO - do not set more generous total reward levels, provide greater 
fixed reward or impose fewer performance-contingent rewards, and that externally hired 
CEOs with no ties to the existing board enjoy higher rather then lower reward levels. 
In summary, both the Agency Theory and Managerial Power approaches identify several 
economic and structural factors that influence CEO reward, and the performance sensitivity 
of CEO reward. These literatures. highlight the· need to apply a model that incorporates i) 
board structural characteristics; ii) ownership characteristics; and iii) fmn-level structural 
and market, and non-market contingencies. Chapter Four considers in detail the contours of 
just such a framework. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a critical overview of the two key theoretical perspectives that 
continue to inform research and practice in the field of CEO reward and performance. In 
evincing the precepts of Agency Theory, and the causal logic underpinning its predictions 
and prescriptions, it is argued that the approach oversimplifies the challenges and processes -. 
involved in the management of the agency relationship through CEO monitoring and reward. 
In particular, it is necessary to question the assumption that boards dutifully and 
unconditionally act in the interests of shareholders. Further, in its pursuit of more optimal 
contracting by increasing the ex ante sensitivity of reward to performance, Agency Theory 
oversimplifies the management of the agency relationship through CEO rewards. Age11cy 
Theory does not illuminate the complexities pertaining to the board's management of CEO 
reward and performance. This is an important focus of discussion in the following chapter. 
The current chapter also presents a critical examioation of the Managerial Power model, and 
its attendant precepts, prescriptions and predictions. It is argued that, like Agency Theory, 
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the Managerial Power approach assumes wide shareholder dispersion and thus does not 
elucidate how large· owners may moderate the reward-performance relationship, nor how 
they may influence internal corporate governance. Also, it is suggested that the Managerial 
Power approach overstates the prescriptive value of corporate governance practices that are 
designed to increase board structural independence. It is quite conceivable that 'best 
practice' corporate governance initiatives aimed at increasi'!g board structural independence 
may have been ineffective in controlling growth in CEO rewards and rendering such rewards 
more performance-sensitive. Removing CEOs from remuneration and nominations 
committees, and proscribing CEO-chair duality may not have insulated boards from CEO 
influence; rather, as. Westphal (1998) suggests, the pursuit of board 'independence' may 
simply have encouraged CEOs to pursue more insidious forms of interpersonal control over 
board directors. 
This chapter O\ltlines a preliminary means of synthesising the key insights afforded by both 
main theoretical perspectives. It is suggested that Agency Theory elucidates the 
principal/agent relationship, whereas the Managerial Power approach focuses on the 
relationship between the CEO and the board, and the psycho-political forces that influence 
this relationship. It is also suggested that the relationship between external shareholders and 
the board needs to be theorised and researched with greater precision. This theoretical 
synthesis is intended to frame and evince the causal logic underpinning the research 
predictions made in the forthcoming chapter. Building on the theoretical overview that this 
chapter provides, the following chapter canvasses the existing CEO reward and performance 
empirical literature. 
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Chapter Three 
Existing Evidence on CEO Reward and Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter offered a critical examination of the key theoretical frameworks and 
concepts that have hitherto informed our understanding of CEO reward and performance, 
and discussed their theoretical limitations. This chapter aims to critically examine the 
extant empirical treatment and evidence on CEO reward and performance. In addition, 
studies examining the determinants of CEO reward level, composition, and performance 
sensitivity will also be analysed. 
The chapter first considers the conventional approach to the model specification, and 
parameter estimation of the CEO reward and performance relationship, and the underlying 
methodological assumptions. It then examines the existing empirical evidence on CEO 
reward and performance, before turning to research that examines determinants of CEO 
reward. Finally, the chapter attempts to synthesise the existing evidence with a view to 
establishing a more solid foundation on which to develop knowledge on CEO reward and 
performance. 
3.2 The Empirical Treatment of Agency Theory 
The conventional approach to model specification and parameter estimation of CEO reward 
and performance is informed by the underlying Agency Theory postulates. According to 
this model, boards can control agent opportunism and risk and effort aversion primarily 
through the executive reward system (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Agency Theory predicts that the board will control agent decisions, actions, and 
strategic choices in ways that serve the interests of shareholders, through executive incentive 
contracts. This logic has also percolated into empirical research, where there have been a 
large number of studies examining the sensitivity of executive reward to measures of firm-
level performance. The sensitivity of CEO reward to measures of market-return 
performance has been used to infer the reality of optimal contracting. 
In interpreting the significance of CEO reward-performance estimates, a number of 
researchers have sought to support Agency Theory. For instance, Lippert and Porter suggest 
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that the sensitivity of CEO reward to performance signifies a firm's commitment to 
incentivising shareholder value. creation ( 1997: 127) .. Conyon and Sadler (200 I: 145) further 
maintain that 'the magnitude of the beta coefficient (jJ) is interpreted as reflecting the 
operation of. the principal-agent mechanism, >"ith_ higher values of fJ suggesting_ closer 
alignment of owner and management interests'. 
Jensen and Murphy, the precursors of the conventional approach to the model specification 
and parameter estimation of CEO reward and performance, defined reward-performance 
sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO wealth associated with a dollar change in the "-:ealth 
of shareholders (1990: 227). This relationship is encapsulated in the following equation 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990: 227): 
!!.(CEO Wealth);,, =flo+ p,t!.(Shareholder Wealth);,,+ fJ2t!.(Shareholder Wealth)1,,.J + e, 
Where !!.(CEO Wealth),,, is the change in CEO reward for firm i in period t. 
p1t!.(Shareholder Wealth);,, is the change in Shareholder wealth, which is measured as the 
inflation-adjusted retllll} to stock in period t, multiplied by the market capitalisation in period 
t-1. 
B2t!.(Shareholder Wealth)1,1.1 is a one year lag in the change in shareholder wealth. 
p, + p, measure the change in CEO wealth for a two year consecutive change in shareholder 
wealth. 
The parameters of this functional form are estimated through a first-differences fixed effects, 
approach. Chapter Five provides a more detailed examination of this _conventional approach. 
to model specification and parameter estimation. It is noteworthy, however, that research 
espousing the Jensen and Murphy statistic, and slight variants of this statistic, are uncritical 
of the assumptions underpinning the functional form specified, measures of performance and 
reward used, and parameter estimation. Essentially, this approach perpetuates the vagaries 
attendant to_ estimating a lagged dynamic panel model through a first-differences approach_ to 
estimation (for a recent Australian example see Merhebi et a/ .. , 2006). As we will see 
shortly, this research has conflated significant reward-performance sensitivity estimates with 
agent-principal alignment. While research examining CEO reward and performance has 
perpetuated the normative assumptions of Agency Theory, research operationalising the 
logic underpinning the Managerial Power thesis has been slow to develop. Nonetheless, this 
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theoretical perspective predicts that CEO rewards are decoupled from firm-level 
performance, and that the reward system reinforces board capture, rather than control. 
3,3 Reward-for-Performance and Reward-without-Performance: The Evidence 
Jensen and Murphy's influential 1990 study continues to inform research investigating the 
relationship between CEO reward and performance. They find that annual changes iit CEO 
total reward, encompassing salary, short-term ·incentives (ST!s), superannuation, and the 
present value of CEO stock options, increased US$3.25 for every US$1000 increase in 
shareholder wealth at the 0.01 level of significance. In addition, they find that their total 
measure of CEO reward yielded greater sensitivities than using a salary plus bonus measure. 
In the same study, these authors investigated the nuances of specific reward components by 
examining their relative sensitivity to changes in shareholder wealth (1990: 231). They 
reported that for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth, the value of CEO stock options 
increased by 14.5 cents, and resulted in a 1.35 cents increase in annual changes in CEO 
salary and.bonus (1990: 233). Accordingly, they argue thai stock options generate closer 
principal-agent alignment than do cash components (1990). The CEO's shareholdings also 
appeared to increase the sensitivity of reward to performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
report similar findings. However, these findings should by no means diminish the 
importance of performance-based CEO cash reward as an important performance incentive 
mechanism to be used in conjunction with fixed cash rewards. Lambert and Larcker (1987) 
suggest different components of CEO·total reward may have different performance criteria. 
It may be the case that cash rewards are conditional on non-market performance criteria, thus 
serving as a complementary, rather thari supplementary 'incentive mechanism. Also studies 
that have included the change in the value of executive stock options, in addition to CEO 
salary and bonus, still yield inconsistent findings. 
Empirical studies in both the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom 
(UK), have provided some evidence in support of a positive relationship between CEO cash 
reward, and shareholder wealth or other corporate performance metrics. A number of studies 
have reported significant positive, but weak, relationships between CEO cash plus bonus, 
and market and accounting return measures (Canyon and Sadler, 200 I; Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998; 'Lilling, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Perry and Zenner, 
2001; Tevlin, 1996; Winfrey, 1994; Zhou, 2000). The results from 'these studies also indicate 
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that firm size had a consistent and robust positive effect in predicting annual changes in CEO 
reward. 
Australian researchers have reported comparable CEO reward-performance sensitivity 
estimates. Using panel data for the 1990s, Merhebi, Swan, and Zhou (2006), reported a 
significant lagged positive association between changes in CEO reward, and annual stock 
returns. They find tharCEO reward, measured by aggregating the annual change in the value 
of CEO shareholdings, as well as bonus and salary, increased AU$l.82 for two consecutive 
AU$1 000 increases in shareholder wealth. They also reported significant positive reward-
performance elasticity. They find that, on average, a CEOrecei\'eS a 1.26% increase for a 
I 0% increase in shareholder wealth. The authors conclude that these findings lend support to 
Agency Theory in its advocacy of CEO reward for performance. A study by Clarkson et a/. 
(2005) arrives at a similar conclusion. The study examined the reward-performance 
sensitivity between 1998 and 2004, inclusive, across 48 listed companies. In pooled, first-
differenced regressions spanning 336 company-years, salary, annual bonus, and the 
' aggregation of these components, are found to be positively and significantly related to a one 
year. lag in Return on Assets (ROA: the coefficients for these reward variables were 3.882, 
2.658, and 6.906 respectively). Annual regression results indicated that from 2002 to 2004, 
firm performance, indexed by one'year lag in ROA, positively and significantly predicted 
salary at the .. 05 level. Performance was only significantly and positively related to annual 
bonus in 2004. Finally, regression coefficients were significantly positive for2004 and 2003 
for the total reward measure. Overall the results from annual regression-models suggest that 
the relationship between CEO reward and performance appears to have strengthened 
between 1998 and 2004. Furthermore,sorne studies have shown,that changes in accounting-
return measures of firm performance can also explain variation .in annual changes in CEO 
cash reward. 
Other North American and UK studies report non-significant or, at best, marginally 
significant reward-performance coefficients despite modelling both market and accounting 
return performance measures (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; 
Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Weinburg, 1995), Kraft and Niederprum 
(1999) even reported a negative relationship between executive reward and Return on Equity 
(ROE). Inconsistent to Jensen and Murphy's (1990) findings, a UK study· by Bucket a/., 
(2003) find that the presence of LTIP, operationsalised as a dummy variable, reduces the 
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sensitivity of total reward to Total ShareholderReturn (TSR). When equity-based long-term 
incentive plans (LT!Ps) are excluded, a. £1000 increase in shareholder wealth predicts a 
£1.81 increase in CEO wealth. However when LT!Ps, are included, CEOs receives an 
increase of £1.55 for every £1000 increase in shareholder wealth. These findings suggest 
that increasing the performance contingency of executive reward to performance through 
LT!Ps, does not increase the ex post sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth, and, 
contrary to Agency Theory, that the performance contingency of CEO rewards should not be 
conflated with agent-principal alignment. More generally, these results draw into question 
whether the reward-performance sensitivity estimates should be considered valid proxies of 
principal-agent alignment, a point to which we shall return shortly. 
Several Australian studies furnish support for CEO reward performance insensitivity. Izan; 
Sidhu, and Taylor (1998), in a study of 99 firms covering the period 1987-1992, report 
several findings contrary to Agency Theory predictions and prescriptions. First, pooled 
analyses yielded statistically insignificant reward-performance coefficients. Second, first-
differenced estimates were not significantly related to either ROA or ROE, but were instead 
related to operating profit after tax. Third, no significant lagged relationship is found 
between reward ~nd performance. Finally, long-window analyses, examining the sensitivity 
of reward to performance over longer measurement intervals als"o yielded insignificant 
results. Despite operationalising an array of functional forms or models, these results 
suggest that the association between performance, and salary and bonus is either 
infinitesimal or non-existent. Similar Australian findings are reported by Defina, Harris, and 
Ramsey (1994), Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell, (1997), O'Neill and lob, (1999) and 
Holland, Dowling and Innes. (200 I). A r~cent descriptive study commissioned by the 
Australian Council of Superannuation Investors (ACSI) examined 10 of the highest paid 
CEOs from the ASX I 00 cohort made two compelling findings. First, six out of the ten cases 
received increases in total reward (including LT!Ps) despite underperforming relative to the 
S&P/ ASX 100 index. Second, three cases which outperformed the index, reported increases 
in reward incommensurate to relative performance (ACSI, 2006: 24). 
Managerial Power Theory and Agency Theory make different predictions about the 
sensitivity of CEO reward to performance and also offer divergent explanations. The 
Managerial Power perspective predicts a decoupling of CEO reward from performance. 
Weak or insensitive reward performance coefficients in the extant research can be explained 
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through notions of rent extraction, stealth compensation, and 'camouflage (See 'Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2002; 2004), A number of studies lend credence to these suppositions in suggesting 
that CEOs can freely influence the management and control of CEO reward. Among them, 
Yermack's (1997) study finds that CEOs can influence the timing of their stock option plans. 
Aboody and Kasznick (2000) report similar findings. Similarly, Callaghan, Saly, and 
Subramanian (2004) report that the repricing of stock option plans coincided with stock price. 
movements. An earlier study by Healy (1985) indicaied that managers freely manipulate 
performance measures to serve their own intereSts. 
These inconsistent findings and interpretations do little to clarify whether executive reward 
systems, on average, are sensitive to changes in shareholder wealth and/or firm-level 
performance. The evidence is thus equivocal regarding both the suppositions and 
predictions of normative Agency Theory, and the Managerial Power model's prediction of 
endemic rent-extraction. As such both sides can continue to claim legitimacy: the reported 
positive significant sensitivities lend credence to the Agency Theory postulates; negative or 
non-significant. sensitivities appear to bolster the premises of the Managerial Power 
perspective. 
Irrespective of whether research furnishes support for the Agency Theory prediction of 
reward for performance, or the Managerial Power prediction of reward without performance, 
a key contention of this thesis is that these research findings are conceivably by-products of 
misspecification of the function form to measure the relationship of CEO reward and 
performance, as well as identifying inappropriate parameter estimators. These problems are 
considered to limit the extent of legitimate inferences ste!llming from this research, and are 
the reason why this thesis specifies alternative functional forms and parameter estimators. 
This is a primary focus of the discussion in 'Chapter Five. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to make note that studies that have investigated the cross-sectional variance in 
reward-performance· using simple arithmetic ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled 
regressions, or the semi-elasticity of reward with regard to performance (for example 
Abowd, 1990; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; !zan et a/., 1998) have substantial but 
unacknowledged limitations in terms of causal inference. Conversely, other studies have 
addressed this problem by specifying a lagged model of CEO·reward and performance, and 
such a functional form is believed to be more attuned to the dynamic nature of executive 
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reward determination (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mishra, McConaughy .and Gobeli, 2000; 
Merhebi eta/., 2006). 
The predominant approach to estimating the parameters of lagged or static models of CEO 
reward and performance is the first-differenced or fixed effects approach. The benefit of this 
approach is that it promises to ' .... net out those (maybe unobservable) factors influencing 
the [sensitivity] relationship that remain [unchanged] over time' (Gregg, Machin, and 
Szymanski, 1992: 5). As we shall see in Chapter Five the approaches to both model 
specification and parameter estimation entrenched in research are highly problematic, and 
this arguably constrains knowledge development in the area of .CEO reward and 
performance. 
As suggested above, some authors have sought to ·address the .complexity of CEO reward· 
determination by examining the effects of factors other than performance on .the level and 
composition of CEO reward. Beatty and Zajac suggest that the theoretical specification of 
CEO reward and performance should recognise ' ... explicitly, the conflicts, tradeoffs, and 
substitution possibili!ies among incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing on organisations 
may have the greatest potential to advance ourunderstanding of.top executive compensation, 
ownership: and corporate governance' (1994: 333). However research has since tried to 
espouse this logic, but failed to formulate an integrative theoretical model of CEO reward 
and performance which fully explicates the effects of these factors on CEO reward decisions, 
in addition to specifying function forms which more accurately depict the decisional 
processes that moderate CEO rewards, and performance. This is the guiding supposition 
underpinning this thesis and its theoretical or prop~sitional logic ~nd research methods. 
Before explicating this propositional logic in detail, it is first appropriate to canvass the 
literature on which these propositions are based. 
3.4 Determinants and Boundary Conditions of the CEO Reward and Performance 
Relationship 
Recent research has highlighted that there are other factors besides performance and finn 
size that account for changes or· cross-sectional variation in the composition and level of 
CEO cash reward (Bebchuk and Fried, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Boyd, 1994; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Lippert and Moore, 1994). Several studies have emerged 
which attempt to explain variation in CEO reward changes, levels, composition, and their 
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performance sensitiyity. These.studies perpetuate an organisational adaptation perspective in 
recognising that formulation of executive contracts is influenced by both the internal and 
external environment of an organisation (Chu, Hu, and Chu, 2006). Research examining the 
boundary conditions on the relationship between CEO reward and finn performance can be 
further classified in terms of: i) Finn-specific factors; ii) CEO-specific factors; iii) board 
governance factors; and iv) external ownership. 
Reasonably robust evidence has been provided which suggests that in order to examine the 
ceteris paribus effects of performance on CEO reward, it is important to consiaer both 
contextual and finn-specific factors that may refract this relationship. The enquiry into CEO 
reward and performance can be. reduced to two key approaches. The first approach 
examines the sensitivity of CEO reward to a specified finn-level performance measure. The 
second approach seeks to explain variation in CEO reward level and composition through 
corporate governance variables, .CEQ characteristics, ownership structures, finn size, and 
finn risk. 
3.4.1 Finn-specific Factors 
Finn-specific factors refer to .finn structural and demographic characteristics, excluding 
ownership concentration. This includes factors such as firm size, finn risk, industry, and 
business life cycle, which have been foci of empirical research explaining variation in CEO 
reward changes, levels, and performance sensitivity. 
Firm size 
Empirical research has furnished equivocal and inco~sistent evidence to support the 
relationship between executive rewards and corporate performance, yet very robust evidence 
in support of the explanatory power of finn size. Tosi et a/., (2000) reported that finn size 
accounted for variation in executive rewards above and beyond corporate performance. 
Several international studies have indicated that finn size had a consistent and robust 
positive effect on CEO reward level (Canyon and Sadler, 2001; Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Lilling, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Perry and Zenner, 
2001; Tevlin, 1996). Turning to the Australian evidence, Merhebi e/ a/. (2006:) find that for 
every 10% increase in finn revenue, there was a concomitant 2.74% increase in the level of 
annual CEO cash rewards. 
41 
In terms of the impact of firm size on reward composition, Lippert and Moore (1994) find 
that the level of CEO incentive of performance-based reward was ·negatively related to:firm 
stze. These authors explicated iheir findings on the basis. that firm size proxies 
organisational complexity, which is considered to render the board's appraisal of CEO 
contribution to corporate performance highly problematic. Also implicii in these findings is 
the possibility that executives may have greater incentives to increase firm size than to 
promote the long-term efficiency of the firm. This proposition seems in keeping with the 
resurgence of merger and acquisition activity that has occurred in Australia in recent times. 
Variance of the firm's performance 
The empirical treatment of Agency Theory focuses disproportionately on the reward-
performance relationship, despite the underlying postulate that agents are risk averse, and 
require fixed rewards alongside performance-contingent rewards to limit· risk exposure 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This assumption has prompted enquiry into the main and 
interaction effects of the vaiiance of the firm's market returns on CEO rewards (Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 1999a; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Core eta/., 1999; Lippert and Moore, 1994; 
Merhebi el a/., 2006 Mishra, McConaughy, and Gobeli, 2000). Furthermore, not accounting 
for the variance in performance in Agency Theory specifications may, in ·effect, cause the 
reward-performance sensitivity to be underestimated Aggarwal ·and Samwick (1999a: 84). 
The same -authors argue that specifying the variance of the firm-level performance measure 
as an independent variable and interaction term results in larger reward-for-performance 
coefficients because their omission results in estimates by being absorbed into the error tetni 
(1999a: 77). Thus, controlling for risk mitigates the potential for omitted variable bias. 
The·empirical operationalisation of risk as a moderator of CEO reward and performance has 
yielded findings in support of principal-agent postulates examined in Chapter Two; in 
particular, that boards need to balance CEO risk bearing with performance incentives 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, the research on the association betweenrisk and 
reward has :furnished some ·of the most valuable insights to emerge from recent Agency 
Theory research, especially in terms of explaining variation in CEO reward-for-performance. 
For instance, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) explain their findings in terms of a trade-off 
between incentives and agent-risk exposure, such that the level of incentive reward is a 
negative function of the variance of firm's performance. Hall and Liebman ( 1998) argue that 
lowering the 'sharing rate' (i.e. the incremental relationship between CEO reward and 
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shareholder gains) may provide a stronger incentive effect because a high sharing rate 
transfers undue compensation risk to agents to the point that they may avoid high net pre~ent 
value projects. Conyon and Sadler (200 I) mount a ·similar argurilent. 
Conversely, implicit in the Managerial Power perspective is the notion that agent risk-
bearing, through results-based incentive contracts, is highly dubious. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) suggest that results-based incentive contracts precipitate further agency problems in 
the form of incentive distortion so that agents can hedge their risk exposure stemming from 
incentives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Such behaviour .may include the manipulation of 
performance standards, an apprehension to pursue high volatility projects with high returns, 
or to make research and development investments (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). In 
addition to the absence of indexed options, there is often no downward adjustment to other 
compensation components, perpetuating 'no" skin off my nose' and further agency costs 
(Murphy, 2002). In interviews conducted by Reilly and Scott (2005), members of 
remuneration committees admitted that .CEOs are insulated from downside risk; such that 
poor firm performance does not precipitate downward adjustments in CEO reward. These 
findings thus contradict the Agency Theoretic notion of 'ex post settling up' where the board 
of directors is assumed to be diligent in ensuring that executive reward is symmetrically 
sensitive to performance, such that CEO reward is reduced when firm performance is poor 
(Fama, 1980). 
Either way, assuming that: these considerations come to bear on the design and management 
of executive reward, we would expect, by extension, that increases in the variance of firm's 
performance would weaken the relationsh[p between CEO rewards and performance. 
Empirical research sensitivity furnishes additional support for this argument. In a study of 
I ,500 firms in the US over the period I 993 to I 996 inclusive, Aggarwal and. Samwick 
(I 999a) provide robust evidence that CEO cash reward for performance is a negative 
function of variance in firm returns (specified as the cumulative distribution function of 
variance in stock returns). It is found that CEOs with the least variance in the firm's stock 
returns earn an additional US$27.60 for every US$1000 increase in the firm's stock returns. 
At the median variance in the sample, a CEO received an additional US$14.55 for a 
US$1000 increase in firm's stock returns. At the maximum variance, and thus the highest 
level of risk exposure, CEO wealth increases US$1.45 for a US$1000 increase in stock 
returns. When risk is omitted, the median CEO reward for performance is US$12.26 for a 
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US$1000 increase in stock returns. Bloom and Milkovich (1998), Core eta/. (1999) report 
similar findings. A study by Merhebi et a/., (2006), furnish Australian evidence to support 
the inverse relationship between firm risk and CEO reward,performance sensitivity. A study 
by Mishra et a/. (2000) suggest that the relationship between changes in CEO and 
shareholder wealth is curvilinear given that agents are undiversified and risk averse. Stronger 
reward for performance is found to exist at low levels of firm risk, but weakens as risk 
increases. This may be explained in terms of agents negotiating higher levels of risk 
compensation to offset or minimise their. risk exposure when firm risk is high. From this 
point onwards, firm risk will be used to refer to the variance of firm returns, unless inoicated 
otherwise. 
Industry 
Researchers have also noted significant differences in the level and composition of CEO 
reward as a function of industry sectors. Using non-parametric analyses, Cordiero and 
others (2006) report considerable variation within and across industries in terms of the 
number of firms that exhibited high reward concurrently with high levels of growth and 
stock returns. It is suggested that: 
"Compensation committees might... well rely on different 
specifications of the CEO compensation relationship to size and 
performance, since different industries are subject to different 
operating environments, political pressure, external regulation, growth 
rates, competition, and risks." (Cordiero eta/., 2006: 244) 
Thus reward decisions may reflect the circumstances that are unique to different industry 
sectors (Cordiero et a/., 2006). As with the effects of firm risk examined above, industry 
may also be an important moderator of the relationship between CEO reward and 
performance. In his study of 120 firms over the period 1977-1981, Decktop (1988: 223) 
reports that industry significantly influences the effect of profit, sales, and market equjty 
value on CEO reward. He also suggests ( 1988) that industry acts as a proxy for the 
influence of on the external labour market on executive reward. As such, market salary 
survey data can be used to inform reward level and composition decisions so that rewards 
are comparable or better than industry peers to attract and retain talented executives. 
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Business cycle 
The business life cycle of a firm may also influence reward mix and, hence, total reward 
level (EIIig, 2003). Growth and start-up firms may require lower fixed labour costs and, as 
such, may have to re\y more heavi\y on incentive reward than do more mature organisations 
(Gerhart and Rynes, 2003). Chu et ·a/. (2003) fmd that, along with industry sector, the 
business cycle affects the level of incentive reward, such that in early phases of 
development, firms tend to rely more heavily on incentives to motivate. In terms of 
performance evaluation, Lambert and Larcker (1987) find that 'growth' firms place greater 
importance on market measures relative to accounting measures, on the basis that accounting 
measures are less sensitive to agent decisions and actions in the current performance period. 
Hall and Murphy (2002) also report that high growth firms are more likely to issue stock 
option plans rather than restricted stock plans. 
External consultants 
The Managerial Power perspective attributes the decoupling of CEO reward and 
performance partly to the influence of reward consultants on board outlook and decision-
making. According to Bebchuk and Fried (2004), reward consultants can interfere with 
optimal contracting· by providing market data that ratchets up the level of CEO reward, and 
by crafting reward plans that obscure rent,extraction. Research from the UK suggests that 
the CEO plays an active role in the selection of compensation consultants (Reilly and Scott, 
2005). In interviews with 21 remuneration committee members, Reilly and Scott (2005) 
report that 88% of participants reported that reward consultants work directly with CEOs, 
and that frequently the consulting firm will have pre-existing contracts with the CEO for 
other areas of business, and thus creates· a normative obligation to comply with the (;EOs 
compensation preferences. Indeed, Baker et al. (I 988) argue that the comparative survey 
data frequently used by consultants to inform reward policies has a 'ratcheting up' effect 
over time, as reward levels are often set above the market median. This is also corroborated 
by Reilly and Scott (2005), who interviewed 21 remuneration committee directors, 77%' of 
whom agreed that the systematic 'ratcheting up' of executive reward can be attributed.to 
setting reward levels to the 751h percentile. 
Coffee (2006) also raises further issues relating to the influence of external consultants on 
CEO reward and performance by maintaining that, given their lack of company-specific 
information, 'independent' directors, may allow professional gatekeepers - that is, reward 
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consultants who may have a vested interest in being conciliatory to the CEO - to have undue 
influence over board decisions regarding reward proposals and recommendations. 
3.4.2 CEO Demographic Factors 
Human capital arguments are often advanced to explain variation in executive reward levels, 
and tradeoffs between performance incentives and retention and attraction incentives. The 
functional background of the CEO, past work experiences and achievements, and whether 
they are an internal or external appointment, can have significant effects on CEO reward 
level and composition. For instance, Finkelstein and Hambrick, (I 989) find that appointed 
externally CEOs are paid premiums so that they leave their current firms, and internally 
appointed CEOs are likely to accept lower levels of reward compared to external appointees 
(for further research see Decktop, 1988; and Lilling, 2006). 
Tenure 
There is a high level of divergence in research findings regarding the relationship between 
CEO tenure and CEO reward and performance. For example, using USA data Lippert and 
Porter (1997) report that tenure negatively moderates the relationship between CEO cash and 
performance, but positively predicts the total level of CEO cash reward. Conversely, Lilling 
(2006) finds that the relationship between tenure and CEO total reward was significantly 
negative in the UK. To add to these inconsistencies, Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1989) 
study reports an inverted U-shape relationship between tenure and total cash reward 
sensitivity. As tenure increases, retenti"on payments created by high levels of performance 
insensitive cash diminish in importance, especially because tenure may be an index of 
reduced labour mobility (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). 
The extant Managerial Power literature has a tendency to operationalise tenure as an index of 
board capture, which is premised on the notion thalthe CEO's power strengthens as length 
of service increases (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). The longer CEO remains with the 
firm, the more the incumbent CEO accumulates trust that in turn displaces the need for 
incentive contracts (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). However, from these disparate 
empirical findings, it remains unclear what effect tenure has on the board's decisions 
pertaining to CEO reward and performance. 
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CEO equity ownership 
Several interesting findings have emerged in research examining the effects of CEO 
ownership in the firm, on reward level and composition on the one hand and its mediating or 
moderating effects on reward for performance on the other hand. 
To recapitulate, according to Agency Theory, CEO ownership automatically induces agent-
principal alignment (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Consistent with this logic, research indicates 
that the pre-existing incentives attendant to agent share ownership can spur a trade-off 
between agent shareholdings and performance contingent cash rewards, on the basis that 
shareholdings serve as a substitute agent-principal alignment mechanism (Conyon and 
Sadler, 200 I). In short, CEOs with large equity holdings are rewarded for corporate 
performance through their shareholdings on top of what he or she receives in cash rewards 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989: 123). Beatty and Zajac (1994) further suggest that agents' 
equity holdings will determine their willingness to accept additional compensation risk 
stemming from increases in incentive reward. 
In addition to these findings, research also suggests that CEO ownership in the firm is a 
significant moderator of the CEO reward and performance relationship. For instance, Lippert 
and Porter (1997) provide preliminary support for a positive association between equity 
holdings and reward-performance sensitivity. However, Tevlin (1996) reports that 
sensitivity is 0.55 higher when the CEO is not a major shareholder. Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) also report that the performance measures the board uses- particularly the relative 
weight placed on accounting and market based measures - in evaluating agent actions are 
contingent on the fraction of CEO ownership in the firm. 
Other studies report a consistent inverse relationship between CEO ownership and the level 
of CEO total cash rewards. Core et a/. ( 1999) find that UK CEO equity holdings are 
negatively related to the CEO reward level, such that a I% increase in CEO equity decreases 
of total reward of $8,027. In their study of the USA leisure industry, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989) report a U-shaped relationship between a CEO's equity holdings and 
salary such that beyond a point, salary level actually declined ( 1989: 129). These results 
have important implications for composite reward measures by suggesting that while they 
are helpful for approximating total rewards, they obscure important nuances in reward 
47 
design and composition and, in particular, the tradeoffs· and substitutions among specific 
reward components, in this case cash and equity-based ·components. This in tun) has 
implications for the model specification of CEO reward and performance, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
CEO stock options 
While some . commentators argue 'that options and related equity instruments are equally 
effective means of aligning principal and agent interests, according to advocates of Agency 
Theory and Managerial Power Theory alike, option plans also have considerable potential 
for incentive distortion and rent extraction. Option plans are said to shield the executive from 
down-side risk, to encourage speculation in the company's shares, to invite manipulation of 
market intelligence and insider trading, t? dilute external shareholder wealth, and to carry 
hidden costs for the firm (Shields, 2007:496). Option plans are also susceptible to a range of 
other risk-avoidance actions, including repricing, up-loading and automatic conversion 
(Pollock, Fischer and Wade, 2002). For these reasons, it may be that powerful owners view 
options and related equity instruments less favourably .than they do direct share ownership. 
To Murphy (2002), a prominent Agency Theorist, the enthusiasm that boards in the USA 
have shown for option plans, is based on the mistaken belief that options are a low-cost form 
of reward. 
3.4.3 Corporate Governance Regulation and Board Governance 
In recent years there has been a surge of research investigating the relationships between 
corporate governance and corporate performance. Recent Australian evidence suggests that 
a range of board governance practices were uncorrelated with corporate performance For 
instance, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) report that a range of board structural measures were 
uncorrelated with corporate performance. 
It is noted in Chapter Two that both Agency Theory and Managerial Power Theory imply 
that performance-insensitive executive reward is an artefact of poor. board governance 
structures. Both perspectives further assume that board structural arrangements affect the 
level of discretion internal. managers can have over the management of their reward and 
performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that board composition affects board 
monitoring effectiveness, and overall the management of principal-agent alignment. In 
particular, having a large proportion of 'outside' directors on the board was posited 'to 
48 
enhance the management of the relationship between CEO reward and performance, This 
appears to be the assumption underling both recent research in the field and mandatory and 
voluntary codes of corporate governance 'best practice' since both have centred chiefly on 
board composition, Increasing board 'independence: has become almost an axiomatic 
corporate governance prescription to improve director monitoring and behavioural 
evaluation of CEOs. Corporate governance reforms and regulatory codes introduced in 
Australia and .elsewhere since the 1980s not only prescribe performance-contingent rewards 
but also a stronger presence by 'outside' directors to enhance board monitoring. However, 
from a board stewardship perspective, having a larger proportion of inside directors is 
purported to enhance board task performance because executive ·directors are more 
specialised in the firm's daily operations (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Arguably, however,. 
the notion of stewardship offers very little scope for evincing the impact of board 
composition on the management and control of executive reward decisions. 
Several empirical studies have investigated the relationship between board composition, 
particularly the ratio of outside directors to. inside directors, and the level and composition of 
CEO reward (See Dalton at al., 1998 for a meta-analysis). Board composition is assumed, a 
priori, to influence the board's effectiveness in monitoring and rewarding executive-agents. 
The research also construes board governance practices as indices of board 'capture' and 
inversely, board 'independence' (see Dalton eta/., 1998). 
In the light of these general points, we can now tum to examining the available research 
findings on the relationship between variations of board composition and CEO reward. This 
evidence addresses three main facets of board structure: i) overall. board composition·;· i) 
board committee presence and composition; and iii) the status of the board chair. 
Evidence on board-/eve/ composition 
The evidence on the main and moderating effects of board-level composition is at best, very 
mixed. Some studies provide support for the proposition that those boards with higher 
proportions of 'outside directors' are associated with more optimal and thus performance-
contingent CEO reward outcomes. For example, Finkelstein and Hambrick (I 989) found 
that board composition had differential effects on CEO reward level and composition. These 
authors reported an inverse relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the 
board and the level on CEO salary plus bonus, yet a positive association between the 
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proportion of outside directors on the board the performance contingency of reward. These 
findings are seemingly consonant with Agency Theory predictions and 'best practice' 
prescriptions. In the Australian context.K.iel and Nicholson (2003) offer some evidence 
supportive of the 'best practice' formula. They find that having a greater number of'outside' 
directors on the board was positively associated with an alternate market value measure, 
Tobin's Q3 Conversely, other studies show that board composition does not bear a 
systematic relationship with other measures of company performance (see Daily et a/., 1998; 
Core eta/., 1999). 
Consistent with Stewardship Theory (See Donaldson and Davis, 1991), several criticisms 
have beeh levelled against having large proportions. of outside directors ori the· board. The 
first criticism levelled at increasing board structural independence is that 'outside' directors 
can be 'interlocked' with the CEO (non-independent directors who share one or more 
external board positions with the CEO); that is, the CEO may serve as a director. on the 
board in which the outside director is chairperson or CEO. In this case, both CEOs may feel 
a normative obligation to be conciliatory to each other's compensation desires. The 
empirical evidence lends some support to this proposition. For example, Core et a/. (1999: 
388) demonstrate that a I% increase in the proportion of interlocked directors leads to a 
$7,356 increase in CEO .total reward Westphal and Zajac (1997) also question the 
assumption that board composition can institutionalise board structural independence and 
control. Utilising an institutional theory perspective,. they· argue that reward practices and 
corporate governance practices can be diffused through board interlocks, and thus nominally 
'independent' or 'outside' directors make reward decisions on the basis of practices within 
their own firms. Their results suggest that ~he proportion of performance-contingent rewards 
decreased as the proportion of directors who were CEOs of other companies increased. The· 
same authors also found associations in the composition of reward between the CEO and 
'outside' CEO-directors. Further empirical evidence of the ineffectiveness of board 
structural independence to curb growth in CEO rewards, is provided by Canyon and Peck 
(1998). 
3 The authors calculated Tobin Q=market value of common stock + the book value of preferred stock + the 
book value of1ong-term stock/the book value of total assets (2003: 197). 
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Further, Westphal (1998) reports that higher levels of outside directors· at the board level are 
associated with greater use of interpersonal tactics by the CEO to maintain compliance from 
board directors. Westphal (1998) provides evidence that increasing the structural power of 
the board through either splitting the role of CEO and chair, or increasing the ratio of 
independent or outside directors to internal-executive directors, increases the level of CEO 
ingratiation and persuasion behaviour which, in turn, reduces the level of performance 
contingent reward while increasing the level of total reward. By implication, a positive 
relationship between structural independence and the level of total reward must be 
interpreted with caution, and is perhaps explicable in terms of the CEO substituting 
structural power with interpersonal influence. Consistent with this evidence, the proportion 
of inside directors is found to be inversely related to total cash reward, which seems to 
indicate that, if anything, insiders may be more effective in structuring economically optimal 
contracts (Ueng, Wells, and Lily, 2000). A stUdy by Core eta/. (1999:385) also corroborates 
this finding. Results from regression analyses show that a I% increase· in the percentage of 
inside directors on the board translates into a $5,639 decrease in reward. 
The third criticism levelled at 'outside' director monitoring· effectiveness is that their 
putative independence is also hampered by the fact that the CEO is typically responsibility 
for their reappointment and selection, which is itself a potential source of Managerial Power 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2002 and 2004; Fama.and Jensen, 1983; Reilly and Scott, 2005). In 
this situation· it is in the director's interests to acquiesce in the CEO's wishes rather than 
engage in reward activism·. Consistent with this proposition, 'outside' directors may have a 
normative obligation to be more accommodating to the incumbent's compensation 
preferences. These authors suggest that CEOs tend to appoint directors demographically 
similar to themselves as a way to minimise the likelihood of dissent and reward activism. In 
corroboration of this proposition, Core et a/. (1999: 387) demonstrate that a orie member 
increase in outside directors appointed by the CEO leads to a $4,137 increase in total reward 
If the CEO holds the balance of power, they terid to select directors demographically similar 
to themselves, and as canvassed above, the proportion of CEO-selected directors is 
positively related to total reward, but negatively related to the level of incentive reward 
(Wesphal and Zajac, 1995). Qualitative research also appears to corroborate these findings. 
In interviews conducted by Perkins and Hendry (2005) nominally independent directors in 
the UK admitted they ·are inclined to accept recommendations pertaining to executive 
rewards that are made by the top management team itself. 
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On the basis of.these inconsistent findings, it is unclear from research whether 'outside' 
directors are more capable of exercising independent judgement in relation to CEO reward 
determination. 
Evidence on commillee-level composition 
The normative discourse on board. governance best practice advocates the formation of 
independent task-specific committees, dominated by outside directors, to enbance board 
monitoring and decision-making. Some studies examine the effects of board composition at 
the committee level on CEO reward and performance (for an example, see Core eta/., 1999). 
Intuitively the focus is on nomination and remuneration committees. 
Research lends very little credence to the institutional suppositions underlying corporate 
governance best practice prescriptions. Murphy (2002) and Canyon (2006) furnish evidence, 
that boards and remuneration committees with more 'interlocked' or 'affiliated'· directors -
that is, non-independent directors who share one or more external board positions with the 
CEO, or who are CEOs themselves - do not set more generous total reward levels, provide 
greater fixed reward or impose fewer performance-contingent rewards, and that .externally 
hired CEOs with ng ties to the existing board enjoy higher rather than lower reward levels. 
Recent qualitative .research from the UK furnishes support for the proposition that 
independent board committees are also susceptible to normative pressures to be compliant 
rather than independent (Perkins and Hendry, 2005). Non-executive members of the 
remuneration committees interviewed reported their concerns regarding the ambiguities 
inherent in discharging their role on the board. They admitted to being .tom between servin~ 
shareholding interests, on the one hand, and maintaining reward satisfaction amongst 
prominent executive directors, on the other. These interviewees also conceded that reward 
activism targeted at the CEO's package is eschewed on the basis that it erodes camaraderie. 
on the board. Together, research by Murphy (2002) and Canyon (2006), indicate that boards 
and remuneration committees with more 'interlocked' or 'affiliated' directors; i) do not set 
more generous total reward levels, ii) do no provide greater fixed reward, iii) nor impose 
fewer performance-contingent rewards. 
Other studies challenge the claimed worth of having independent or non-executive director 
dominated remuneration committees. Canyon and Peck's (1998) findings suggest that the 
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corporate governance best practice of having independent remuneration committees does not 
militate against higb levels of CEO reward, and may not provide the board with incentives to 
structure optimal contracts. Daily and others ( 1998) report similar findings. Their US study 
demonstrates that there is no systematic relationship between CEO rewards and the presence 
of either non-executive directors or affiliated directors and CEOs themselves on the 
remuneration committee. In sum, the research evidence on the efficacy of having an 
independent or non-independent formal remuneration committee is extremely mixed. 
Evidence on the status of the board chair 
There has been considerable debate over the efficacy of having outside director chairpersons 
instead of CEO-chairpersons - or CEO-chair 'duality' - from a CEO reward and 
performance management perspective. Research and theory has generally focused on the 
impacts of board leadership on board governance practice in general. Research is lacking on 
what specific effect board leadership practices may have on CEO reward and performance 
management. 
From a stewardship perspective, having dual roles enhances board effectiveness because of 
the CEO's specialised knowledge (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Conversely, from a 
principal-agent perspective, duality can be eschewed on the basis that decision control and 
management needs to be clearly demarcated (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
With regard to what influence CEO-chairpersons might have on board governance practices, 
evidence suggests that dual role holders can have substantial control over board 
appointments, and re-appointments. CEO-appointed directors, from a Managerial Power 
perspective, can become beholden to the CEO and may tend to err on the side of the CEO 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2002): In support of this, Wesphal and Zajac (1995) report that the 
CEO holds the balance of power when they select directors demographically similar to 
themselves .. They also find that the proportion of CEO-selected directors is positively related 
to total CEO reward but negatively related to the level of incentive reward; this conceivably 
both supports and challenges the prescriptions of the Agency Theory. Interviews conducted 
by Reilly and Scott (2005) indicate that UK CEO-chairpersons are commonly appointed as 
directors to the remuneration committee (2005:36). A recent Corporate Board Survey in the 
USA also corroborates this finding, where 28% of non-executive directors reported that 
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having an 'independent' chair was likely to have a small effect on reducing the level of CEO 
reward (Lawler and Finegold, 2007). 
This evidence seems to question the level of 'control' that boards have in managing and 
controlling CEO reward and performance. The paucity of empirical research on the impact 
of·the duality of these roles on CEO rewards makes it difficult to infer the prescriptive 
validity of separating the two roles. As we shall see, the results reported in this study 
indicate that the predictive effects of having a non-executive director board chairperson are 
non-significant, and thus neither support nor challenge the separation of these roles. 
Evidence on board size 
There is also considerable divergence in the empirical and theoretical literature about the 
impaci of board size on corporate performance, and CEO rewards. Some studies indicate that 
the size of the board limits its effectiveness iri pursuing optimal contracting. According to 
Core eta/. (1999: 387) a one member increase in board size is associated with a $30,601 
illcrease in total reward. 
In contrast, a meta-analysis by Dalton and others (1998) reports a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance. This is consistent with the notion that board size 
may have· important implications for board task performance. Kiel and NiCholson (2003) 
also find firm size to be positively associated with board size, greater proportion of non-
executive directors, and the separation of CEO and board chair roles. However, no 
significant association is reported between board size and corporate performance. 
These findings are significant for our purposes in that they suggest that board demographics 
have implications for board task performance. Yet the same evidence is of limited value in 
terms of evincing whether board size enhances the board's effectiveness in managing the 
agency relationship through rewards, a point that is explored further below. 
Outside director ownership 
Core et a/. (I 999), provide some evidence that stock ownership of outside directors may 
create incentives to challenge the CEO in terms of reward, and may serve to neutralise CEO 
entrenchment and attendant pressures for compliance. Specifically, Core and others (I 999: 
387) demonstrate that for a I% increase in the percentage of stock owned by outside 
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directors, total CEO reward decreases by $21, 183. In confirmatory factor analysis, Boyd. 
(1994) report that aggregate stock ownership by board members positively loads on board 
control. 
In summary, the evidence on the effects of board composition at the chair, board, and 
committee level are at best equivocal. It remains unclear whether board governance codes of 
best practice serve to enhance the board's management of CEO reward and performance. 
Some explanations relating to thisareprovided:in Chapter Ten in light ofthe.res!Jlts reported 
in this study. 
3.4.4 External Ownership 
Bloom and Milkovich (1998) contend that the degree of control that owners have over CEO 
reward varies from firm to finn, with the presence of one or more large external shareholders 
conferring greater principal control (that is, an 'owner-controlled' finn) and the absence of a 
large external shareholder conferring weaker principal control (or a 'manager-controlled' 
finn). The concentration of external ownership may, indeed, act as a countervailing force to 
Managerial Power, and, hence, to its ascribed- consequences: _rent-extraction, and incentive 
distortion. In firms where ownership is widely dispersed, individual owners may not possess 
the expertise and corporate knowledge to evaluate the executive team and incumbent CEO; 
nor, as Individuals, will they possess sufficient market power to have much influence on 
either market perceptions or finn governance. However, this may not be true of large 
external 'block holders', whether they happen to be wealthy individuals or large institutional 
investors, such as pension/superannuation funds. They have the power to influence both 
market perception and board compositiov. 
Ownership concentration may thus impose psychological constraints on rent-extraction and 
the level of perfonnance-decoupled rewards. Outrage - or potential outrage - from these 
large principals may act to curb rent extraction and thus reward without performance. 
Managerial Power theorists suggest that agents will.be less inclined to pursue rent extraction 
when they believe that their actions may provoke concerted shareholder outrage, especially 
where the principals concerned hold large blocks of the finn's equity. Accordingly, 
ownership concentration may serve to tighten the outrage constraint against, firstly, the 
decoupling of reward from performance and, secondly, the payment of sub-optimal (i.e. 
unnecessarily high) levels of total reward. Consistent with the theoretical and empirical 
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literature, it can be hypothesised that ownership concentration will constrain the level of 
stealth compensation, and performance-decoupled cash rewards. To support these 
propositions, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) surveyed 175 chief compensation officers, and 
reported that 'owner controlled' firms, characterised by an external block holder owning 5% 
or more of the company's stock, have higher ,levels of .incentive alignment in executive 
contracts that did those firms that are 'managerially controlled'. Yet, Tevlin (I 996) finds that 
firms with low ownership concentration had a sensitivity parameter that was 0.35 higher 
than highly concentrated firms (1996: 44 ). She maintains that incentive co.ntracts act as a 
substitute for monitoring such that the more dispersed external ownership, the higher the 
reward-performance sensitivity. 
In summary, there have been a number of studies that indicate that firm-level factors other 
than performance can influence CEO reward changes, levels, and performance sensitivity. 
These findings have important implications for both the theoretical specification and 
empirical estimation of the CEO reward and perfomiance relationship. 
Overall, the existing findings of reward for performance research, together with research 
examining the impacts of CEO and firm specific factors, and corporate governance on CEO 
rewards, carry discordant messages in relation to the predictive validity of Agency Theory 
and Managerial Power postulates, as well as the efficacy of the best practice governance 
prescriptions that rest: on one or both of these conceptual frameworks. If there is one thing 
that this literature does confirm, it is that the management of the agency relationship is more 
cmriplex than the literature acknowledges, and that an .understanding of the predictors and 
outcomes of CEO reward decisions will be enhanced .by recognising that the efficacy of 
Agency Theory and Managerial Power prescriptions for managing the agency relationship 
may be context-specific rather than universal. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Returning to the conceptual treatment of CEO reward and performance, Chapter Two 
identifies two key theoretical frameworks, and provides a critical overview of their 
assumptions and attendant prescriptive validity. The two frameworks advance similar 
solutions to CEO excess and pay without performance. 
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Agency Theory recommends that.boards should consist of a large proportion of 'outside' 
directors (See Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theorists do, however, imply that the board has a 
stewardship role to monitor agents, ·and to use incentives to manage problems attendant to 
the separation of ownership and control. The Jylanagerial Power perspective recognises the 
possibility of CEO entrenchment which may. prevent that board from determining .CEO 
rewards at arm's length and by default, that the board effectiveness to monitor agents and 
provide them with incentives can be impaired (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). A point of 
different between these two approaches is . that. the Managerial Power perspective is more 
explicit in suggesting that stealth compensation and incentive distortion are symptomatic of 
suboptimal board structural configurations that foster CEO entrenchment. Therefore, both 
theoretical perspectives consider board structural characteristics to be important boundary 
conditions for CEO pay for performance, and for controlling the growth in CEO pay. As we 
~ill soon see in Chapter Four, this institutional logic has become the edifice of corporate 
governance best practice, even though it remains to be empirically untested: Despite these 
caveats, increasing the performance-contingency of CEO rewards, as well as increasing the 
structural independence of the board, continues to be the. locus or object of corporate 
governance codes and best practice principles. 
In conjunction with Chapter Two, this chapter provides a .critical overview of both the 
empirical and theoretical literature pertaining to CEO reward and performance. It can be 
argued, however, that the prescriptions of both models rest on the a priori assumption that 
the board has the capability (as compared to the obligation) to manage CEO reward and 
performance on the basis of objective judgment and. strategic choice. It is this proposition 
that constitutes the pivotal point of departure for this thesis. . The universal assumption of 
board capability is arguably hampering knowledge development and research rigor by 
detracting attention from the board decisional processes which moderate CEO reward and 
performance. Research surveyed above, examining the determinants of CEO reward, has 
failed to convincingly and comprehensively elucidate how firm-specific, CEO-specific, 
external ownership and board governance practice influence the CEO reward and 
performance relationship. 
As such, the extant research corroborates neither Agency Theory nor Managerial Power 
explanations nor prescriptions in any conclusive manner. Upon closer examination, it is 
difficult to ascertain how each of the two leading conceptual approaches identified above, by 
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themselves, is capable of advancing our understanding of CEO reward and performance 
much further. Reward for performance can be used to infer board diligence to manage the 
agency relationship by constraining managerial power, and making CEO rewards more 
performance contingent. Similarly, reward performance insensitivity can be taken as 
indirectly lending credence to the Managerial Power model and to infer persistent board 
'capture' and poor board governance. Furthermore, we are left to reconcile the discrepancy 
between theory, and the empirical inconsistencies evident in extant CEO reward and 
performance sensitivity research. The only certainty evident in the empirical literature is that 
size continues to explain variation in CEO rewards. 
The methodological isomorphism evident in extant research examining the sensitivity of 
CEO reward to performance adds another layer of complexity to this story. This chapter 
provided a brief examination of some of the methodological limitations of the conventional 
approach to estimating and specifying the relationship between CEO reward and 
performance that were examined. The overarching argument presented is that the empirical 
inconsistencies in CEO reward and performance sensitivity research may be 
methodologically driven. 
To this end, this thesis seeks to examine the association between CEO cash reward and 
performance, in addition to empirically testing the institutional supposition this relationship 
is bounded to board structural characteristics. To manage the validity of inferences drawn 
from these analyses, this thesis uses a system GMM approach to dynamic panel model 
estimation; an approach discussed further in Chapter Five. Such an approach necessarily 
challenges the continued preoccupation with board siructural. configurations as mechanisms 
to optimise the board's management of CEO reward and performance. 
To facilitate these research objectives, the following chapter - Chapter Four - presents an 
hypothesised structural and economic model of CEO cash reward. The purpose of Chapter 
Four is twofold. First, it attempts to integrate extant theory, research examining the 
association between CEO reward and performance, along with corporate governance 
regulation. The second purpose is to present and explain the research hypotheses tested in 
this thesis. 
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Chapter Four 
An Hypothesised Economic and Structural Model of CEO Cash 
Determination 
4.1 Introduction 
The critical reviews of the existing research and theoretical perspectives on CEO reward and 
performance provided in Chapters Two and Three, suggest that the debate on CEO reward 
and performance has been localised to economic and structural models. A number of 
criticisms were made regarding the validity of the dominant conceptualisation, empirical 
specification, and estimation of the relationship between CEO reward and performance. It is 
argued that both theory and research neglects the complexities of board decision-making 
processes underlying CEO cash reward. It is also argued that the extant empirical evidence 
is equivocal on the relationship between CEO reward and performance, as well as on the 
factors that moderate this relationship. Theory and research has consequently failed to 
contribute to an enhanced understanding of CEO reward and performance to any great 
extent. The structural independence of the board continues to be the locus or object of 
corporate governance codes and best practice principles. 
To promote a better understanding of CEO reward and performance, this chapter presents an 
hypothesised structural and economic model of CEO cash reward explicates its embedded 
causal and propositional logic. The model integrates the key suppositions underpinning 
Agency Theory and Managerial Power literatures that continue to inform corporate 
governance prescriptions in Australia, the USA, and the UK. It also incorporates insights 
from the empirical literature examining various structural and economic factors that can 
influence CEO reward. 
To this end, this chapter firstly elucidates how the extant theoretical perspectives on CEO 
reward and performance can be integrated for the purpose of developing an integrative 
economic and structural model of CEO reward and performance. Economic and structural 
factors in the hypothesised model include: i) firm characteristics, ii) ownership 
characteristics, and iii) board characteristics. Subsequent sections then explain how factors 
posited in the model can potentially impact on and moderate the relationship between CEO 
cash rewards and performance. 
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4.2 Integrating Extant Theory 
Following the critiques of Agency Theory and the Managerial Power perspective, there is a 
need for a more comprehensive and integrative framework for understanding how factors 
derived from extant research and theory exert influence on CEO reward outcomes. While 
attempts have been made to integrate extant theory and research, the insights provided are 
largely descriptive (Chu, Hu, and Chu, 2006; Devers et a/., 2007; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Finkelstein. and Hambrick, 1988; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995). 
In ·order to build on and advance existing theory and research on CEO reward and 
performance management, we need to first integrate and synthesise key postulates and 
prescriptions underpinning both Agency Theory, and the Managerial Power perspective. 
The critical review of these. two perspectives in Chapter Two revealed that the synergies 
between the two approaches have been overlooked. Both perspectives pose two pivotal 
assumptions. First, they assume that a board of directors can potentially act in the interests 
of the CEO, above and beyond principal-shareholders when ratifying proposals put forward 
by management for board approval (Fama, 1980). The second assumption is that board 
structural characteristics can enable the board to be more critical and analytical when 
judging the efficacy of management-initiated proposals, especially those concerning CEO 
reward. 
Exhibit 4.1 provides a schematic and integrative model of both Agency Theory and 
Managerial Power prescriptions for optimising the board's management of CEO re.ward. 
According to the diagram, the key actors in the determination and management of CEO 
reward and performance include the board of directors, the shareholders, and the CEO. The 
prescriptions proffered by both theoretical perspectives are targeted at enhancing and 
positively moderating the alignment of interests between the shareholders and the board, or 
the CEO and the shareholders. 
The various mechanisms proposed in the literature that are said to align the interests of the 
CEO and shareholders include: executive ownership (Eisenhardt, 1989); the use of 
performance-based reward; board direct monitoring and control of CEO task performance 
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(Fama and Jensen, 1983); the board's appraisal of CEO task performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983); and enhancing shareholder power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
Further, mechanisms to enhance the alignment of interests between the board of directors 
and shareholders include: director incentives and share ownership (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004); external share ownership, board leadership, large numbers of outside directors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989); the potential for shareholder outrage (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004); and the 
presence of board task specific committees (see Cadbury, 2002). 
In Exhibit 4.1, the arrows inside the triangle indicate that such mechanisms are assumed to 
remove structures and socio-political forces that prevent the board from optimising CEO 
reward outcomes. They also act to preclude the CEO from influencing the management and 
administration of CEO reward. Consistent with Agency Theory, the Managerial Power 
perspective assumes that board structural arrangements and institutional forces can render 
the board more efficient in monitoring the CEO and evaluating and ratifying CEO reward 
proposals. 
r 
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Exhibit 4.1 An Integrative Model of the Mechanisms to Align the Interests of Shareholders and Agents 
Board-Shareholder alignment 
moderators 
• Large proportion of outside 
directors 
• Director incentives 
• Director ownership 
• Increased shareholder power 
• Reputational costs 
Shareholders 
Board-CEO alignment 
moderators 
• CEO entrenchment 
• CEO influence director 
appointments 
• CEO influence on director 
incentives 
• Board interlocks & social ties 
• CEO-Chairperson duality 
CEO-shareholder alignnrelll 
moderators 
• Performance-contingent CEO 
rewards 
• Executive ownership 
• Board monitoring & CEO 
performance evaluation 
• Separation of decision & strategic 
management from decision & 
strategic control 
• Increased Shareholder power 
• Reputational costs 
• Ex post settling up. 
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Both Agency Theory and Managerial Power Theory assume that under the 'right' conditions, 
boards have an economic and rational orientation _to the decision-making process. Under the 
'wrong' conditions, socio-political forces preclude the board's economic orientation to the 
management of CEO reward and performance. Managerial Power Theory assumes that 
unless there are structural constraints on CEO entrenchment, boards will determine CEO cash 
reward on the basis of a psychosocial imperative to be conciliatory to the CEO (Bebchuk and 
Fried, .2004). This bias toward the CEO may preclude the director from constructively 
evaluating a proposal for the purpose of managing CEO cash reward and performance. 
However, the efficacy of board structural prescriptions advanced by these theories remains 
empirically untested. It. remains ·unclear whether board structural arrangements, prescribed 
by these theories, necessarily optimise CEO reward outcomes and the relationship between 
CEO reward and performance. 
4.3 An Hypothesised Economic and Structural Model of CEO Cash Reward and 
Performance. 
The Agency Theory literature delineates various firm, ownership, and board characteristics 
that can influence the level, composition, and performance sensitivity of CEO reward (See 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Kerr and Kren, 1992). Exhibit 4.2 
merely describes the structural and economic determinants of CEO cash reward. The· 
following subsections explore on the basis of existing theory and research, how these firm, 
ownership, and board characteristics can influence CEO reward outcomes. Such a discussion 
explores how . these factors can influence board strategic choices relating to the level, 
composition, and performance sensitivity of cash reward. On the basis of extant research and 
theory, it is reasonable to propose the following. 
Proposition 1: While CEO reported CEO cash rewards may be sensitive to firm performance 
it is unlikely Ia be exclusively contingent on firm performance. 
The broad logic encapsulated in the proposed theoretical system prompts research to explore 
the direct and moderating effects of a range of firm, ownership, and board characteristics on 
CEO cash reward level, composition, and the ex post sensitivity of these rewards to measures 
of firm performance. Based on existing research and theory, Exhibit 4.2 outlines the firm, 
ownership, and board structural characteristics posited in extant theory and research, to 
influence CEO cash reward, as well as their treatment of these determinants in subsequent 
64 
chapters. Our purpose here is to examine the extent to which these factors influence and 
explain variation in the CEO cash reward, and also the extent to which they moderate the 
association between CEO cash reward and measures of firm-level performance. 
4.4 Determinants of CEO Reward and Performance 
4.4.1 Firm characteristics and CEO Cash Reward 
Performance 
It is important that the empirical and theoretical specification of CEO reward and 
performance account for the practical and human realities of board decisions pertaining to the 
design of performance incentive cash plans. In particular, there is a need to account for the 
possibility of cash reward levels being determined against multiple measures of firm 
performance (see El!ig, 2003 for an example). "Contrary to Lambert and Larcker's 
suppositions, in some cases, there may not be tradeoffs between accounting and market return 
measures, especially where cash incentive plans specify multiple performance measures, and 
have concomitant awards determined according to a multiple-measure matrix (see El!ig, 2003, 
for an example). 
Proposition la: CEO total cash reward is positively associated with lagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance 
Proposition lb: CEO annual cash reward is positively associated with lagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance 
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Exhibit 4.2. An Hypothesised Economic and Structural Model of CEO Cash Reward and Performance 
Firm Characteristics 
• Firm Accounting Returns: Chapter 6 
• Firm Market Return: Chapter 6 
• Firm Size: Chapter 7 
• Firm Total Risk: Chapter 7 
Ownership Characteristics 
CEO Ownership: Chapter 8 
• Percentage of issued stock held by CEO 
• CEO Participation in Option and/or Share Rights Plan 
External Ownership: Chapter 9 
• Percentage of CEO Capital Held by Top Shareholder 
• Percentage oflssued Capital held by Top 20 
Shareholders 
Board Characteristics: Chaf!Jer /0 
• Percentage ofNon-Executive Directors on the Board 
• Presence of an 'independent' nomination committee 
• Presence of an 'independent' nomination committee 
• Non-Executive Chairperson 
Main Effects 
• CEO Cash Reward 
• CEO Annual Incentive Cash Reward 
Moderating Effects 
• CEO Cash Reward and Performance 
Sensitivity 
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Firm Size 
Previous studies have shown that firm size also plays an important role in the management 
and determination of CEO rewards. Tosi and others (2000) report that firm size accounted for 
40% of the explained variance in CEO total reward, whereas firm-level performance 
explained less that 5%. Some authors explain this in terms of firm size being a proxy of firm 
complexity; more specifically operational, financial, and strategic complexity from 
diversification, intemationalisation and greater resources (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; 
Lippert and Moore, 1994). They argue that this warrants greater levels of fixed rewards to 
attract and retain CEO talent. The literature also suggests that firm risk or high-variance in 
firm returns may have the same effects as firm size in attenuating the sensitivity of firm-level 
performance to CEO decisions and actions. 
The performance insensitivity and magnitude of CEO pay have also been justified in terms of 
job characteristics. Following this line of logic, some commentators suggest that CEO pay 
serves as a compensatory mechanism and suggest that the job [of the CEO] has become 
increasingly 'difficult and less pleasant' (Kaplan, 2008: 6). Henderson and Fredrickson 
(1996) rationalise frends in CEO pay on the premise that CEOs need to be compensated for 
the information-processing demands attendant to the position. Finkelstein and }fambrick 
(1988) also suggest· that high CEO rewards are explained more simply through organisational 
size, where CEOs who manage large firms are required to manage greater resources (1988: 
549). Indeed, the size, the intemationalisation, and diversification of firms have become 
indices of CEO task complexity (Gabaix and Landier, 2008), indeed there is robust empirical 
support suggesting the size predicts CEO pay (See Tosi et al, 2002). 
Proposition 3: Firm size is positively associated with CEO total cash, and annual incentive· 
cash reward. 
Firm Risk 
Consistent with Agency Theory, performance insensitivity is also explained in terms of 
managing CEO risk bearing. According to a behavioural model of Agency Theory, risk 
bearing refers to the agent's perceived risk taking, and the potential for loss of wealth 
(Larraza-Kintina, Wiseman eta/., 2007;·Wiseinari and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Larraza-Kintina 
et a/., (2007: I 002) suggest that agent risk bearing is a positive function of the agent's 
perceived employment risk, and second, the agent's perceived compensation risk or the 
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unpredictability of future earnings. Zajac and Westphal (1994: 121) show that there are 
'diminishing· behavioural returns' associated with higher levels of incentive reward in firms 
where there is a high variance in stock returns. They also suggest that firms with complex 
corporate strategies face diminishing 'behavioural returns' to increases in monitoring. 
Aggarwal and Samwick imply that in order for the board of directors to account for agent 
risk-bearing in the management of the relationship between reward and performance, they 
would necessarily have to examine the variance of the performance measure ( 1999a: 77). In 
tum, the observed high variance of firm performance may require that the agent receive 
additional fixed reward or a risk premium to dissuade them from leaving the company 
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Similarly, Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that lowering the 
'sharing rate' (i.e. the incremental relationship between CEO reward and shareholder gains) 
may provide a stronger incentive effect because a high sharing rate transfers undue 
compensation risk to agents to the point that they may avoid high net present value projects 
(see also Canyon and Sadler, 200 I). 
The principal-agent model assumes that the board needs to balance agent-risk exposure wi!h 
agent incentives. By implication, agents exposed to high levels of firm risk can be expected to 
receive lower levels of incentive reward (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Consistent with this logic, several studies have found that stock volatility, a source of firm 
risk, negatively moderates the relationship between CEO rewards and firm-level performance 
(Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Core et a/., 1991); Lippert and 
Moore, 1994; Merhebi eta/., 2006; Mishra, McConaughy, and Gobeli, 2000). 
They suggest that in order to improve board attributions regarding the CEO's· individual 
contribution to firm-level performance, boards may examine the volatility of the performance 
criterion specified in the plan, in addition to relative performance to 'net out' error in 
attributing firm-performance to the CEO. Consistent with Lambert and Larcker (1987), the 
model is premised on the assumption that firm-level performance is ostensibly an imperfect 
measure of CEO performance. 
For instance, it is difficult to discern from firm-level performance measurement the extent to 
which such outcomes are attributable to CEO behaviour (Lambert. and Larcker, 1987). This; 
by extension, creates the possibility that CEOs may be rewarded not for random noise in the 
performance measure, rather than their own actions. This limits the extent to which valid 
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inferences can be drawn about the CEO's performance. At the very least, we should expect to 
find a significant relationship between reported performance contingent rewards and lagged 
firm performance measures. Where we find a disassociation. between reported performance-
based cash rewards and recent firm-level performance, it is fair to deduce that boards have 
been ineffectual in terms of providing rewards commensurate with lagged p'erforinance. 
Proposition 4a: Firm risk is positively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 4b: Firm risk is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
4.4.2 Ownership and CEO Cash Reward 
CEO Ownership 
Our theoretical model specifies these two forms of CEO ownership as determinants of CEO 
cash reward. However, the model is neutral in terms of predicting what impact these two 
different forms of CEO equity participation have on the level and composition of CEO cash 
rewards as well as their moderating effects on the relationship between these reward measures 
and firm-level performance. 
An added complexity here is that different types of CEO equity participation may have 
differential incentive and nsk effects on the CEO (Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien, 2000; Sanders, 
2001). For this reason, we distinguish between asymmetric and symmetric risk by using as 
proxies option or share rights plan participation and equity ownership respectively. It is 
conceivable, then, that boards may also place differential importance on stock ownership 
compared to stock option participation (see Byran, eta/., 2000). It is for this reason that this 
thesis does test hypotheses regarding the directionality of the association between CEO 
ownership and CEO cash reward. 
Agency Theory recognises the importance of taking CEO risk·preferences into account when 
managing CEO reward and performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory 
suggests CEO share ownership, by default, provides the agent with incentives to promote 
market return. CEO equity owuership thus exposes the CEO to risk that is identical to that 
experienced by shareholders (Sanders, 2001). By extension, it is reasonable to predict that 
CEO ownership may moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and firm-level 
performance in two ways. First, consistent with Lambert and Larcker's (1987) insights, CEO 
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ownership can prompt tradeoffs between different performance measures, as well as tradeoffs 
between different reward components, in an attempt. to. balance agent risk and incentives. 
FUrther, boar~s may be more inclined to condition CEO cash reward on measures of 
accounting-return performance when CEO share ownership is higher. Second, and consistent 
with. Agency Theory, CEOs with higher levels of CEO share ownership do not require 
additional performance incentives through CEO cash rewards, and thus would be expected to 
receive lower levels of performance-based cash, relative to fixed cash reward (See Tevlin, 
1996). 
Proposition 5a: The percentage of issued capital held by. the CEO is associated with CEO 
total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
Proposition 5b: CEO participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan is associated 
with CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
External Ownership 
As canvassed in Chapter Three, the extant empirical research suggests that external ownership 
concentration may be an important basis for CEO cash reward and performance deliberations. 
Studies reporting positive moderating effects. on the reward-performance relationship 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003) and negative main effects of CEO reward levels lend credence to 
the proposition that concentrated shareholders may provide the board with greater incentives 
to structure more optimal CEO rewards. Especially where CEO cash reward sensitivity to 
firm-level performance is considered to demonstrate the board's commitment to managing the 
agency relationship (Abowd, 1990). Consequently, external ownership concentration may 
provide the board with greater incentives to increase the performance contingency of CEO 
cash rewards. 
In the Australian regulatory context, external shareholders can influence executive reward 
decisions through non-binding shareholder resolutions. Thus shareholders and ownership 
structure can impact on the board's management and control of CEO reward and 
performance. 
Accordingly, based on the logic that agents will be less inclined to pursue rent extraction 
when they believe that their actions may provoke concerted shareholder outrage (Bebchuk 
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and Fried, 2004), both research and theory suggest that ownership may act to buttress board 
effectiveness. This is the case especially where the principals concerned hold _large blocks of 
the firm's equity. The extant literature suggests that ownership concentmtion may serve to 
tighten the outrage constraint and, in tum, militate against the decoupling of reward from 
performance and, secondly, leads to the payment of sub-optimal (i.e. unnecessarily high) 
reward levels. 
It is also possible that in some contexts tradeoffs may occur between performance contingent 
rewards and the degree of equity dispersion. Tevlin (1996) provides evideri.ce that 
performance-contingent cash rewards may substitute for direct monitoring by large external 
block holders, a possibility to be considered further in the next chapter. Thus, external 
ownership may be important foci in board deliberations pertaining to the control and decision 
management of CEO cash reward and performance. Our model proposes that external 
ownership may also influence both board governance pmctices and the board's ability and 
willingness to exercise strategic choice and objective judgment in their efforts to manage 
CEO reward and performance. It is plausible that boards may be more strongly motivated to 
act objectively where they perceive the need to appease large visible external block holders. It 
may also be the case that having large external block holders precipitates more strategic 
choices and more diligent decision-making processes pertaining to CEO reward and 
performance, and. by extension more diligent monitoring and valid reliable measurement of 
CEO performance. Equally, it is possible that a board may decide to make less use of 
incentive contmcts where block holders prefer to monitor the CEO directly. 
Proposition 6a: The percentage of issued capital held by top shareholders is negatively 
associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 6b: The percentage of issued capital held by top ·shareholders is positively 
associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
4.4.3 Board Chamcteristics and CEO Cash Reward, and Corporate Governance 
Recent corporate governance reforms in the Australian context have sought to increase board 
efficiency in managing executive reward and performance. The theoretical model specified 
accommodates or recognises that Australian listed company boards have institutional 
pressures to manage CEO reward in certain ways, and also to practice board governance in 
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particular ways - in accordance with 'best practice' requirements. Thus the model casts 
corporate governance regulation and best practice rhetoric as both a determinant of Board 
Governance practice and a moderator of CEO cash reward and performance. 
On the basis of past research; the model·assumes that board governance practice can have 
differential effects on the board's management of CEO reward and performance. Thus 
according to the model, corporate governance regulation and rhetoric can potentially impact 
on CEO cash reward and performance in two ways. First, these institutional pressures can be 
a focal point of board deliberations when structuring CEO cash reward. Second, these 
interventions can directly influence board governance practice. However, as suggested, the 
effects of subscribing to board governance codes of best practice may not necessarily translate 
into more optimal CEO cash reward and performance outcomes. 
Before explicating these implications from a CEO reward and performance management 
perspective, a definition of corporate governance is in order. 
This thesis adopts the definition of corporate governance developed by The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (2003). Corporate governance is described as 
" the system· by which companies are directed and managed .. 
. [which] influences how objectives of the company are set and 
achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how 
performance is optimised." (2003: 3) 
The past decade has seen a rapid development in corporate governance prescriptions and 'best 
practice' codes. This paper will use a definition suggested by Huse (2007, 181) that corporate 
govemance.codes.of best practice are 'sets of that best-practice recommendations regarding 
the structure and behaviour of boards'. These codes are intended to enhance board task 
performance in general, and especially the board's ability to make effective decisions. Huse 
(2007) cites examples of codes of corporate governance best practice as well as corporate 
governance regulation in UK and USA. In aggregate, these reports, codes, and statutes have 
furthered a normative model of corporate governance, which has implications for board 
composition, leadership, diligence and accountabilities, as well as transparency in board 
decision-making. 
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Corporate governance interventions are considered to improve board effectiveness through 
their implicit mechanisms, structures and processes. Overall, these interventions are 
considered to impact on: i) board accountabilities; ii) board governance; and iii) board 
decision and strategic control. Codes of best practice, by definition, are purported to enhance 
board decision-making abilities and judgements. The implicit mechanisms or throughputs to 
facilitate. improvements in board task perform~nce more generally include board governance 
practice, which encompasses board structural characteristics and board composition· at the 
board, committee and chair level, and disclosure requirements. These mechanisms are 
considered to enhance overall board task performance by: i) accountability and task 
requirements; ii) diligence and pflldence; and iii) optimising the executive reward system. 
Yet it is possible that boards may subscribe to board governance and CEO reward practices 
simply as a matter of regulatory compliance. As such, these prescriptions may present as ends 
in themselves rather than as means to any higher purpose. That is, boards that comply with 
these prescriptions may simply be assumed to be •more effective monitors, diligent and 
prudent decision makers, and thus more effective in procuring CEO incentives through the 
CEO reward system. 
For our purposes; the key question is whether and to what extent such requirements and 
prescriptions stand to enhance the board's effectiveness in specific areas -of board task 
performance such as the management of the CEO reward and performance relationship? In 
addressing this question, it is helpful at the outset to examine the specific foci of these 
interventions in terms of board task domain, the mechanisms posited to enable enhance board 
task performance, and their purported outcomes. 
Towards this end, we will now consider briefly the speCific implications of Australian 
corporate governance interventions and their impacts of CEO cash reward and performance. 
In 1998, the Australian Corporations Law and Australian Accounting Board Standards (I 046) 
mandated an embryonic form of disclosure of the ;remuneration of the highest paid company 
officers. Publicly listed companies were required to outline, in a formal remuneration report 
appended to the company's annual report, the underlying remuneration policy for company 
officers, the policy's relationship to the company's performance and a reporting of the total 
CEO reward of the company's five highest paid officers in a disaggregated form (base salary, 
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superannuation, benefits, cash bonuses, termination payments, etc.) (sees. 300A of Schedule 
I of the Company Law Review Act1998, which is now the same section of the Corporations 
Act 2001). ln. 2004, the enactment of the. CLERP9 reform recommendations amended that 
section to further detail the remuneration disclosure requirements (see Schedule 5 of the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
2004). The 2004 amendment specifically requires the reporting of the 'fair values' of new 
option grants (ss. 300A(I)(e)(ii)-(vi) of the Corporations Act 2001): These reforms thus 
require boards to rigorously disclose CEO rewards, by detailing the constitutive components 
of the highest paid company officers (sees. 300A(I )(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 and reg. 
2M.3.03 of the Corporations Regulations 200 I) and by disclosing the performance conditions 
and criteria used to determine CEO rewards (see s. 300A(I )(ba)). These targeted 
interventions are intended to provide boards. with. stronger incentives to increase the 
performance contingency of CEO ~eward. The additional requirement of a non-binding 
shareholder vote on the remuneration report provides the board with additional incentives to 
structure more fair and reasonable CEO reward packages (including termination payments), 
as well as director rewards (see s. 250R of the Corporations Act 200 1). 
Thus, Australian boards have to comply not only with a raft of CEO reward disclosure 
requirements, they are also required to respond to institutional pressures to engender board 
governance codes of best practice. The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003), provide 
a ·number of recommendations pertaining to, inter alia, board composition and governance 
practices. Recommendation 2.1 prescribes that boards should have a larger proportion of 
'independent', rather than non-independent directors, on the board. The rationale for this is 
that independent directors are considered to be in a better position to act in the interests of the 
company and to. exercise 'independent judgment' in order to 'to promote ethical and 
responsible decision making' (2003: 19). The ASX Council of Good .Governance define an 
'independent' non-executive director as someone who is 
" .... independent of management and free of any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere with - or could 
reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with- the exercise of 
their unfettered and independent judgment." (ASX Principles of 
Good Governance, Recommendation 2.1, 2003: 19) 
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OECD principles endorse this logic by suggesting that independent directors are likely to be 
more adept at exercisin'g independent judgement. They also help ensure proper compliance 
with committee charters (OECD, 2004: 25). 
According to the prescriptions implicit in the ASX Principles of Good Governance (2003), 
'independence' at the chair, board, and remuneration and nomination ·committee level can 
improve the board's ability to manage the relationship 'between CEO cash rewards and 
perfonmance in three ways. Boards subscribing to these principles are considered to have the 
ability to exercise objective judgments and strategic choice when making decisions in 
general, be better placed to procure effective CEO incentives·and make 'fair and 'appropriate' 
CEO cash reward decisions and to 'encourage enhanced' perfonmance. Recommendations 
2.2 and 2.4 prescribe that boards have independent non-executive chairpersons at the board 
and nomination and remuneration committee levels. Having an independent chairperson at 
the committee and board level is considered to enhance board leadership. In particular, 
having predominantly independent directors on the remuneration and nomination committees 
is considered to increase the board's ability to exercise objective and. effective judgments 
regarding corporate governance practice, board appointtnents and executive appointments. 
These practices are purported to improve the board's ability to 'encourage enhanced 
perfonmance' (ASX Principles of Good Governance, Principle 8, 2003: 47) and to 
'remunerate fairly and responsibly' (ASX Principles of Good Governance, Principle 9, 2003: 
51). 
In large measure, such interventions have the intention of militating against board capture. 
Board capture is said to be greater when the CEO is also the board chairperson, when the 
board is comprised of more :internally-recruited than externally-sourced directors and when 
the CEO is an internal appointee with extensive corporate knowledge. In such situations, it is 
suggested, a CEO is able to neutralize board monitoring, dominate the flow of organisational 
infonmation and secure a large pay packet irrespective of finm perfonmance. The Cadbury 
report (1992, cited in Cadbury, 2002) in the United Kingdom (UK) recommended separating 
the board chairperson and CEO roles to buttress board leadership. Thus, separating the two 
roles (Recommendation 2.3 ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance, 2003) and 
having a non-executive chair have come to be regarded as key elements of 'best practice' 
corporate governance. Consistent with the Managerial Power approach, separating the roles is 
purported to reduce a board's susceptibility to managerial self-interest, and improve their 
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effectiveness to structure optimal contracts by curbing growth in the level of performance-
insensitive CEO reward. 
Corporate governance regulation has also sought to enhance board task performance by 
stipulating more rigorous annual reporting and executive reward disclosure requirements. 
This increased transparency is assumed to enhance board leadership and accountability and 
provide greater incentives for the board to enhance the alignment between executive_ 
incentives and firm-level performance (See ASX Principles of Good Governance, 2003). For 
example, increased CEO reward disclosure requirements, along with shareholder resolutions 
on CEO rewards, may ·motivate the board: to make to cash rewards more performance 
contingent and sensitive to shareholder returns, while at the same time controlling the growth 
in CEO rewards. 
Rather than test these decisional processes directly, this thesis tests their outcomes. For our 
purposes, the key question is whether and to what extent such requirements and prescriptions 
stand to enhance the board's effectiveness in specific areas of board task performance such as 
the management of the CEO reward and performance relationship? 
Proposition 7a: Board 'independence' at' the board chair, board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO total cash reward 
Proposition 7b: Board 'independence' at the board chair, board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO annual cash reward. 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a non-executive dominated remuneration or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a non-executive dominated remuneration or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
A necessary caveat to be made here, however, is that corporate governance structures 
purported to improve board effectiveness to make optimal reward decisions that are 
independent of managerial influence, may in actuality, not precipitate optimal decisions and 
may .be instead more tokenistic. Thus, in this thesis, board effectiveness· is conceptually 
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distinct to optimal corporate governance structures and board structural independence. It is 
hoped that this thesis and the model presented will ultimately test the empirical validity and 
efficacy of board structural independence and 'best' practice corporate governancestructures 
to improve the board's effectiveness to structure optimal rewards. 
The ideal of director 'independence' has assumed virtually uncontested status in current 
governance theory and practice and is routinely taken as a key indicator of board decision and 
strategic control capabilities. However, it remains unclear from research evidence whether 
these prescriptions are improving the board's management and control of CEO cash· reward 
and performance. Indeed, as noted in Chapter Three, there is no empirical evidence that 
'independence' at the board and committee level has facilitated material improvements in 
board task performance. 
Bebchuk and Fried's (2004) exposition of 'camouflage' suggests that disclosure requirements 
do not necessarily optimise CEO cash reward decisions or the accuracy of the reporting of 
those decisions. It is also conceivable that governance reforms provide impetus for 'coercive 
isomorphism' (Bender, 2004; Bender and Moir, 2006). Thus on the basis of these 
considerations, it seems plausible to suggest that boards may mimic reward practices of peer 
companies as a means to retain and attract CEO talent, while also feeling pressure to conform 
to regulatory impositions in an attempt to manage potential media and shareholder outrage 
(see Zajac and Westphal, 1995 for evidence). In essence, board governance practices 
encompass the informal and formal processes and norms that affect board task performance. 
Board governance practices aimed at institutionalising board 'indepen~ence' .may not be 
sufficient for enhancing the board's control and management of CEO rewards and incentives. 
This is notwithstanding the degree to which the board's structure conforms to best practice 
governance prescriptions. Board 'independence' at the committee, chair and board level 
should not be conflated with board competence to manage and control CEO cash reward and 
performance on the basis on strategic choice and due diligence. 
Accordingly, this thesis tests whether the diffusion of board governance best practice 
principles has precipitated material changes in the board's management of CEO reward and 
performance. It is conceivable that the board's adherence to the best practice prescriptions 
may be merely perfunctory or tokenistic. By themselves, board structures are not necessarily 
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instrumental in increasing the board's effectiveness to manage the agency relationship. 
Research investigating the link between board demographics and corporate performance in 
the Australian context by Kiel and Nicholson (2003) provides evidence to support this 
supposition. They found that a range of board governance measures were uncorrelated with 
corporate performance. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The integrative model presented in this chapter elucidates the economic and structural 
determinants of CEO cash reward identified in extant theory and research., and presents a 
series of research hypotheses. Building on these points, the next chapter considers how 
theoretical model of CEO cash reward and performance management presented in this chapter 
can enable the more rigoroJIS specification and e.stimati!)n of the reward determination 
process. It will also facilitate richer and more precise research inferences regarding the 
management and control of CEO cash reward and performance from a board decision-making 
perspective. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Method and Model Specification and Estimation 
5.1 Introduction 
The review of existing research on CEO reward and performance in Chapter Three notes 
several methodological limitations in existing approaches. In response to these shortcomings, 
this chapter presents a rationale for shifting to systems - or an identified multi·equation -
approach to the model specification and parameter estimation of CEO reward and 
performance relationship. A secondary aim of this chapter is to describe the methods for data 
collection, data management and analysis used in this study. We tum our attention firstly to 
why aggregate statistical analysis was considered the most appropriate method for advancing 
our existing understanding of CEO reward and performance management. 
5.2 Research Method 
This study takes a more considered and systematic approach to the theoretical specification, 
model specification, and parameter estimation of CEO reward and performance management 
compared to the extant theory and research. One of the most important criticisms levelled at 
the existing research, especially recent research conducted in the Australian context, is that 
the specification and estimation of CEO reward and performance has several limitations 
which essentially bias the estimates generated. It is argued in Chapter Three that the Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) statistic remains an entrenched method for examining the relationship 
between CEO reward and performance despite its susceptibility to a range of sources of 
contamination, most notably autoregressive processes stemming from the complex error 
structure of a dynamic panel model. 
Anastasi (1976) alluded to the importance of synchronising the theoretical specification of a 
causal relationship (in this case reference was made to the relationship between motivation 
and performance) with the empirical specification, and the estimation of this relationship. 
Ostrom (1990) concurs with this strategy. Berry also indicates that this is an appropriate 
strategy for optimising the validity of model specification and, in tum, parameter estimation 
(1993: 67). 
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The extant empirical literature is contaminated by specification error in this regard, especially 
in that it does not accord due consideration to, inter alia, autocorrelation and exogeneity. This 
will be further discussed in the forthcoming sections comparing different approaches to 
parameter estimation. In line with these general observations, this chapter specifies an 
identified multi-equation lagged distribution model as a more appropriate functional form to. 
examine CEO cash reward and performance relationship._ A two-step System GMM is 
identified as an appropriate dynamic panel estimator. It is thought that this research strategy· 
enables generalisable research findings that can then be used to formulate more task-specific 
and nomothetic guiding principles, or targeted interventions, to enhance the practice of CEO 
reward and performance management. 
5.3 Data and Sample 
This study draws on consecutive reported annual financial and reward data collected on 
Australian public companies that, at any time between 1998-9 and 2005-6, were included in 
the S&P/ASX 500 index (i.e. the share index representing the 500 most higbly capitalised 
public companies traded on the Australian Securities Exchange). Only firms with five or more 
annual observations were included in the final sample, giving a total potential sample o(4,456 
company years of panel data. The final sample includes data relating to a total of 663 distinct 
firms', and 1,257 CEOs over this period. All data were captured at balance date. 
In general, reward data were captured for the executive with the highest reported. cash reward 
(i.e. base salary, cash benefits, plus cash incentives/bonus). In the vast majority of cases this 
is the individual nominated as the 'Chief Executive Officer' (CEO) or 'Managing Director' 
(MD). However, in a small number of cases where we have observed that the nominated 
CEO or MD was not the executive or director with the largest individual shareholding, data 
were captured for the director with the largest individual shareholdings rather than for the 
nominated CEO/MD. In many such cases this individual was an executive nominated as the 
'executive chairperson', who, by virtue of their shareholdings, occupied a position of 
executive leadership and influence on the board greater than that of the nominated MD/CEO. 
4 Using the statistical sof!:ware STA TA, the researcher was able: to iden~ify ~hat 9~% of firms san:Jpled had 
balanced panels of data. 
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Discussions in the previous chapter indicated that since 1998 Australian Corporations law has 
imposed disclosure requirements for both the directors and executives within listed 
corponitions. The Company Law Review Act 1998 required firms to compile a Director's 
Report detailing 'the nature and amount of each element of the emolument of each director 
and each of the 5 named officers of the company receiving the highest emolument'. It also 
mandated total CEO reward to be reported in disaggregated form (base salary, 
superannuation, benefits, cash bonuses, termination payments, etc.) and a discussion of the 
relationship between the remuneration policy for directors' and executives' and firm 
performance. Since then, various amendments have served to add detail to these 
requirements. Reward data for years prior to 1998-9 have not been included since before that 
time Australian companies were only required to report the total cash reward of $100,000 and 
above in $10,000 bands without disaggregating and without individual executives being 
named. Moreover, prior to 1998 companies were only required to disclose the equity holdings 
of board directors, not those of salaried executives. 
Data were also captured on the.number of shares held directly and indirectly by each CEO at 
each report date, as well as on the aggregate number of unexercised share options and share 
rights held at the relevant balance date. The decision to exclude the 'fair' value of CEO stock 
options will be explicated shortly. 
Initial data management was performed using SPSS 14.0 (2006), and subsequent data analysis 
was performed using ST A TA 9 (2008). STAT A was used to ideniify and remove· annual 
duplicates within panels of data. 
Data were collected retrospectively from March 2005 up until October 2007. During the data 
collection period, some companies in the sample changed their names, codes, or re-used 
codes. To prevent duplication and to account for firms having multiple ASX codes, data were 
checked throughout the data collection period. Companies de-listed during the period were 
excluded unless they had five or more annual observations. Listed trusts were also excluded. 
All dollar values were inflation adjusted using the Australian Consumer Price Inflation index 
(CPI) with 1999 as the base year. Inflation rates were obtained from the Reserve Bank of 
Australia. Foreign currency paymenis were also adjusted to Australian dollar ($AU) values at 
respective balance dates. 
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Past studies in the Australian context have excluded years in which there has been a CEO 
furnover event, or the final year of a given CEO's incumbency (Merhebi et a/., 2006; 
Stilpledon, 2006), the rationale being ·that. termination payments can add systematic noise to 
inferential analyses. In the current study, turnover episodes were dummy coded and 
controlled for in all regressions. Outgoing CEOs identified were coded I and 0 if otherwise. 
Incoming CEOs identified were coded I, and 0 if otherwise. Results remained qualitatively 
unchanged when turnover episodes were excluded. 
5.4 Variables 
The previous chapter identified a range of causal relationships among variables specified in 
the hypothesised economic and structural model of CEO cash reward determination. A series 
of metrics have been applied to gauge the variables incorporated in the hypothesised model. 
The measures applied are detailed below. 
5.4.1 CEO Reward 
Some studies of CEO reward-performance sensitivity have used total reward measures (for 
example Bucket a/., 2003; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lilling, 2006; Lippert and Porter, 1997; 
Mishra eta/., 2000). Jensen and Murphy's seminal paper (1990) measured total CEO reward 
by aggregating salary, bonus, the value of restricted stock, deferred compensation, the 
equivalent value associatocd with the probability of dismissal, and the annual change in the 
value of CEO shareholdings. Even so, the extant empirical research has focused 
predominantly on executive cash reward. More specifically, models have specified annual 
CEO cash reward as the sum of salary and bonus payable within the fiscal year (see Abowd, 
1990; Boyd, 1994; Cough and Schmidt, 1985; Decktop; 1988; !zan eta/., 1996; L~one, Wu, 
Zimmerman, 2005; Merhebi eta/., 2006; Ueng eta/., 2000). This preference for a.total cash-
based reward measure has been partly driven by the dearth of reporting on equity-based 
emoluments in the Australian context. In addition, researchers (e.g. Shields, 2005) have 
considered the use of these data problematic given the .inconsistency in the valuation of the 
underlying stock. We will return to this point shortly. 
In this study, three CEO cash reward variables are used. The first is a composite CEO total 
cash reward variable, encompassing both incentive and non~incentive cash components 
(other studies utilising a comparable reward measure include Abowd, 1990; Boyd, 1994; 
Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Decktop, 1988; Levinthal, 1988; Merhebi et a/., 2006). This 
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measure includes salary, the dollar value of non-cash benefits, allowances, post-e'!'ployment 
fees (including consulting fees), superannuation, and short-term cash incentives, The second 
CEO annual incentive cash reward measure is the level of annual reported performance-based 
cash reward. The third CEO cash reward measure is the level of CEO total non-incentive 
cash reward; this encompasses all the cash reward components outlined above excluding the 
performance-based (or incentive) cash component. 
The annual value of equity-based CEO rewards and company stock holdings were not 
aggregated with CEO cash rewards measures for several important reasons. Since 2004, 
Australian companies have also been required to report the number and 'fair value' of new 
options and rights grants to each of the five named executives. However, since the mandatory 
disclosure of new option grants to Australian executives is of such recent origin (especially 
compared to the USA), and since the reported option valuation data are of questionable 
consistency, validity and reliability (Stapledon, 2006), the 'fair' value of these rewards· have 
been excluded from our analyses (see a study conducted by ACSI in 2006 or evidence on the 
unreliability of reported new option grant fair values in Australian companies; and Shields, 
2005). Rather, the analy§is focuses on the elements of cash reward, including cash incentive 
payments. For our purposes however, it is important to note that the .exclusion of equity 
based rewards is not a specification error of exclusion per se, as this does not affect the 
variance-covariance matrix, and thus does not bias estimates through omitted variable bias 
(see Berry, 1993). The exclusion of the value of equity-based rewards does, however, limit 
the extent to which causaL inferences can be drawn in regards to total CEO reward. 
While some studies have included the annual change in the value of CEO shareholdings in 
their CEO total reward measures (Jensenand Murphy 1990; Merhebi, 2006), it is believed 
that it is difficult to establish whether such a change is attributable to the CEO's incentive 
plan, stock purchase plan, or to option re-loads. While our main concern with the Merhebi et 
a/. (2006), paper is the approach to parameter estimation, the inclusion of a change in the 
value of CEO shareholdings also warrants further interrogation. Consistent with Jensen and 
Murphy ( 1990), Merhebi et a/., (2006) also aggregate cash reward measures with annual 
dollar value changes in CEO shareholdings (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990). It is the 
subsequent interpretation of the change in the value of CEO shareholdings that concerns us, 
especially when the change in the volume of CEO shareholdings maybe attributable to share 
purchase (e.g. via option exercise) or disposal. In addition, despite their claim to be applying a 
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total reward· measure, their total reward estimates take account of neither new option grant 
fair values no mark-to-market (i.e. retrospective realised values) of new option grants made in 
a given year. 
Data on ·the volume of CEO equity holdings 'were collected to examine the main and 
moderator effects of lagged equity-based CEO rewards and holdings on the relationship 
between CEO cash reward and· performance. In ·terms of long term incentive plan (LTIP) or 
equity-based compensation, data were collected for the following: shares held directly and 
indirectly; the number of unexercised options or performance rights held or balance'; the 
number of performance rights or options granted during the fiscal year number; and the 
percentage of company shares outstanding owned by· the CEO. Rather than operationalising 
CEO share ownership, and CEO stock option and/or share rights plan participation, the 
existing study, consistent with Lambert and Larcker (1987), operationalised these variables as 
indices of CEO-agent risk bearing (see Buck eta/., 2003 for another example). Consistent 
with Agericy Theory, CEO ownership and stock option participation are posited to exert a 
lagged influence on CEO cash rewards, and also moderate the relationship between CEO cash 
rewards and performance. As suggested above specifying total reward measures in research 
may obscure nuances and tradeoffs, and differential sensitivity in CEO·reward processes (see 
also Dechow, .2006). For example, in an attempt to manage CEO agent risk bearing, boards 
may use equity based CEO rewards as a substitute for cash-based reward conditional on 
market-return performance. In this situation, it is reasonable to expect CEO equity 
participation to negatively-moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and measures 
of market-return performance (Limbert and Larcker, 1987). 
There are notable problems with construing equity-based rewards as the optimal CEO 
performance incentive mechanisms that displace the notion of CEO cash reward for 
performance. Ellig (2003) suggests that cash-rewards can prefer over equity-based rewards 
where boards have concerns regarding equity dilution. It is thus reasonable to expect CEO 
cash reward, which remains a significant proportion of total CEO reward, to co-vary with 
market and non-market firm-levd performance criteria. Indeed, shareholders will continue to 
be surveyors of cash performance-insensitive CEO cash reward. From an Agency Theory 
5 This excludes 'zepos' (zero exercise price options) and listed options. To enhance the precision of these data, a 
distinction was made as to whether the incumbent held options, performance rights or both. 
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perspective CEO cash reward for performance is a necessary requirement in managing 'moral 
hazard', irrespective of agent ownership and stock options (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). 
Part of managing moral hazard is the enforcement of 'ex post settling up', which requires the 
board to enforce upward or downward adjustments to cash awards on the basis of finn 
performance (Fama, i 980). While it Is important to recognise the escalation in equity-based 
executive incentives, it is important that theory, research, and practice, does not detract from 
the instrumental role that cash-based incentives play in providing short ienn performance 
incentives. 
5.4.2 Performance 
Agency Theory has been pivotal in influencing the research methods in the area of executive 
reward as well as influencing the finn-level performance measures used. It is observed in 
Chapter Three that research investigating the reward-performance link in publicly listed 
companies, has shown a predilection for market-based or stock return performance metrics. 
Market-returns have been measured in various ways. These include: Total Shareholder 
Return (TSR) (Abowd, 1990); the annual adjusted return to shareholders adjusted for 
dividends and capitalisation changes (!zan et a/., 1996; Merhebi et a/., 2006); discounted 
present value of all future cash flows accruing to shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990); 
Compounded monthly stock returns (Leone et a/., 2005); and abnormal stock price returns 
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). 6 
To a lesser extent, research has also operationalised performance though accounting return 
measures. Accounting measures have i.ncluded return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) (see Canyon eta/., 200 I; !zan 1!/ a/., 2000; Ke at a/., 1999; Leone eta/., 2005; ~illing, 
2006; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mishra eta/., 2000 for examples), and operating profit after 
tax (OPAT) (!zan eta/., 1996). 
Accounting performance metrics have been used less frequently on the grounds that they are 
more susceptible to managerial manipulation. However, as Lambert and Larcker (1987) 
suggest, the validity of market-based measures is equally contentious as an index of CEO 
performance. Factors extraneous to the CEO's locus of control may influence share price 
performance and, in turn, the determination of CEO rewards. For instance, CEOs may enjoy 
6 These studies modelled these firm-level performance measures separately. 
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windfalls in the event of market bullishness. By extension, these measures can further act to 
attenuate the link between reward and performance because extraneous noise in share price 
performance can increase the CEO's risk-bearing so that a risk compensation premium is 
required to offset the agent's risk aversion (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). These 
considerations will be revisited in forthcoming chapters. 
To account for the possibility of the board using market and non-market performance criteria 
to evaluate CEO performance against, this study uses ROE7 as a non-market accounting-
return performance measure along with annual real stock returns as a market-return measure. 
Real Returns are estimated as follows: [(I +nominal return)/(! +inflation rate)] -I. A three-
year cumulative real return measure is also used on the premise that it is a com_mon measure 
used to evaluate CEO performance against (see Bender and Moir, 2006). It is also used to 
account for the lagged adjustment of CEO cash reward to a longer performance period. This 
three year stock real return measure is calculated as follows: [(l+Rt)(l +Rt-l)(l+Rt-2) -I]. 
Further auxiliary regression analyses were conducted using alternative firm-level performance 
measures. These measures included return on invested capital (ROIC), return on assets 
(ROA), and abnormal stock returns" Revenue measures were not used on that basis that, in 
the Australian domain, banks and insurance companies have different methods for measuring 
and reporting revenue. 
5.4.3 Size and Risk 
The empirical literature reviewed in Chapter Three suggests that firm size and firm risk are 
important controls in examining the ceteris paribus relationship between CEO cash reward 
and performance. This is also consistent with the theoretical specification of CEO cash 
reward and performance elucidated in the foregoing chapter. 
7 Sourced from FinAnalysis, ROE is calculated as net profit after tax/ (shareholders equity-outside equity 
interests). This measures Company performance in terms of how well managers are managing funds provided by 
investors. 
8 Return on Assets was also sourced from FinAnalysis and was calculated as earnings before interest!( total assets 
less outside equity interests). Data on ROIC were sourced directly from Fin Analysis which calculates this 
measure as Net operating profit less adjusted taxes/operating invested capital before goodwill. 
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It is·well established that firm size continues to explain variance in CEO or executive reward 
above and beyond shareholder return measures (see Tosi et a/., 2000 for a meta-analysis). 
Again, firm size has been measured in various ways. Commonly used measures include 
annual sales, the log of sales, total assets, as well as market capitalisation (see Tosi et a/., 
2000). In the· current study firm .size is measured as the natural logarithm of firm total assets 
(sourced from.FinAnalysis e-database). 
Some researchers (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Mishra eta/., 2000; Merhebi eta/., 2006) 
have investigated the moderating effects of the variance or 'riskiness' of firm real stock 
returns, on CEO reward and performance relationship, on the premise (consistent with 
Agency Theory) that executive-agent risk preferences moderate the performance incentive 
effects of executive reward. In support of this proposition these researchers also found that 
CEO reward for performance sensitivities fell as firm specific risk increased. On this basis it 
is appropriaie for the current research to control for total firm risk. This stUdy operationalises 
Aggarwal and Samwick's {1999a) measure of total firm risk. Firm risk, a total risk measure,. 
is estimated as the cumulative distribution of the variance of firm monthly real returns, 
including dividends, over a minimum of three years (36 months) prior to the year t (Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 1999ar Chapter Seven will examine the main and moderator effects of firm 
size, and firm risk, on CEO reward and performance. 
5.4.4 CEO Share Ownership 
Agency Theory considers executive ownership as an effective agent-principal alignment 
mechanism. On this basis, imd on the basis of research evidence on the relationship between 
CEO reward and CEO share ownership, CEO share ownership is operationalised as a 
regressor. 
CEO share ownership is estimated from data collected from FinAnalysis. Consistent with the 
method used by Jensen and Murphy (1990) this study measures CEO stock ownership as the 
sum 'of CEO direct and indirect shareholdings over total ordinary shares outstanding. 
9 The cumulative distribution function was then obtained by ranking the observations from I to sample size, 
subtracting 1, and dividing by the sample size minus I. 
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CEO participation in stock option and/or share rights plans is operationalised as a variant of 
CEO ownership. For the purpose of analysis, a binary measure of CEO participation in stock 
option and/or share rights plan is used, with 'I' indicating that the CEO participated in a stock 
option and/or share rights plan, and a '0' indicating no participation (see Buck et a/. (2003), 
for an example of a study using this methodology). Chapter eight examines the _main and 
moderator effects of lagged CEO share ownership, and CEO stock option participation, on .the 
CEO cash reward and performance relationship. 
5.4.5 External Ownership 
Previous studies examined in Chapter Three have used a categorical (rather than a 
continuous) .measure of external ownership concentration (for example, Core, et al.; 1999; 
Tevlin, 1996). In these studies, ownership concentration is operationalised as a dummy 
variable for differentiatingbetween owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. Owner-
controlled firms are defined 'as those having at least one major shareholder, other than the 
CEO, owning five percent or more of the company's equity; management-controlled firms are 
defined as those in which there is no single major external shareholder (Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002: II). 
In the current study, a one-year lag in ownership concentration is operationalised as a 
hypothesised moderator of CEO cash reward and performance. Two measures of external 
ownership concentration are computed. The first measures the percentage of stock. owned by 
the firm's largest shareholder as a percentage of total stock outstanding. The second measures 
the percentage of stock held by the companies' largest 20 shareholders, as· a percentage of 
total company stock outstanding. These data were obtained directly· from annual reports 
retrieved through Connect4 and FinAnalysis e-databases. Chapter Nine examines the 
explanatory power of external ownership to explain variation in CEO cash rewards on the one 
hand, and CEO cash reward and firm-level performance on the other. 
5.4.6 Board Governance 
Board governance best practices are operationalised as hypothesised determinants and 
moderators_ of CEO cash reward and performance. Chapter Four identified specific board 
governance practices considered to enhance boards' management of CEO reward and 
performance. In this study, five measures of board governance best practice are used. These 
include: (i) a board chair independence variable measures for whether the chairperson was a 
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non·executive director; (ii) non·executive director dominated remuneration committee 
measures ·whether there was a formal independent remuneration committee10; (iii) non-
executive dominated .nomination .committee variable measures whether there was a formal 
independent nomination committee; (iv) the non-executive directors· variable measures the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board; and (v) finally the non-executive director 
shareholders variable measures the percentage of non-executive directors on the board with 
company shares. 
5.5 Model Specification 
It is important, that the model specified to examine the relationship CEO reward and 
performance reflects the functional from of the relationships among variables in a specified 
theoretical system (Berry, 1993:30). The specification ·of the econometric model in this 
thesis accords with the postulates underlying the research design and theoretical model 
examined in Chapter Four by specifically .encapsulating the process by ·which CEO cash 
rewards are determined. 
A dynamic panel model of CEO reward and performance operationalised in this thesis is 
predicated on the assumption that CEO cash rewards are dynamically related to performance, 
and past realisations of performance, and CEO cash rewards are outcomes of a complex 
dynamic decision making process. The board evaluates performance and other posited 
contextual factors prior to the fiscal year in which rewards were reported (EIIig, 2003). Thus, 
specifying a dynamic panel model is a natural restriction given that we expect performance to 
exert a lagged influence of CEO cash reward (see Ellig, 2003; Lambert and Larcker, 1987). 
A dynamic lagged model of CEO reward and performance. assumes that CEO re~ard is 
related to past values of the hypothesised explanatory variables, .as well as to its own past 
values (Ostrom, 1990:58). 
It is important that there is not only synergy between the theoretical and econometric 
specification of CEO reward and performance, but also that the parameter estimation 
approach accords with the theoretical and empirical specification of CEO reward and 
performance. Extant empirical research on CEO reward and performance has not espoused 
1° Firms coded as having a ·ronnal independent committee' we~e those that identified the committee explicitly in 
the board member and committees tables. Firms were in addition coded I where 50% or above were,identified 
as non-executive directors. 
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this logic, and consequently suffers from several sources of contamination. In specifYing a 
static model 11 (for further explication, see Sayrs, 1989), the extant research has neglected the 
complex error structure attendant to a dynamic panel data. For our purposes, it is important to 
recognise that a more appropriate. estimation technique for estimating the relationship 
between CEO reward and performance, as well as the determinants of this relationship, is an 
identified multi-equation model. This approach addresses the complexities attendant to 
dynamic panel models, such as higher-order auto-correlative processes, serial correlation, and 
endogeneity (see Ostrom, 1990). 
An additional challenge - and oversight in extant empirical research - is the empirical 
estimation of CEO reward and performance that CEO cash rewards may be adjusted to deeper 
lags in performance. The entrenched Jensen and Murphy (1990) statistic carries several 
limitations. One of them is that it does not account for the possibility that variation in CEO 
reward can also be explained by CEO reward levels in the year prior (Y,_1), and results in 
dynamic misspecification. For example, reward decisions may also be based on ·anticipated 
performance outcomes, especially if the board deems it appropriaie to reward the CEO for 
current or previous investmeni decisions. This demonstrates the limitations of specifying a 
static lagged model. This is represented in the following equation 
Y, =a +boX, + b1X,.J +b2Yt-I + e, (I) 
The equation implies that the dependent variable Y may be sensitive to a one year lag in X and 
Y. When this logic is applied to CEO reward (Y), it suggests that CEO reward levels can be 
explained in terms of contemporaneous and a one. year lag in levels of firm level performa!'ce 
(X. X,.1 ). This means that deeper lags are absorbed into the disturbance term, .and then 
correlate with variables in the x-vector (see Sayrs, 1989); resulting in higher order 
autocorrelation (see Baum eta/., 2007). To account for these lagged and forward adjusltnent 
considerations, it is considered appropriate to identifY a dynamic panel model estimator that 
can account for the effects of deeper lags in the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variables (see Ostrom, 1990, for further discussion of times-series models). These 
11 The efficiency of estimators based on assumptions pertaining to static econometric models is contingent on 
observations being serially uncorrelated and the disturbances homoscedastic. However, such assumptions are 
unrealistic in the context of pooled time-series analysis (Sayrs, 1989:25). 
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shortcomings warrant the specification of a lagged distribution model to account for higher-
order autocorrelation. We revisit these points shortly. 
In contradistinction to extant empirical research, in specifying a lagged distribution dynamic 
panel model to examine the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance this 
study assumes, a priori, that variable in the x vector (that is hypothesised explanatory 
variables and covariates) may not be strictly exogenous. Specifying a static dynamic panel 
model, by default, violates assumptions of orthogonality, thus OLS estimators yield 
inconsistent estimates for dynamic panel models (see Ostrom, 1994; Sayrs, 1989). Thus, 
instruments may be required to orthogonalise the suspected endogenous variable through a 
reduced form equation (See Sayrs, 1989). Furthermore, past research has failed to identify 
appropriate dynamic panel estimators that account for the challenges highlighted in this 
discussion pertaining to dynamic panel model specification. 
This thesis set out to explain variation in CEO cash rewards, and their ex post relationship to 
firm-level performance. Towards this end, two primary cash reward variables are used: i) the 
level of total CEO cash reward; ii) the level of CEO reported performance-based cash reward. 
These variables are interacted with all the posited contextual factors deemed to impact on 
board deliberations pertaining to CEO reward and performance in forthcoming chapters. 
Modelling a composite measure of CEO cash reward alongside separate incentive and non-
incentive cash components of reward enables more nuanced interpretations of estimated 
coefficients, and accord with the notion that the criteria the board use to judge the efficacy of 
a specific proposal may depend on the compon~nt of CEO total reward which is the object of 
the proposaL For example, some of the economic and structural variables in the model 
identified as foci in board deliberations of CEO cash rewards may affect CEO performance-
based rewards, but not total cash based rewards. Operationalising composite and component-
specific measures of CEO cash reward, enables a richer analysis of the decisional processes 
governing CEO cash reward. 
A necessary caveat, however " as discussed in Chapter Four - is that the dependent variables 
are not total CEO reward measures. They do not include the present value of equity-based 
rewards, and thus inferences pertaining to CEO total reward are tempered on this basis. 
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Based on the extant literature, three primary firm-level performance measures are specified as 
focal independent variables. For these, two are measures of market-returns (real annual stock 
returns and three year cumulative stock returns), and a third measures accounting returns 
(return on equity). These measures were deemed appropriate given that they are commonly 
used as performance measures in CEO performance evaluations (See Bender and Moir, 2006). 
Lambert and Larcker (I 987) suggest that the relative weight placed by boards on these two 
types of performance measures is context-specific. The use of an accounting-return measure 
is consistent with the supposition that boards rely differentially on the two types of measures 
(lndjejikian, 1999; Kren and Kerr, 1992; Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Consistent with this, 
Ellig (2003) suggests that growth firms may place more emphasis on market return measures 
(Ellig, 2003). Raghavan et a/., (2005) also provide empirical support for this argument in 
reporting that equity firms rely more on accounting return measures of performance in 
executive reward determination compared to high-leveraged firms. 
An important caveat against extant research and theory, raisedin the previous chapter, is that 
boards do not necessarily select measures of CEO performance on an informed-dispassionate 
basis. It is also argued that rather than use single and divergent measures of CEO 
performance; boards may rely on multiple measures of performance in multiple time periods. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick ( 1988) suggest that a way forward for research would. be to 
consider that CEO reward adjusts to multi-periodicity in performance. They further suggest 
that the CEO's current reward may reflect cumulative performance (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1988: 547). Very few studies. have since taken this into consideration in the 
empirical specification of CEO n:w&rd and performance, and thus do not consider the 
possibility that boards may adjust CEO reward to deeper lags in company performance. This 
study attempts to account for this possibility. 
Finally, in the current study firm-dummies are specified to co-vary out unobserved fixed 
effects. Industry is controlled for in initial OLS regressions excluding fixed effects. The 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector classifications (n=lO) were sourced 
from FinAnalysis to create industry sector dummies for each observation. 
It is also important to control for the inflationary or deflationary effects of turnover episodes 
on the dependent variables. It is well known that turnover episodes add considerable noise to 
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CEO reward data. Termination payments can have significant inflationary effects on reported 
CEO reward, especially the cash component. Past ·research has controlled for turnover by 
excluding observations relating to outgoing CEOs. Rather than excluding these observations, 
we have modelled two dummy variables, one for incoming ·CEOs (N= 695), and one for 
outgoing CEOs (N=628). 
The econometric model applied in the study specifies mixed level data. In an attempt to 
control for possible nested effects of CEO-level factors on finn-level data (see Wooldridge, 
2002), CEOs dummies were operationalised alongside finn-dummies. However, the majority 
of these dummies were dropped by STAT A during computation on the basis of 
multicollinearity. The results remained substantively unchanged when the remaining CEO 
dummies were included. In addition, a number of alternative CEO-level measures were used 
to address CEO nested effects. Dummies were also used· to capture for whether the CEO was 
internally appointed, a member of the remuneration and nomination· committees, or was a 
CEO-founder. With the exception of the turnover dummies, these theoretically-informed 
CEO-level variables were dropped from the current analyses because they lacked explanatory 
power in preliminary sensitivity analyses on the basis of joint significance tests. 
5-6 Parameter Estimation 
Agency Theory research has predominately estimated the relationship between CEO cash 
reward and performance through a first-differenced fixed effects approach. This is seen as 
being necessary to co-vary out unobserved fixed effects. Jensen and Murphy (I 990) specified 
a fixed effects first-differenced model to examine the sensitivity of CEO total reward to 
shareholder returns. As noted in Chapter Three, many several subsequent stUdies have 
followed this first-differenced approach to estimation (for example: Aggarwal and Samwick, 
1999b; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Hartzell and Stark, 2003; Ke et 
a/., 1999; Leone et a/., 2005; Merhebi et a/., 2006). A fixed effects estimator is deemed 
efficient when the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous and errors are homoscedastic 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 439). 
However, as Roodman notes.(2007), a first-differenced. model is still susceptible to violating 
the classical linear model assumptions regarding orthogonality." First-differences are still 
12 The efficiency of OLS estimators depends on Classical Linear Model assumptions that are based on static 
models. First, disturbances are identically distributed, and the variance of disturbances is constant. Second, 
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susceptible to endogeneity stemming from serial correlation, higher order autoregressive 
disturbances" (Sayrs, 1989), and multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2000), and simultaneity, 
(Baum et a/., 2007; Roodman, 2007). In consequence, with a first-differenced model, 
inferences regarding the effect of performance on CEO reward may be overestimated or 
biased. The entrenched approach to the empirical specification and parameter estimation of 
CEO reward and performance ignores the effects of deeper lags in the explanatory variables, 
and also the possibility that explanatory variables are predetermined (See Baum eta/., 2007). 
Consequently, it is appropriate to suggest that much of the .extant research has failed to adopt 
a more considered approach to identifying appropriate parameter estimators for dynamic 
panel data. 
Instrumenting purportedly endogenous explanatory variables has been one approach to 
expunge such variables of omitted variable bias; this is the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
Regression or Two Step Least Squares (2SLS) approach (Sayrs, 1989; Wooldridge, 2002). In 
terms of the application of this approach to the current study, the use of instrumental variables 
acts to expunge performance measures of unobserved effects on performance which 
contribute to 'noise' or measurement error in CEO performance evaluation (Sayrs, 1989; 
Wooldridge, 2002). Unobserved CEO effects, such as individual managerial ability, for 
example, can. render performance measures endogenous to the· error term and need to be 
controlled for to ameliorate bias in the estimated coefficients for performance. 
A variable that is both a determinant of the suspected endogenous explanatory variable, and 
an indirect determinant of the dependent variable (yet unrelated to the error term) can be used 
as an 'instrument' to orthogonalise the suspected endogenous variable (Wooldridge, 2000). 
Thus this estimator includes a vector for other covariates that act as instruments to 
disturbances ar~ not serially independent of future and past values (Wooldridge, 2002). Third, regressands are 
uncorrelated with the errors (orthogonal, strict exogeneity assumption) (Roodman, 2006;Wooldridge, 2001). 
·n The use of a lagged dependent variable as a regressand results in upward bias in OLS (Ostrom, 1990). Given 
that it is predetermined or endogenous, it becomes correlated with the error term and thus violates the strict 
exogeneity assumption. This also violates the orthogonality assumption {Sayrs, 1989). The preponderant use of 
first differences is also rendered problematic given the likelihood that errors are serially correlated (Wooldridge, 
2001:311) that again violates Classical Linear Model assumptions. 
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orthogonalise the suspected endogenous variables through a reduced form regression (see 
Sayrs (1989), for an explication). 
The current study uses industry-level instruments to orthogonalise the suspected finn-level 
explanatory variables. This decision was informed by research. Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999b) found that finn-level performance was related to rival finn performance. Kren and 
Kerr (1992) make an insightful contribution to the field by illuminating the role of relative 
performance evaluation in the board's appraisal of CEO performance. It wasnoted in the 
discussion of the research design and theoretical model in the previous chapter that boards can 
examine finn risk as a way to discef!l or deduce the effects of the CEO's actions on finn-level 
performance. It is .also intuitive that boards can examine industry level performance in order 
to make more accurate anributions regarding CEO performance. Further, industry level 
performance is likely to affect performance directly, and unlikely to affect CEO cash rewards 
directly. A priori, we can expect a positive association between finn-level performance and 
industry level performance. Therefore, industry-means of the three performance measures, 
used in this study, are expected to have indirect effects on CEO cash rewards. These 
instruments were tested for exogeneity and overidentification. 
Using estimators appropriate for dynamic panel models has considerable merit in terms of 
addressing all _concomitant potential sources of contamination noted above. One such 
estimator is the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) introduced by Arellano and 
Bond (1991, cited in Roodman, 2007)and further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Roodman (2007) identified several advantages of using a _system GMM approach as an 
alternative approach to parameter estimation. Through ~ ·system of equations, the system 
. . . 
GMM renders explanatory variables exogenous by addressing simultaneity and possible 
reverse causality between the dependent variables and explanatory variables, serial correlation 
and higher-order autoregression in the error term, omitted variable bias stemming from 
measurement error in the explanatory variables, and multicollinearity in the x-vector 
(Roodman, 2007; Wooldridge, 2000;). 14 
14 While the IV estimator is useful in terms of ameliorating endogenous explanatory variables, it is still based on 
assumptions pertaining to a static linear model (Roodman, 2007; Wooldridge, 2002), and in the specification of a 
dynamic panel model, estimates may still be susceptible to contamination from autoregressive processes 
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The system GMM approach yields more efficient estimates to examine the effect of 
exogenous changes in performance on CEO cash rewards. (see Wooldridge; 2000), and 
represents a novel approach to the estimation of CEO reward for performance. In this system, 
purportedly endogenous and predetermined regressors (in this case, all explanatory variables 
excluding year duinmies, turnover episodes, and firm risk) are differenced and instrumented 
using the differences and levels of exogenous regressors. Cognisant of dynamic 
misspecification, the system GMM perpetuates a lagged distributed model (Gujarati, 2003; 
Roodman, 2007). This accounts for the lagged depth in explanatory variable mentioned 
earlier as a key oversight of extant approaches to the estimation of CEO reward and 
performance examined above. Specification tests reported in forthcoming chapters confirm 
that using a system GMM to estimation is more efficient than using a fixed effects, and 
instrumental variable approaches. 
The following single equation encapsulates an identified multi-equation dynamic panel model 
of CEO cash reward and performance relationship estimated through a system GMM 
approach: 
Cu = I.,EX;_, + Y!·' + J.,EWu +(V, +'11.J. i=J, ... ,N; i=J, ... ;T, (2) 
C equals the dependent variable, which in this case is the natural logarithm in a selected 
measure of CEO cash reward. EX is a vector for strictly exogenous variables. In the current 
study, these are year .dummies, and turnover episodes. These variables are considered 
exogenous because there is little reason to suspect that they are predetermined or endogenous 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2007). EW is the vector for predetermined ·or 
endogenous covariates. The EW vector includes explanatory variables including risk or the 
variance of fiim market returns, board governance measures, firm size, and firm performance. 
V is the firm-level fixed effects; y the external instrument vector· for the performance 
variables 15, and '7 is the error term that is assumed not to be auto-correlated, with the added 
assumption that v and '7 are not serially correlated. 
IS The rank and order conditions of these instruments for the performance vector are test,ed iry Chapter Six. The 
instruments satisfied both rank and order conditions, suggesting that their inclusion did not result in the over 
identification of the model. The instruments for performance measures were the industry means of the relevant 
performance measure. 
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Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed modifications to Arellano and Blundell's (1995) 
formulation of a linear first-differenced GMM. They included further moment conditions to 
result in a system GMM (Roodman, 2007). These moment conditions or equations enable the 
function to be extended to models with endogenous and predetermined regressors (see 
Blundell and Bond, 1998: 117). Blundell and Bond argue that the linear GMM advanced by 
Arellano and Blundell (1995) only uses lagged levels to instrument first differences, when it 
should also include a moment condition where lagged differences are used to instrument 
levels (1998: 116) to ameliorate autoregressive processes. As an additio11al moment 
condition, they are suggesting the. use of the residuals from the first step of the equatiowto 
orthogonalise the x-vector like an IV estimator. 
In addition, the two-step system GMM command in STAT A allowed the researcher to specifY 
the depth of lags. The researcher used 3 lags and also deeper lags, which accords with 
suggestions made by Roodman regarding lag depth (2007). The omission of lagged depth in 
the specification and estimation of CEO reward and performance potentially contaminates 
estimates in the extant research, whereas the current study avoids this problem of dynamic 
misspecification. Also, another benefit of the system GMM approach in ST A TA is that 
through the 'rob'!st' command, the researcher was able to ensure that the standard errors were 
robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary patterns of. autocorrelations within firms (Roodman, 
2007: 37). 
Using the system GMM approach is also. beneficial in terms of addressing simultaneity 
between values ofx, y, and disturbance.vectors through a system of equations. As Jaccard and 
Turrisi (2003:1) suggest, causal models can contain up to six different types of causal 
relationships. The estimation method is critical in terms of optimizing the validity of 
inferences deduced from the estimated coefficients. As indicated in the previous chapter, this 
study makes the a priori assumption that CEO reward and performance decisions are an 
artefact of complex relationships and interactions between firm, CEO, and board level 
contingency factors. Further, a system GMM approach to estimation is relatively more 
appropriate given its ability to control or partial out different types of causal relationships 
among controls, and explanatory variables, and the disturbance vector. For example, it is 
intuitive for remuneration committees and firm size to be bi-directionally related; bigger firms 
may demonstrate a greater preponderance of best practice initiatives such as a remuneration 
committee precisely because they have bigger boards. 
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A further benefit of this approach to estimation is that it preserves sample size. Usually. 
specifying a dynamic lagged panel model means that observations are lost in specifying 
lagged values. To ameliorate this loss of data, the system GMM uses forward orthogonal 
deviations as opposed to first differences as instruments (see Baum eta/., 2007; Roodman, 
2007). 
In this study the three approaches to parameter estimation described above are used to 
estimate the ceteris paribus relationship between CEO cash rewards and performance. These 
include: i) the fixed effects estimator; ii) the IV regression estimator; and iii) the two-step 
system GMM. 16 It is expected that typical sources of contamination discussed above will 
render estimates of all three regression approaches inconsistent. This methodology enables the 
researcher to ascertain, through specification tests examined in Chapter Six, the effects of 
three sources of measurement error relevant to dynamic panel models on the estimated 
coefficients. The three estimators differ in the efficiency with which they address these 
potential sources of contamination, each having differential effects on the structure of the 
error component (Sayrs, 1989). 
5.7 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In Chapter Four,- CEO cash reward levels are conceptualised as outcomes or artefacts of a 
complex board decision-making process. In essence the model re-casts firm size, total firm 
risk, CEO share ownership, external ownership, and corporate governance prescriptions, as 
bases or foci of board deliberations at each phase of the decision-making process. On the 
other .hand, board governance structures are cast as a moderator of the board's management 
and control of CEO cash reward and performance. .Operationalisi.ng these factors as 
determinants of CEO cash reward levels, and then examining the moderating effects of these 
factors on the relationship between CEO reward and ·specified firm .level performance 
measures (in Chapters Six; Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten), enabled the .researcher to infer 
16 The two-step system GMM addresses problems attendant to dynamic panel models including: predetermi-ned 
and endogenous 'explanatory variables, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and yields more efficient estimates 
by removing unobserved fixed effects, and measurement error (Wooldridge, 2002). It uses Windmeijer finite 
sample- correction of standard errors, in the absence of which one-step estima'tion is more efficient (see 
Roodman, 2006 for further discussion). The system GMM minimizes data loss typical of first differences by 
using forWard orthogonal deviations (Roodman, 2006: 19). 
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whether these factors are important foci of board deliberations at each stage of the decision-
making process. 
Joint significance tests were performed to ascertain whether groups of variables had a greater 
impact on the dependent variable when pooled. This involved putting all explanatory 
variables and their interaction terms in the one model. By selecting individual variables .or 
groups of variables and then conducting joint significance' tests, the researcher was able to 
examine whether specific explanatory variables or groups of explanatory variables 
significantly and additively increased the explanatory power of the model through a 
significant F-statistic. 
From a more conceptual perspective this is important especially if the explanatory variables, 
such as board governance variables for example, additively impact on CEO reward outcomes 
and board decisions. For example, it is conceivable that. boards practicing 'independence' at 
the board and committee levels, and also at board chairperson level, may have a stronger 
ability to monitor and manage CEO reward and performance than a board only practicing 
independence at the conimittee level. 
A David Mackinnon test through the 'dmexogt' command in ST ATA enabled the researcher 
to examine endogeneity in the fixed effects OLS model after an IV regression (Wooldridge, 
2000). A significant F-test statistic suggests that endogeneity may bias the ~estimates of a fixed 
effects approach. In most cases these statistics were significant, indicating that there was at 
least one endogenous covariate in the x-vector. This also supports an IV and system GMM 
approach to estimation over and above a fix(!d effects approach to parameter estimation. 
To ensure that the system GMM was correctly identified, the Hansen J statistic was conducted 
and analysed. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions checks whether the 
instruments in the system of equations are exogenous. A significant F test statistic indicates 
that the instruments specified are inappropriate (Roodman, 2007). Another more informal test 
of whether the model has appropriate instruments is to check whether the number of 
instruments used exceeds sample size (see Roodman, 2007: 43). All equations met these 
requirements and were not over-identified. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has elucidated the key weaknesses of the empirical specification and estimation 
of CEO reward for performance in previou~ studies; weaknesses that are said to limit the 
extent of legitimate inference pertaining to CEO reward and performance management. On 
the basis of this analysis, it is plausible that results from studies espousing a first-differences 
approach to parameter estimation, thus existing Australian research, are method driven. 
While such an approach is used to co-vary out unobserved fixed effects, it may not address 
problems such as high-order autocorrelation in first differences, and multicollinearity. 
Problems such as heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, simultaneity, and higher order 
autocorrelation are best addressed through a multi-equation approach (see Blundell and Bond, 
1998). 
The system GMM approach to estimating parameters has been chosen for this study because 
it accords more intuitively with the dynamism attendant to CEO reward determination, as well 
as the error structure of a dynamic panel model (see Sayrs, 1989). Caveats to research 
method espoused in the current study are examined in the final chapter. It is believed that this 
approach to research is beneficial in terms of serving as a foundation for further case-specific 
and idiographic research that is more amenable to the distillation of context-specific best 
practice in terms of CEO reward and performance management. In other words, qualitative 
research would usefully supplement and extend the findings presented in this thesis. The 
following chapter examines the relationship between CEO reward and performance before 
examining the factors in the model that are posited to moderate this relationship. 
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Chapter Six 
CEO Cash Reward and Performance in Australia: A System GMM 
Dynamic Panel Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter raised a number of caveats against extant empirical research using a 
first-differenced approach to estimate the sensitivity of CEO reward to measures of company 
performance. Research examining this association in an Australian context has also espoused 
this approach and overlooked the application of system GMM panel analysis. In effect, the 
Australian estimates are in part method driven, and thus causal inferences should be tempered 
with considerable caution. 
A recent study, Merhebi and others (2006) reported that CEO salary plus bonus was 
significantly sensitive to both measures including ROE, ROA, and real annual stock returns. 
On the basis of their first-differenced fixed estimates they concluded that Australian boards 
are diligently promulgating CEO reward-for-performance. However,, such conclusions are 
rendered questiona])le when the limitations of using a first-differenced approach to parameter 
estimation on dynamic panel data are considered. To be able to infer that Australian boards 
are managing the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance requires a more 
sophisticated approach to parameter estimation. 
This chapter examines the association between CEO total cash reward and measures of 
company performance in Australia over the period 1999 to 2006, using system GMM panel 
analysis. Using more rigorous methods of parameter estimation, which account for the 
complex error structure of dynamic panel data models, this study finds no relationship 
between CEO total cash reward and measures of firm-level performance commonly used by 
the board to determine performance-contingent rewards. This study also finds that levels of 
CEO cash reward that are disclosed as being performance-contingent are unrelated to a range 
of firm-level performance measures. While this study does not incorporate the value of 
equity-based reward, it does test whether CEO cash rewards provide ex ante performance 
incentives to the CEO, and results suggest they do not. In using three different approaches to 
parameter estimation, it is shown that first-differenced estimates may not be as efficient as 
previous authors in the field have presumed. Finally, this chapter considers the results in light 
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of the propositions advanced in Chapter Four. It is suggested in Chapter Four that a range .of 
contingent .factors operating as various levels- at the level of the CEO, the firm, the industry, 
and the regulatory system - may moderate the board's administration of CEO cash reward. 
The findings presented in the present chapter suggest thai greater considerations should be 
given to the decision-making processes underpinning CEO cash reward outcomes, and 
whether Australian boards do undertake efficacious analyses to judge proposed CEO reward 
actions. 
6.2 Hypotheses 
It is the responsibility of the board to ensure that CEO total cash rewards are not only 
competitive and attractive, and cost-effective, but also aligned to shareholder interests. These 
objectives are also assumed to become the criterion for judging the efficacy of proposals put 
forward for full board approval. Ellig (2003) suggests that it is not uncommon for CEO 
performance to become a secondary consideration in the management of CEO cash rewards. 
This study also argues that the proliferation in equity-based CEO rewards should not detract 
from the notion that CEO cash rewards supplementary CEO performance incentive 
mechanism used in conjunction with CEO equity-based rewards. On the basis of these 
considerations, Chapter Four presented the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: While CEO reported CEO cash rewards may be sensitive to firm peiformance 
it is unlikely to be exclusively contingent on firm performance. 
Proposition 2a: a CEO total cash reward is positively associated with lagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance. 
Proposition 2b: a CEO annual cash reward is positively associated with lagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance. 
Accordingly, in this chapter the following hypotheses are tested to validate the foregoing 
assumptions regarding the board's management of CEO reward and performance. 
H6.1: There is a significant positive association between CEO total cash rewards and lagged 
annual real stock returns. 
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H6.2: There is a significant pasitive association between CEO total cash rewards and lagged 
3 year culnu/Gtive stock returns. 
H6.3: There is a significimt positive association between CEO total cash rewards and lagged 
re,turn on equity. 
H6.4: There is a significant positive association between.CEO annual incentive cash rewards 
and lagged annual real stock returns. 
H6.5: There is a significant positive association between CEO annual incentive cash rewards 
and lagged 3 year cumulative stock returns. 
H6.6: There is a significant positive association between CEO annual incentive cash rewards 
and lagged return on equity. 
The following section delineates the empirical model specified. to test these hypotheses. That 
is to say, we now tum .to explicate how the empirical specification of CEO cash reward for 
performance ameliorates the weaknesses in the extant empirical literatures that were 
identified in Chapters Three and Five. This approach taken seeks to ameliorate these sources 
of measurement error identified as contaminants of extant empirical research on CEO reward 
and performance by means of a stronger link between econometric specification, parameter 
estimation, and the theoretical specification of CEO reward and perforniance. It is believed 
that this will enhance the precision and depth of inferences regarding the board's decision and 
strategic control and management of CEO cash reward and perfqrmance. 
6.3 An Alternative Empirical Model of CEO Reward-Performance Sensitivity 
The empirical model specified to test these hypotheses operationalises two different CEO 
cash reward measures as dependent variables. Both accounting-return firm-level 
performance measures (Con yon and Sadler, 2001; !zan et a/., 2000; See Ke et a/., 1999; 
Leone eta/., 2005; Merhebi eta/., 2006) and market-return performance measures (Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 1999a; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) were. 
operationalised as independeni variables. 
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The specification of market-based measures is intuitive from an Agency Theoretic 
perspective. The use of an accounting-return measure is consistent with the proposition that 
boards may rely differentially on the two types of measures depending on firm-specific 
factors (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Kren and Kerr, 1992; lndjejikian, 1999). Besides 
specifying two types of firm-level performance measures, the empirical model also specifies a 
multi-period performance measure based on evidence that firms commonly assess three year 
shareholder returns when determining CEO reward (see Bender and Moir, 2006). 
The dynamic panel model relating to CEO total cash reward level as the dependent variable is 
encapsulated in the following level equation: 
CEOTota/Cashu = <.< + fJoCEOTota/Cash;. 1.1 + fJ1Size;. r-1 + fJ2FirmRisk, + 
p~ccoutingReturns;, r-J + /34MarketReturnu.J + A.2Turnover;,t + p; + &;,, 
Where: 
• Size is indexed by the natural logarithm of total assets, and FirmRisk, indexed by the 
cumulative distribution function of firm returns of 36 months prior (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999a for methodology). 
• AccountingReturn is measured by real ROE. 
• MarketReturn is the vector for two market-return measures: one being the real stock 
retums, which measures returns relative to the risk free rate; the other being a 3 year 
cumulative real stock return measure to account for the possibility of annual incentives 
being based on longer and cumulative performance periods. 
• Turnover is the vector for incoming and outgoing CEO dummy variables to control for 
payments which may include prorated payments, severance payments, as well as sign-
on payments. 
The model also controls for unobserved firm-effects through firm dummies, and time effects 
through year dummies. The same model is also estimated using annual cash incentives as the 
dependent variable. 
Exhibit 6.1 also identifies the key variables modelled in the panel regression analyses. The 
specified model is estimated using three regression approaches: i) fixed effects estimator; ii} 
IV regression estimator; and iii) two-step system GMM. It is expected that typical sources of 
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contamination hitherto discussed will render estimates of all three regression approaches 
inconsistent. 
Exhibit 6.1. Measures and Variables 
Variables 
Dependent Variables: 
CEO Total Cash 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 
Performance Variables: 
Real Returns 
3Yr Real Returns 
ROE 
Control Variables: 
Size 
Finn Risk 
'Turnover Variables: 
Incoming CEOs 
Outgoing CEOs 
Instruments for Performance 
Variables: 
Industry Mean for Real Returns 
Measures 
Natural Logarithm of the summation of reported incentive and 
non-incentive cash components 
Natural Logarithm of Reported annual incentive cash reward 
{price at t +Dividend less Price at t-1)/price at t-1) 
Accumulated average retum=[(I+~)(I+R1• 1 )(1 +R1•2)- 1] where 
R:::return to stock or TSR. ' . 
ROE=NPAT before abnonnall(shareholder equity-outside 
equity interests) 
Total Assets 
Aggarwal and Samwick's Cumulative Distribution Function of 
firm real returns. The measure is l?etween I and 0 with I as the 
maximum level of volatility. 
1 = first year in the position as CEO and 0 if otherwise 
1 = Last year in the position as CEO and 0 if otherwise 
Mean by Industry and year using S&P/ASX Sectoral indices 
(n-10)' 
Industry Mean for 3Yr Returns I Mean by IndustrY and year using S&P/ASX Sectoral indices 
(n-10)' 
Industry Mean for Accounting Return I Mean by Industry and year using S&P/ASX Sectoral indices 
(n-10)' ·· 
a Excludes Financials property trusts, Gold sub-industry, Metals and Mining, and Property Trusts due to 
differential executive reward and/or accounting performance reporting requirements. GICS industry sectors 
included Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, HealthCare, Materials, Information 
Technology, Telecommunications Services, and Utilities. 
6.3 Descriptive Results 
Exhibit 6.2 presents the annual means for nominal Australian dollar values), of CEO salary, 
annual incentive cash reward, total non-incentive cash reward, and total CEO cash reward. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar values henceforth refer to Australian dollars. As 
shown, these figures indicate an increasing trend in the level of all CEO cash reward measures 
h . d 17 over t e perJO . 
17 The figure for annual incentive cash in 1999 appears to be somewhat anomalous compared to the proceeding 
figures. There may be several explanations for this. First, outliers among nominal un-adjusted values may have 
caused this skewing, and would appear to warrant a linear logarithmic transformation to ameliorate this. Second, 
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Exhibit 6.2. Nominal $AU Annual Means for CEO Salary, Annual Cash Incentives, 
Total Non-incentive Cash (TNIC), and Total CEO Cash Reward. 
Balance Year Salary_Year t Annual Incentive ' TNIC_ Year t CEO Total Cash 
Cash_ Year t Year t 
1999 214,013 91,845 269,855 280,854 
2000 352627 354704 453778 577127 
2001 392741 415903 501636 639798 
2002 412985 503313 587319 754192 
2003 426521 525021 530515 736331 
2004 461906 543490 625576 863804 
2005 474065 699144 599660 916840 
2006 547750 649677 710337 1029703 
Exhibit 6.3 reports the annual mean values of CEO stock holdings and the volume of CEO 
option and share rights held at report date. According to these figures, CEO equity holdings 
have also increased over the period. However, there does not appear to be an increasing trend 
in CEO stockholdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding. 
Exhibit 6.3. Annual Means for CEO Shareholdings, Shareholdings as a Percentage of 
Total Shares Outstanding, and Volume of CEO Options and Share Rights. 
Volume of shareholdings Volume of options and share 
rights held 
Balance Year Shares held by Firms Shares held Volume of Firms 
CEO observed by CEO as a options and observed 
percentage share rights 
of total 
shares 
outstandine 
1999 6,698,000 425 8.07 2,423,394 236 
2000 11,000,000 462 9.48 2,122,538 274 
2001 12,900,000 471 10.26 2,447,446 267 
2002 15,100,000 454 10.22 2,808,593 279 
2003 14,300,000 445 9.62 2,681,303 280 
2004 II ,500,000 447 8.04 2,959,651 264 
2005 11,900,000 416 7.94 3,208.352 250 
2006 13,600,000 428 6.78 3,115,083 249 
the anomaly may be explained in terms of the changes in reporting requirements during this stage, from banded 
to component specific disclosure of CEO reward. It is interesting that other fixed reward components were non-
anomalous. 
106 
6.4 Inferential Results 
Exhibits 6.4 and 6.5 present the summary statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables 
operationalised to test the relationship between CEO total cash reward, annual incentive cash 
reward, and three specified performance measures. On the basis of diagnostic analyses 
examining skewness and kurtosis, all dollar values were inflation-adjusted and then 
transformed into natural logarithms. According to the bivariate Pearson correlation 
coefficients, the magnitude of all the bivariate associations among explanatory variables does 
not suggest collinearity. The association among dependent variables and their attendant lags 
are strongly correlated which suggests that serial correlation and autoregressive disturbances 
may potentially contaminate reward-perforrriarice estimates in the absence of the specification 
of a lagged dependent variable in the x vector. A prima facie examination of the bivariate 
correlation results reveals that the performance measures are weakly or negatively related to 
total cash and incentive cash. 
Exhibit 6.4. Means and Standard Deviations (S.D) for Firm and CEO-level Variables 
Variable Mean S.D N 
Dependent Variables: 
CEO Total Cash 1 843,267 22,106 3,034 
CEO Annual Incentive' 
Cash 1 329,702 13,986 3,034 
Performance Variables: 
Real Returns t-t 12.520 1.480 3,034 
3Yr Returns ,_1 53.010 3.090 3,034 
ROE,_ 1 -8.440 1.480 3,034 
Control Variables: 
Size 1•1 3630 456 3,034 
FinnRisk 1 0.510 0.005 3,034 
Incoming CEOs 1 0.151 0.007 692 
Outgoing CEOs, 0.126 0.006 628 
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Exhibit 6.5. Pearson's Bivariate Correlations' 
Variable Mean s.e 1 2 '3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CEO Total Cashb 13.18 0.02 1.00 
2 CEO Total Cash 1•1 b 13.17 0.02 .90*** 1.00 
3 CEO Annual Incentive Cashb 11.81 0.02 .79*"'* .75*** 1.00 
4 CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1•1 b 11.80 0.02 .73*** 0.79*** .90*** 1.00 
5 Real Returns r-t ' 13.25 1.40 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
6 Real Returns t 12.77 1.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 '-0,02 0.03 t.oo· 
7 3Yr Returns r-l ' 54.61 3.13 .05** .04' 0.00 0.00 .42**"' ·.10*** 1.00 
8 3Yr Returns ,c 57.46 2.74 .04* 0.01 0.00 0.00 .52**"' .44*** .65*** 1.00 
9 ROE 1.1 ' -5.54 1.28 .12*** 0.10*** .04* .03* .15**"' .06**"' .06** .09*** 1.00 
10 ROE,c -7.48 1.52 .II*** .II ••• .04** 0.03 ,.08*"'"'· .15*~~<* 0.00 .07*** .31*** 1.00 
11 Size1.Ja 18.57 0.04 0.65*** .61 **':" .04*** .37*** 0.02 -0.03 .06** 0.00 .28*** .24* .. 1.00 
12 Firm Risk, 0.51 0.01 -0.04*"'* -.36*** -.22*** -.20*** 0.03 .04* .08*** .08*** -.29"""* -.27*** -.66*** 1.00 
13 Incoming CEOs1 0.15 O.OL ~0.02*"'* -0.02 -.04** -0.03 -.07*** -0.02 -.04* -.05** -.07''"""' -.04** -.08"** .10*** 1.00 
14 Outgoing CE0s1 0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -.06*** .OR*** 0.00 -.05** -.07*** -.07*** -.05*** .09*+* 0.00 1.00 
aN"" 2774 (Listwise exclusion) 
b Natural Logarithm 
cReal annual percentage 
. 
p <0 .05 
.. 
p <0 .OJ 
... 
p <0 .001 
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Exhibit 6.6. Fixed Effects, IV, and System GMM Estimates of CEO Total Cash 
Reward' -Performance Sensitivity 
Estimator: 
Market Return: 
Real Retumsb 1-1 
Real Retumsb 1 
3Yr Returns~ 1•1 
3Yr Retumsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb 1•1 
ROEb, 
Controls 
Sizeb ,_, 
Firm Risk 1•1 
CEO Total Cash Reward•,_, 
Incoming CEOsc 1 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
Constant 
Observations 
R' 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Davidson McKinnon Test 
of Exoeeneitv 
Hansen J Test of 
Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR{2) in first differences 
"Natural Logarithm 
6 Percentage 
cBinary Variable 
0 
p <0.05 
""p<O.Ol 
"""p<O.OOJ 
FE 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-.001' 
(0.00) 
0.122* .. 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.10) 
0.284 ... 
(0.034) 
-0.182 ... 
(0.022) 
0.073*"' 
(0.027) 
7.154**"' 
(0.492) 
2775 
0.74* .. 
Yes 
Yes 
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis 
IV GMM 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.00) 
-0.001 -0.001' 
(0.002) 0.000 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.002) 0.000 
0.162 0.094*** 
(0.09) (0.026) 
-0.162 .173' 
(0.111) (0.08) 
0.214* .. 0.764••• 
(0.039) (0.078) 
-0.207* .. -0.255*** 
(0.035) (0.027) 
0.053' 0.074' 
(0.026) (0.031) 
7.406*"'* 1.312 
(1.337) _i722) 
2457 2775 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F~2.223' 
1~124.46 
z~2.73 
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Exhibit 6.6 reports the results of the regression analyses· estimating both the lagged and 
contemporaneous relationship between Total CEO cash reward and the three firm-level 
performance measures using a fixed effects (FE) estimator, instrumental variables (IV) or 2 
step least squares estimator, and a two-step system GMM estimator. 
To recap, the primary aim of this chapter is to estimate the ceteris paribus lagged relationship 
between CEO cash rewards and three firm-level performance measures. Hypotheses 6.1-6.3 
predicted a significant positive association between the three performance measures and the 
level of CEO total cash rewards. 
Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2 test the explanatory power of two inflation,adjusted market return 
measures. On the basis of the results presented in Exhibit 6.6 both hypotheses are 
consistently rejected. Across all three specifications, the lagged estimates of the hypothesised 
association are non-significant. In terms of the predicted direction of the hypothesised 
association, all estimated coefficients were positive for annual Real. Returns. Almost all 
estimates were in the predicted direction for three year cumulative stock returns; for the 
system GMM, the coefficient was negative. Finally, all contemporaneous associations 
between the level of CEO total cash reward and two market-level performance measures were 
non-significant and inconsistent with the directionality of their lagged measures of three year 
stock returns, and in the IV specification for annual real stock returns. 
Hypothesis 6.3 predicted a positive and significant association between lagged ROE and the 
level of CEO total cash reward. On the basis of results presented in Exhibit 6.6, this 
hypothesis is rejected. The lagged effect of ROE ·on .the !eve) of CEO total cash reward is 
non-significant across all specifications, and the majority of these estimated coefficients are 
negative. A significant contemporaneous relationship between ROE and the level of CEO 
total cash rewards was found in the fixed effects and system GMM specifications (/3= -
0.0004, p < .001; f3= -.0011, p < 0.05 respectively). These results imply an inverse 
contemporaneous relationship between ROE and the level of CEO total cash reward. 
While all three firm-level performance measures lacked power in terms of explaining 
variation in the level of CEO total cash reward, some of the theoretically informed controls 
operationalised had robust effects on the dependent variable. The lagged effect of the size 
measure on CEO total cash reward was positive and significant at the point 0.001 and 0.05 
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levels for the GMM -and fixed effects estimates respectively, but not for the IV regression. 
This suggests that, after controlling for endogeneity, as per the IV specification, the 
coefficient was rendered non-significant. This suggests that endogeneity results in a 
positively·biased estimate for the lagged effect of firm size. However, the GMM, addressing 
endogeneity, omitted variables, and serial correlation, yields a significant and positive' 
coefficient for firm size. 
Agency Theory is premised on the assumption that agent incentive contracts are, inter .alia, 
subject to agerit risk preferences.. To recapitulate, agency theory suggests agents are risk 
averse, and on the basis of recent empirical evidence (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Mishra 
et a/., 2000) firm risk is a· significant predictor of reward level and composition. The 
following chapter discusses this literature in terms of the moderating effects of risk on the 
reward-performance relationship. The results presented in this chapter indicate that while the 
effect of firm risk is not consistent in terms of directionality and significance across all 
specifications, 'it is significant and positive at the 0.05 level for the GMM estimator. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that as firm risk increases, the level of CEO total cash reward 
also increases. This result is consistent with the theory and research evidence suggesting that 
incentives and firm risk are inversely related (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Mishra et a/., 
2000). 
Various CEO-level measures were also specified as controls. As expected, Incoming CEOs 
receive significantly lowerlevels of total cash, and this is robust across all specifications. As 
expected, outgoing CEOs receive significantly more total cash rewards than incumbent CEOs, 
and again this result is robust across all. three specifications. The ·estimates suggest that 
outgoing CEOs, on average, receive significantly more total cash reward than non-outgoing 
CEOs, whereas, incoming CEOs received significantly less total cash reward than non-
. . CEO 18 mcommg s. 
18 Scholarship in both. the Agency Theory paradigm and the burgeoning Managerial Power paradigm suggests 
that CEO reward is a positive function of CEO tenure. Perhaps of more tangential significance, however, there 
is marked inconsistency in how CEO tenure is operationalised and theorised. Positional and organizational 
tenure may have differential affects, and can be measured in different ways. Given these ambiguities, this study 
operationalise~ a simple and time invariant measure of organisational tenure - and that is, whether the CEO was 
internally appointed. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggest that internally appointed CEOs may have already 
crystallized their managerial power prior to be appointed to the position~ Accordingly, a narve hypothesis was 
advanced that internally appointed CEOs may have rewards that are significantly different to externally 
appointed CEOs. This measure also serves as an important CEO-level control. The effects of the dummy 
variable was negative across all specifications, yet was also non-significant. An alternative time-variant measure 
of organizational tenure was used by interacting the dummy variable with year dummy variables to account for 
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The CEO cash reward-performance relationship was tested across three different 
specifications. Research on this relationship has commonly specified a first-diffen:nce 
approach to parameter estimation, chiefly to expunge unobserved fixed effects. However, as 
mentioned, the -fixed effects models are still prone to endogeneity, especially when a dynamic 
functional fonn is specified_(see Jensen and Murphy, 1990). By way of illustration, annual 
changes in performance may be attributed to unobserved factors such as industry performance 
or managerial ability, for example. It is for this reason that a level equation was specified and 
estimated along with a fixed effects model, using an IV regression. The rationale of using this 
technique was to test whether the performance yariables were potentially ~ndogenous. The IV 
technique is used to expunge the endogenous explanatory variables of unobserved effects that 
render them correlated with the error tenn through· a reduced fonn equation (seeSayrs, 1989, 
for further discussion). 
Exhibit. 6.7 presents the results for the_ first-stage and .reduced fonn regressions of the IV 
estimator. In the first stage, the IV estimator regresses all purportedly endogenous and 
predetermined variables .on both instruments and .x vector exogenous variables. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that the main effects of the instrumental variables on CEO total 
cash reward are_ non-significant, but that the instrumental variables have significant main 
effects on the suspected endogenous performance variables. 
According to the .results, all instruments have significant main effects on the suspected 
endogenous. explanatory variables in the reduced fonn equations, and no significant main 
effect on the dependent variable, except through performance. This was the first 
identification strategy. The results suggest that these industry-level effects on performance 
should be an important consideration in the specification of reward-performance models. !tis 
intuitive that the level of CEO total cash reward in the previous period may be indirectly 
explained by industry-level total cash. This is consistent with the practitioner argument that 
attraction and retention reward geared to enhancing the finn's competitiveness in the relevant 
executive labour market are important aims in the design and determination of CEO c~sh 
reward. 
the possibility that the effect of organizational tenure is cumulative over time. The results remained 
substantively unchanged, and the measure was thus excluded f~om further analysis. 
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Besides being predicated on theoretical propositions stemming from a more constructive and 
process-oriented model of CEO cash reward and performance, the· results also indicate that 
both the raok and order conditions for identification have been .met. First, there are as many 
instruments as there are endogenous regressors. Second, the choice of instruments is 
appropriate such that the model has not been over-identified as shown above (see Wooldridge, 
2001, for further explanation). 
Furthermore, these results provide evidence suggestive of endogene'ity, on the one hand, and 
of the relevance of instruments, on the other. They also suggest that the. classical linear 
assumptions underlying OLS have belm violated given that performance measures are not 
strictly endogenous. Finally, to test for the overidentification of the IV estimaior, estimated 
residuals from second-stage IV were regressed on all exogenous explanatory variables and 
instruments (see Wooldridge, 2001) and the results produced were non-significant. 
In addition, to corroborate the evidence provided in Exhibit 6.6, the Davidson-MacKinnon 
test was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the estimates from our :fixed effects 
estimator are consistent with our IV estimator. The null hypothesis is rejected (f'5•916=2.1870, 
p<.05), suggesting that endogeneity is a legitimate source of inconsistency between the two 
specifications, and that performance variables should be treated as endogenous. The test 
implies that OLS estimates of the model are significantly inconsistent with IV estimates and 
such an inconsistency is attributable to one or more explanatory variables not being strictly 
exogenous. 
However, the correlation between the x vector and the disturbance vector (p=0.8155) in the 
second stage of the IV regression suggests that unexplained variance still remains a potential 
source of contamination, perhaps stemming from the dynamism attendant to our empirical 
specification. In other words, one or more explanatory variables are endogenous with respect 
to the error term, thus the IV estimator appears to be inefficient in terms of orthogonality. 
The IV regression is premised on a static model (for a discussion of the implications of this 
for dynamic panels see Wooldridge, 200 I). 
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Exhibit 6.7. First Stage Results for CEO Total Cash Reward 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Size,_, 
Finn Risk 1•1 
CEO T ota1 Cash 
Reward1. 1 
Industry Mean 
Real Returns'·' 
IndustryMean 
3Yr Return ,_ 1 
Industry Mean 
ROE,_, 
lndustryMean 
Real Returns 1 
lndustryMean 
3Yr Return 1 
Industry Mean 
ROE, 
Constant 
Observations 
R Change 
(Stage-Two) 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
----· 
• p <0 .05 
**p<O.O/ 
••• p <0 .001 
Real Return 
t-1 
-6.059 
(3.514) 
70.522"' .. 
(19.644) 
-1.196 
(5.068) 
0.914*** 
(0.194) 
-0.033 
(0.035) 
-0.168 
(-0.231) 
-0.269 
(0.191) 
0.154** 
(0.556) 
0.054 
(0.279) 
91.62 
(88.346) 
2456 
0.027*** 
yes 
yes 
3Yr Returns 
t-1 
36.733*** 
(7.006) 
279.125* .. 
(38.078) 
12.039 
(9.825) 
0.426 
(0.375) 
0.547* .. 
(0.068) 
-0.64 
(0.447) 
-1.237*** 
(0.369) 
0.928*** 
(0.426) 
-0.605 
(0.541) 
-1039.911*** 
(171.251) 
2456 
0.113*** 
yes 
yes 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Instrumented Variables 
ROE t·l Real 
Return t 
30.809"* ~34.428*** 
(2.853) (3.185) 
6.561 31.804 
( 15.507) (17.310) 
-14.803*** -6.237 
(4.001) (4.466) 
-0.053 0.145 
(0.153) (0.171) 
-0.021 -0.012 
(0.028) (0.031) 
0.458** -0.195. 
(0.182) (0.203) 
0.183 1.102*** 
(0.150) (0.168) 
-0.008 0.018 
(0.044) (0.049) 
0.096 -0.237 
(0.220) (0.246) 
:371.318*** 701.88*** 
_!69.741) (77.849) 
2456 2456 
0.108*** 0.006*** 
yes yes 
yes yes 
''' 
3Yr ROEt 
Returns t 
-12.446* -12.270*** 
(6.295) (3.592) 
219.043* .. 7,714 
(34.215) (19.522) 
-0.773 -0.558 
(8.828) (5.037) 
-0.228 0.287 
(0.337) (0.193) 
-0.003 0.016 
(0.061) (0.035) 
-0.238 -0.071 
(0.402) (0.229) 
-0.335 0.102 
(0.332) (0.189) 
1.262*** -0.065 
(0.097) (0.055) 
-0.316 0.710** 
(0.486) (0.277) 
115.828 229.152** 
( 153.888) (87.797) 
2456 2456 
0.06*** 0.03*** 
yes yes 
yes y~ 
The system GMM specification was used to address potential endogeneity in the x-vector, as 
well as higher-order autoregressive processes which can be characteristic of dynamic panel 
models (see Wooldridge, 2001 and 2003). This may also explain the inconsistencies in 
estimates of IV and system GMM specifications. The system GMM is considered to yield the 
most efficient estimates for a dynamic panel model. In the first stage, the level equation is 
instrumented using their first differences, and first differences are instrumented using lagged 
levels of x-vector variables. The second step uses strictly exogenous explanatory variables in 
the model - in this case year dummies and CEO turnover dummies • in addition to the 
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instruments industry-level performance means, to orthogonalise the suspected explanatory 
variables. By implication, the system GMM addresses all possible sources of contamination 
for dynamic panel models, including unobserved fixed effects, endogeneity, and 
autocorrelation. Indeed, the results from the GMM also indicate that the GMM system of 
equatiOns -is not over· identified, nor does have second-order autoregressive processes in its 
instruments (see Roodman, 2007 for further explication). Exhibit 6.6 reports the results from a 
Hansen J test, which tests the validity of the system GMM instruments. The Hansen J test for 
~wer identification tests the null hypothesis that the system GMM is over-identified. The null 
is supported and suggests that the· model is not over identified, and the instruments in the 
system of equations are valid (/=124.46, p > z=l.OOO). In other words, specifications tests 
support the specification .of the model as a two-step GMM. The Hansen J test provides further 
support that the instruments used on the moment conditions are appropriate (See Baum, 
Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007). In other words this callsinto question the validity of estimating 
the reward-performance relationship using first-differences, a point that will be revisited 
shortly. 
Exhibit 6.8 reports the results of the regression analyses estimating the relationship between 
CEO annual incentive cash reward and the three finn-level performance measures across 
three specifications. All estimates include year and finn dummies and all. standard errors are 
robust to potential heteroscedasticity. 
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Exhibit 6.8. Fixed Effects, IV, and System GMM Estimates of CEO Annual Incentive 
Cash Reward-Performance Sensitivity 
Dependent Variable: CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1 
Estimator: 
Market Return: 
Real Retumsb 1•1 
Real Retumsb 1 
3Yr Retumsb ,_ 1 
3Yr Retumsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb t-t 
ROEb, 
Controls: 
Size1 1. 1 
Finn Risk 1•1 
CEO Annual Incentive 
Cash• 1•1 
Incoming CEOsb 1 
Outgoing CEOsb 1 
Constant 
Observations 
Adjusted R2 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Davidson McKinnon 
Test of Exo2eneitv 
Hansen test of 
Overldentifying 
Restrictions 
Arellano-Bond test for 
ARc-2) in first differences 
QNatural Logarithm 
bPercentage 
.:Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
.. p <0 .OJ 
... p <0 .001 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
FE IV 
0.000 ·0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) 
0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
10.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.003 
(0.00) (0.004) 
0.000 -0.003 
10.00\ 10.003) 
0.044* -0.116 
(0.022) (0.151) 
0.018 -0.165 
(0.119) (0.192) 
.450*** .387* .. 
(0.041) (0.027) 
-0.056 -0.055 
(0.032) (0.065) 
-0.06 -0.087 
(0.034) (0.046) 
5.557*** 9.565*** 
10.611) (2.885) 
2775 2456 
0.81* .. 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F-2.500* 
GMM 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
.071* 
(0.032) 
0.0248 
(0.137) 
.813*** 
(0.057) 
-0.039 
(0.03) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
0.89 
(0.553) 
2774 
Yes 
Yes 
/-133.85 
z-2.23 
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Hypotheses 6.4 and 6.5 predicted positive associations between the two market-return 
measures specified and the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. According to the 
results for all three specifications, there is a non-significant lagged and contemporaneous 
association between the two performance measures and the level of CEO annual incentive 
cash reward. Further, for the lagged measures, estimates are consistent with their predicted 
directionality for most specifications. 
The coefficients were negative and non-significant for annual lagged real ·returns in the IV 
specification, and for three-year inflation adjusted cumulative stock returns (3Yr 'Returns) in 
the GMM specification. Consequently, these results do not furnish support for hypotheses 6.4 
and 6.5. The Hansen J StatistiC suggests that the GMM is correctly specified and has valid 
instruments. 
Hypothesis 6.6 predicted a significant positive association between 'the level of. CEO annual 
incentive cash reward, and lagged ROE. According to the estimated coefficients, this 
prediCtion was not supported by any of the specifications. All estimates were non-significant 
and negative in the fixed effects and GMM specifications, and positive and' non-significant in 
the IV regression. In addition, across all specifications, the contemporaneous association 
between the level of annual incentive cash· aud ROE was non-significant. As such, 
Hypothesis 6.6 was not supported by the estimates. 
These results prompted auxiliary sensitivity analyses with alternative accounting-based and 
market performance measures. Our measures are consistent with typical performance 
measures used by company boards to determine reward (see Bender and Moir,, 2006). 
Accordingly, in auxiliary regression analyses, the level of CEO annual incentive cash was 
regressed on alternative firm-level performance measures operationalised in previous studies. 
These measures included, ROA and ROIC (see Chapter Five for explication). However, these 
measures did not provide incremental explanatory power according to joint significance tests, 
and such results were not reported. 
Finally, dummy variables for negative returns were used as explanatory variables to account 
for the possibility of asymmetric sensitivity and the Agency-based notions of 'ex post settling 
up' (see Bender, 2004; Dechow, 2006; Leone, Wu, and Zimmer, 2006). Operationalising a 
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negative stock return measure failed to provide any incremental explanatory power, as the 
estimated coefficients were not statistically significant from zero .. 
Turning to the other controls, the lagged effect~ of firm size~ was positive and significant in 
both the GMM and fixed effects specifications: According to the estimated coefficients, an 
increase in firm size, as expected, was associated with an increase in the level of purported 
and .reported incentive cash. This may be further explained by firm size affecting the level of 
salary, which is commonly used as a basis for incentive awards (EIIig, 2003). While firm risk 
was predicted to increase in the level of total CEO cash reward, it did not have a significant 
effect in either direction on the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. This result is 
inconsistent with research evidence that risk and incentive reward are inversely related (see 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; and Mishra eta/., 2000 for examples). In contrasi to the total 
cash model results, turnover episodes were not significant predictors of the level of CEO 
annual'incentive cash reward, even though significant negative effects ·were predicted. 
Exhibit 6.9 reports the results of the first stage results of the IV regression. The results 
suggest that the instruments are appropriat~ on the· basis of predicting variaiion in purported 
endogenous variables whilst having non-significant effects on the dependent variable. Also, 
according to the Davidson McKinnon test in Exhibit 6.9, one or more predictors in the 
empirical model are not strictly exogenous, thus precipitating inconsistencies in estimates 
from OLS fixed effects, and IV regressions (F16,1926)=2.499, p<.05). 
However, the correlation between the x vector and unexplained variance in the IV estimator 
(p= 0.4210) - not reported here - suggests that ~the while the IV addresses endogeneity. 
stemming froni omitted variable bias, it does not address the endogeneity stemming from the 
autoregressive processes characteristic of dynamic panel models. Also, results from the 
Hansen overidentification test confirm that instruments in the system are valid (J('=I33.85, 
p>z=I.OOO). Overall, the results in Exhibit 6.9 suggest that the first-order autoregressive 
process needs to be addressed as a potential source of contamination, and that extant studies 
based on first-differenced estimates of the reward-performance relationship (see Merhebi et 
a/., 2006 for an example), are biased by endogeneity stemming from autoregressive· 
disturbances. 
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Exhibit 6.9. First Stage Results of IV Regression for CEO Annual Incentive Cash 
Reward 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Size ,_1 
Finn Risk 1•1 
CEO Annual 
Incentives 
Cash,_1 
Industry Mean 
Real Returns 
... 
Industry Mean 
3Yr Return t-1 
Industry 
MeanR0~. 1 
Industry Mean 
R~al Returns 
t 
Industry Mean 
3Yr Return 1 
lndustryMean 
ROE, 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 Change 
(Stage two) 
Year 
Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
• p <0 .05 
** p <0 .OJ 
... p <0 
.001 
Real Return 
,_, 
-6.52 
(3.570) 
70.003*** 
(19.627) 
6.360* 
(3.027) 
0.913*** 
(0.194) 
-0.319 
(0.352) 
-0.154 
(0.231) 
-0.254 
(0.191) 
0.(55** 
(0.056) 
0.068 
(0.278) 
12.603 
(75.88"7) 
2456 
0.028*** 
yes 
No 
JYr Returns 
,_, 
37.375*** 
(6.918) 
277.207 
(38.025) 
15.682** 
(5.864) 
0.422 
(0.375) 
0.551*** 
(0.068) 
-0.599 
(0.447) 
-1.203*** 
(0.037) 
0.929*** 
(0.108) 
-0.561 
(0.540) 
1051.119*** 
(147.023) 
2456 
0.105*** 
yes 
No 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Instrumented Variables 
ROE,.1 Real Return JYr ROE, 
• 
Returns 1 
29.234*** -34.909*** -13.031* -12.145*** 
(2.812) (3.150) (6.219) (3.551) 
7.294 32.432 218.127 8.049 
(I 5.564) (17.314) (34.185) (19.521) 
-0.856 -3.912 10.683 -3.432 
(2.400) (2.670) (5.272) (3.010) 
-0.043 0.15 -0.228 0.289 
(0.154) (0.171) (0.337) (0.193) 
-0.022 0.011 -0.001 0.016 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.613) (0.035) 
0.458** -0.203 -0.211 -0.077 
(0.183) (0.204) (0.402) (0.229) 
0.193 1.097*** -0.031 0.095 
(0.151) (0.168) (0.332) (0.190) 
-0.006 0.019 1.264*** -0.065 
(0.044) (0.049) (0.097) (0.055) 
0.09 -0.248 -0.335 0.702** 
(0.021) (0.246) (0.486) (0.277) 
-539.778*** 668.227*** -1.956 258.595*** 
(60.178) (66.945) (132.175) (75.478) 
2456 2456 2456 2456 
. 
0.103*** 0.007*** 0.059*** 0.028*** 
yes yes yes yes 
No No No No 
After controlling for endogeneity, stemming from both omitted variables and autoregressive 
processes, the effects of all performance variables on both total cash reward and annual 
incentive cash reward are non-significant, and on this basis Hypothesis 6. I -6 are rejected. 
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Size, however, measured by total assets, has a robust positive lagged effect on bot~ dependent 
variables at the 0.001 level of significance. This tells us that as size increases, the level of 
CEO total cash, and annual incentive cash reward, increases. 
6.5 Discussion 
We have used three different estimators to test the sensitivity of reported CEO cash rewards 
to two measures of firm-level performance, and determine whether itis more appropriate to 
estimate reward performance sensitivity through more rigorous econometric techniques 
appropriate for dynamic panel models. 
Hypothesis 6.1 predicted a significant positive lagged· association between real stock returns 
and the natural logarithm of CEO total cash reward. On the· basis of the results of the three 
specifications, this hypothesis was rejected. Moreover, estimates were inconsistent across all 
three specifications in terms of. directionality and magnitude. According to the IV estimates, 
lagged annual real returns negatively predict the level of CEO total cash rewards. The system 
GMM specification did not yield significant estimates for real returns. 
Hypothesis 6.2 predicted a positive lagged association. between CEO total cash reward, and 
three-year lagged cumulative real stock returns (3 year returns). This hypothesis was partially 
supported, but was not robust across all specifications. Both the fixed effects and 
instrumental variable specifications yielded significant positive coefficients for three year 
Cl!mulative returns. However, this effect did not persist in the system GMM estimates. These 
results suggest that common. sources of contamination attendant to dynamic panel models 
may be biasing the two other specifications'.estimates (see Sayrs, 1989), and are suggestive of 
dynamic misspeeification. Indeed, upon further examination of the disturbances, a significant 
correlation between the x vector and disturbances in IV regressions was found to persist even 
after the IV estimator controlled for endogeneity by instrumenting performance variables. 
This suggests that the IV regression did not improve the orthogonality of the explanatory 
variables. These results reinforce the importance of using econometric techniques appropriate 
for. dynamic panel models. 
According to the results, the main effect of lagged ROE on CEO total cash reward was 
contrary to prediction implicit. in Hypothesis 6.3. The fixed effects model provided a 
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significant negative estimated coefficient; however such an association failed to persist once 
endogeneity and serial correlation were accounted for in the system GMM estimates. 
Hypothesis 6.4 predicted a significant positive lagged association between real returns and the 
level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. The results failed to support this prediction. The 
estimated coefficients on lagged real returns were inconsistent both in terms of directionality 
and magnitude across all specifications. For the IV specification, the estimated coefficient 
was significant and negative, implying that the level of incentive cash is inversely related to 
real returns. The GMM estimates did not yield a significant coefficient in either direction. In 
addition, the Hypothesised association between lagged three-year cumulative real stock 
returns (3Yr Returns) and CEO annual incentive cash reward was non-significant. On this 
basis, Hypothesis 6.5 was rejected. One important rationale for using this measure was to 
account for multi-period performance appraisals by the board. Also, such a measure was 
deemed to be highly construct valid explanatory variable given that it is a commonly used 
measure in CEO annul incentive plans (Bender and Moir, 2006). 
Finally, Hypothesis 6:6 predicted a significant association between CEO annual incentive 
cash reward and lagged ROE. Again, and contrary to prediction, results indicated a negative 
and significant coefficient for the fixed effects specification, and non-significant coefficients 
for the remaining specifications. 
Specification tests for overidentification, as well as the inconsistencies in estimated 
coefficients both in terms of significance and directionality, suggest that both endogeneity and 
serial correlation were.soirrces of contamination and measurement error in both fixed effects . 
and IV specifications. Again, such results suggest that the econometric techniques 
appropriate for dynamic pane! models are important to safeguard the integrity of estimates, 
and their subsequent inferential validity. 
The results have some important implications for the. empirical specification of the reward-
performance relationship, on the one hand, and the estimation of the resultant model, on the 
other hand. First, the results suggest that classic linear model assumptions regarding the 
orthogonality of explanatory variables were violated, and that OLS assumptions predicated on 
static models rather than dynamic models may be inappropriate when testing the CEO 
reward-performance relationship (see Sayrs, 1989). This is because serial correlation and the 
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autoregressive processes in the error vector stemming from dynamic misspecification are 
meaningful sources of contamination in dynamic panel models. This has certainly been 
overlooked by the extant empirical literature, despite the suggestion by early authors that 
performance variables themselves can .exhibit positive autocorrelation (see Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987: 92). 
These results question the integrity of estimation techniques .in previous research based on 
first difference estimators and, consequently, the reliability the estimates reported (Kerr and 
Kren, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1991; and Merhebi eta/., 2006). It is quite plausible then, 
that the significant associations reported in prior research, irrespective of directionality and 
magnitude, are potentially a methodological artefact, and thus have limited inferential or 
analytical significance. In particular, the claim by Merhebi eta/. (2006), thar Australian CEO 
total cash reward in recent times is a 'non-anomaly' as compared to previous sensitivity 
research further afield, is a questionable contention in view of the these considerations and the 
results reported, at least with respect to cash reward. The results in this chapter also challenge 
the contention m.ade by Merhebi et a/., (2006), that Australian boards are promulgating CEO 
reward for performance. The results from system GMM specifications suggest first 
difference and fixed effects estimates are inefficient. Indeed, the GMM results reported in 
this chapter suggest significant first and second order autoregressive disturbances among the 
first differences of explanatory variables. Again, this confirms that OLS first-differences 
estimates of the CEO reward and performance relationship may be inconsistent, especially 
when orthogonality conditions have been violated (see Ostrom, 1990). 
Each of the three estimation techniques used have different implications for the error term and 
the x vector. The system GMM is especially efficient when dealing with multiple 
endogenous regressors (Roodman, 2006) .. The merit of the two-step system GMM is that it is 
appropriate for the complex error structure attendant to dynamic panel data (Baum et a/., 
2007; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2007). It addresses two sources of possible 
endogeneity: first, omitted variable bias due to endogenous and predetermined explanatory 
variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998); and second, the serial correlation in both the x and 
disturbance vector that transpires when specifying lagged dependent and explanatory variable 
in the x vector. Chapter five provided a more exacting analysis of the relative benefits of 
using a two-step system GMM approach to parameter estimation. Further, even after 
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addressing orthogonality in a 'two-step system GMM, the non-significance of the CEO 
reward- performance relationship persisted. 
The approach taken here has attempted to minimize error in estimation and in measurement. 
Lambert and Larcker (I 987) suggest that the theoretical and empirical specification of the 
sensitivity of reward to performance needs to account for the possibility of boards placing 
differential weight on accounting and market return performance. The empirical model 
specified here is predicated on the assumption that CEO rewards are based on a 
multidimensional and multi-period assessment of CEO performance. However, despite using 
a range of metrics for performance (commonly used in extant empirical research), both 
accounting and market retUrn measures failed to explain variaiion in both the level of CEO 
total cash reward and also in reported incentive based cash reward, which, by definition, 
should be performance contingent. 
In addition, alternative accounting and market return measures. such as ROA, and ROIC 
(Canyon and Sadler, 200 I; Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine, I 999), failed improve or buttress 
explanatory power. Even auxiliary an·alyses assessing asymmetric reward-performance 
sensitivity by using· a dummy variable for negative lagged real returns (see Aggarwal and 
Samwick 1999a for im example) failed to provide incremental increases in the explanatory 
power. The purpose of ihis auxiliary analysis was to discern whether boards make downward 
adjustments to total reward, and at the very least incentive reward, in the event of poor 
performance (consistent with notions of ex post settling up). Leone, Wu and Zimmer (2006) 
reported evidence of asymmetric sensitivity, where CEO rewards were differentially sensitive 
to positive and negative returns. However, our results suggest ihat, consistent wiih Dechow 
- . 
(2006), Australian boards do not penalize CEO-agents for poor performance through 'ex post 
settling up' in cash terms, given 'that the estimated coefficient on the negative stock return 
dummy was not statistically significant -from zero. The auxiliary results do not suggest that 
boards make downward adjustments in CEO cash reward in the event of poor performance, 
even after firm risk has been controlled for; nor do boards use negative discretion formulae 
when determining CEO cash reward. 
There are several important theoretical implications of these results, all of which are 
considered in the context of the discussions in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. ·one of the 
first propositions advanced in Chapter Four is premised on the assumption that boards make 
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CEO reward decisions on .the basis of various economic and structural characteristics. The 
net effect of these considerations is that CEO rewards are not exclusively contingent on firm-
level performance. However, CEO rewards do serve an ex ante incentive ·purpose and, as 
such, should be sensitive to measures firm-level performance. Overall, the results indicate 
that CEO total cash reward, and incentive cash· reward, are insensitive to both firm-level 
accounting performance and market-return performance. Thus this study does not furnish 
support for the proposition. that CEO reported cash rewards in aggregate, are aligned to, albeit 
not exclusively contingent on, firm performance. 
Agency Theory assumes, albeit more implicitly, that boards appropriately specifY 
performance measures that are sensitive to agent actions more than random noise as alluded to 
by Lambert and Larcker (1987). However, the results provide n-o support for·the inference 
that boards ratifY incentive plans which: i) have valid performance targets and measures 
which are aligned to the strategic and financial interests of the company; ii) incentivise 
desired and value adding CEO actions, behaviours, and strategic choices; and iii) inform 
and/or determine appropriate CEO reward outcomes which. are correlated with .firm-level 
performance. Thus, it does not appear from the results that the average CEO is rewarded (or 
punished) in cash ·terms for neither market-return nor accounting return performance. By 
extension, it remains unclear whether CEO rewards are based on the board's evaluation of 
CEO performance against these two variants of firm-level performance. It remains unclear 
whether boards ratify incentive plans with valid measures and, even if they do so, whether 
reliable measurement of performance has occurred ex post. 
The results presented in· this chapter provide evidence indicating. that boards typically make 
cash-related rewards decisions on the basis of factors other than accounting and market-return 
performance. Further, and as a point of conjecture, if this is true of cash-based rewards, 
including cash incentives, there is also no reason to. suppose that it is .not also true of board 
decisions relating to the granting of equity-based rewards. 
What is especially perplexing is that annual incentive cash incentives are unrelated to the two 
common measures of firm-level performance. The implications are fourfold. First, one of the 
assumptions made at the outset, informed by some of Lambert and Larcker's insights ( 1987), 
is that boards may place differential importance on different types of firm-level performance 
in different contexts. One of the subsidiary predictions made is that CEO total cash, and to a 
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still greater extent annual cash incentive rewards, would have differential sensitivities to the 
two types of firm return measures. Nevertheless, performance measures were expected 
(additively or individually) to explain variation in annual incentive reward at the very least. 
However, all the system GMM estimated coefficients for the two measures. were non-
significant, even after several alternative measures were used. Consequently, the results are 
inconsistent with the Agency Theory prediction that boards manage the agency relationship 
through performance contingent rewards. In other words, there is rio evidence, contrary to 
Merhebi et a/. (2006) claims, that boards are using executive rewards to induce CEO-agent-
principal alignment. It may also be suggested, in keeping with the .Managerial Power 
perspective, that boards may .disclose superficial performance-contingent rewards in an 
attempt to appease shareholders and critics in accordance with institutional arguments 
presented at the outset, in conjunction with the Managerial power perspective. More simply, 
it may also be suggested that this lack of sensitivity, rather than necessarily being a symptom 
of managerial power, may be an outcome of boards' idiosyncratic decision-making in relation 
to cash incentive plans. A necessary caveat here is that this study does not test the processes 
of CEO cash reward determination, but rather the outcomes. Nevertheless, it may be 
speculated that lack of CEO reward-performance sensitivity may be attributable to a lack of 
capability or sufficient knowledge to: i) select valid performance.targets and measures which 
are aligned to the strategic, operational, and financial interests of the company; ii) incentivise 
desired and value-adding CEO actions, behaviours, and strategic choices; and iii) inform 
ancl/or determine appropriate CEO reward outcomes which are correlated with firm-level 
performance. Thus the results provide suggestive support for the contention that Australian 
Boards may be judging the efficacy of reward actions in relation to CEO cash rewards on the 
basis of either socio-cognitive integration of information,. or uninformed-dispassionate 
integration of information. In other words, the insensitivity of CEO total cash reward to 
performance may reflect inefficacious assessments of proposals put forward for board 
approval that are attributable to either the socio-cognitive processing of information, or a lack 
of sufficient knowledge or information to process information in a rational and economic 
fashion. These points are revisited in Chapter Eleven in the context of a discussion of 
possible avenues for research, theory, and practice in the area of CEO reward and 
performance. 
The results also provide support for the argument that there is a discrepancy between reported 
performance-contingent cash rewards and our sensitivity analyses. It remains unclear, then, 
125 
how the board has constructed and measured 'performance'. Reported performance cash 
rewards are purportedly performance sensitive: According to remuneration reports, CEO 
incentive-based rewards are based on an appraisal of CEO performance against the 
performance standards specified ex ·ante, in the incentive plan. It follows that: the board may 
ratify and disclose valid performance measures and targets in step one, but may then fail to 
assess CEO performance reliably. Essentially, this decouples CEO cash rewards from firm-
level performance. The results ·presented substantiate Ellig's (2003) suggestion that CEO 
performance "can become a secondary consideration in the management of CEO cash rewards. 
This argument is consistent with Bender and Moir's (2006: 525) interview data, which 
showed that board directors reported that one of the most important goals of incentive 
contracts is· to signal desired behaviours to the CEO, even though directors interviewed 
admitted that these intended incentive effects may not be realised. 
Moreover, this discrepancy between reward outcomes and the board's performance ratings 
suggests bias and measurement error contaminates performance evaluations and reward 
outcomes. Given that measurement error in the specification and estimation of reward for 
performance were minimized in a number of ways in this study, it is possible to attribute such 
error to the board's" administration of performance evaluation and reward determination, and 
to a discrepancy between the CEO reward processes on the one hand, and CEO performance 
management processes on the other. 
It also appears from the results that CEO cash incentive contracts are insulated from downside 
risk. Auxiliary analyses support this supposition. Certainly, the reported discrepancies 
between our CEO reward-performance estimates, and reported performance contingency of 
rewards, provide evidence corroborative of Bender's institutional supposition and interview 
evidence (2002). The directors interviewed reported that nominally performance contingent 
rewards were a way to manage shareholder perceptions and especially those of large block 
holders. This argument is revisited in the forthcoming chapters. 
It is perplexing that recent regulatory pressures have provided impetus for increased CEO 
reward performance contingency on the one hand, and transparency on the other, yet no· 
significant association has been found, at least with respect to cash components of reward. 
Recent corporate governance reforms relating to executive reward disclosure and corporate 
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governance structures are commonly assumed, a priori, to have increased the efficiency of 
board monitoring and management of the agency relationship. 
While this study has addresses a number of the criticisms canvassed in Chapter Two and 
Three, and thus furnishes greater precision to make inferences regarding CEO reward and 
performance, it is .not without limitations. First, the reward measures used are not 
comprehensive, in that they do not include the value of CEO equity-based incentives and, thus 
underestimate the level of CEO rewards in aggregate. Equally plausible then, the estimates 
may underestimate the sensitivity of the CEO total reward and performance relationship. This 
said, however, disaggregating CEO total rewards into specific components, cash and equity 
components in particular, is conducive to a more nuanced understanding of CEO reward 
determination. Further, there is no reason to suppose that CEO cash reward-performance 
sensitivity is not a valid and reliable indicator of overall reward-performance sensitivity. 
6_6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides prima facie empirical support for the misalignment between the level of 
CEO total cash reward and firm-level performance indexed by both accounting and market-
return measures, in Australian public companies for the period 1999-2006. These results 
show that there is a discrepancy between reported performance sensitive cash rewards and the 
two performance measures specified. They also suggest that despite recent regulatory 
pressures in the Australian context to make CEO rewards more performance contingent - and 
board decision-making more 'independent' and 'accountable' -there are still non-significant 
lagged associations between the level of annual incentive reward, and measures of firm-level 
accounting and market-returns. 
This finding is even more compelling given that the current study addressed potential sources 
of contamination stemming from methodologies entrenched in extant empirical literature. 
The study estimated the relationship using three approaches to parameter estimation to 
account for the possibility of bias and error stemming from the specification of a dynamic 
panel model. According to the results, endogeneity, and serial autocorrelation were 
meaningful sources of contamination. This reinforces the importance and efficiency of using 
a system GMM that uses identified multi-equations to estimate the relationship between CEO 
cash reward and performance. 
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Accordingly, it is believed that many prior studies, including Jensen and Murphy's (1990) 
celebrated paper, are potentially contaminated by both sources of endogeneity, which first 
differencing does not redress. Furthermore, this paper makes an important contribution 
empirically, methodologically, and theoretically to the study of CEO reward and performance. 
In light of these findings and analyses, the forthcoming chapter tests the moderating effects of 
total firm risk, and firm size, on the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. 
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Chapter Seven 
Firm Size and Risk as Moderators of CEO Reward anil Performance 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examines the ex post sensitivity of reported CEO cash reward levels to 
various criterion-relevant measures of firm·-level performance, whilst co-varying out other 
important explanatory variables such as size, risk, and turnover episodes, to name a few. In 
so doing, the chapter redresses some potential sources of error in measurement, error in 
inference, and error in the theoretical specification of CEO reward and performance. It is 
argued that these sources ·or contamination limit ihe extent of legitimate inference regarding 
the board's effectiveness in managing the CEO reward-performance relationships. 
The results presented in Chapter Six indicate that CEO cash rewards levels are non-
significantly associated with various performance measures. This dissociation is robust 
across three different estimators. It is argued that these results furnish evidence indicating 
that Australian company boards, on average, have been ineffectual in terms of establishing a 
link between CEO cash rewards and firm-level performance. 
Both firm size and variance or riskiness in firm returns have received considered attention in 
the extant literature as important moderators and determinants of CEO reward. This chapter 
examines the moderating role of firm size and firm risk on CEO cash reward. The chapter 
begins by revisiting the body of literature suggesting that firm size and firm risk play an 
important role in explaining the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. In 
so doing, this chapter will explicate the causal logic of the prediction that firm size and risk 
positively influence levels of CEO total cash reward, but negatively moderate the relationship 
between CEO cash reward and performance. The results are then discussed· in terms of their 
implications for extant research. 
7.2 The Role of Size and Risk: Evidence and Hypotheses 
Chapter Four elucidates some of the specific ways in which firm size and firm risk can 
influence CEO cash reward outcomes. Previous research has shown that firm size also plays 
an important role in the management and determination of CEO rewards. Tosi et a/. (2000) 
report that firm size explained 40% of the explained variance in CEO total reward, whereas 
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firm-level performance explained less that 5% .. Some authors (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1988; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Lippert and Porter, 1997) explain this in terms of firm 
size being a proxy for firm complexity, and, more specifically, that it proxies operational, 
financial, and strategic complexity arising from diversification and intemationalisation and 
that size per se thus warranting greater levels of fixed rewards to attract and .retain CEO 
talent. Aggarwal and Sam wick (I 999a) suggest that high volatility in a specified performance 
criterion transfers considerable uncertainty or reward at risk to the CEO. This in tum makes it 
difficult to determine the extent to which this volatility in the criterion measure:is attributable 
to CEO actions and decisions, and thus influences the CEO's perceived expectancies in 
relation to accomplishing performance targets. Research canvassed in Chapter Three 
substantiates· this logic in finding that the higher the variance in firm market returns, the 
weaker the relationship between CEO cash reward and measures of firm market returns. 
Research suggests that firm size may also be an important consideration in the board's 
management of CEO cash reward and performance. As the size of the firm increases, so too 
does the complexity of firm operations, and capital structures (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lippert and 
Porter, 1997). This has the effect of making board attributions in relation to CEO 
performance increasingly difficult and, in tum, diminishes. the sensitivity of firm-level 
performance CEO actions and decision-making. Boards. espousing this logic would either 
make decisions to specify performance measures which may be perceived by the CEO as 
more easily attainable, or grant the CEO a risk premium for additional risk exposure 
stemming from being evaluating against firm-level performance (Lippert and Porter, 1997). In 
keeping with these findings, this chapter tests the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Firm size is.positively. associated !Vith CEO total cash, and annual incentive 
cash reward. 
Several authors report that stock volatility, a source of external firm risk, negatively 
moderates the relationship between CEO rewards and firm-level performance (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999a; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Core et a/., 1999; Lippert and Moore, 1994; 
Merhebi et a/., 2006; Mishra, et a/., 2000). As canvassed in Chapters Two and Three, firm 
risk has important implications for the management of CEO reward and performance, 
although the nature of the effect remains to be clearly explicated in the literature. Thus, on the 
basis of these considerations and the extant research evidence, it can be expected that: 
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Hl.la: There is a significant positive association between firm size and the level of CEO total 
cash reward. 
H7.1 b: Firm size negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between firm-level 
performance measures and CEO total cash rewards in such. a way that -the relationship is 
weaker when firm size is high than when it is low. 
H7.1c: There is a significant negative association between the level of CEO annual incentive 
cash rewards and firm size. 
H7.1 d: Firm size negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between firm-level 
performance measures and CEO annual cash incentive -reward in such a way that the 
relationship is weaker when firm· size is high than when it is low. 
It is reasonable to assume that firm risk and firm size are foci of board deliberations pertaining 
to CEO cash reward determination. An assessment of firm risk and firm size can influence 
the board's choice of performance measures. For example, in the event of high-risk volatility, 
boards may be more likely to specify relative measures of firm-level performance or use 
performance measures that are indexed to broader share price movements. This acts to net-
out measurement error in CEO performance evaluations and thus the incentive plan is likely 
to have greater incentive effects. Conversely, boards can evaluate CEO performance against 
firm-level performance measures more leniently as a way to manage CEO exposure to finn 
risk or the complexities of managing large corporations. Equally plausibly, CEOs exposed to 
high levels of external risk may receive higher lev.els of risk compensation in the form of 
performance-decoupled rewards, which, in turn, attenuate total rewards from firm-level 
performance. It is reasonable to propose the following on the basis of these considerations: 
Proposition 4a: Firm risk is positively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 4b: Firm risk is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward 
In public companies, high firm risk and exposure to speculative investors has the potential to 
de-motivate CEOs, especially when there is a loss of perceived control over the firm's value 
in the market. To manage this source of risk in the design of a CEO incentive plan, the board 
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may place differential weightings on accounting and market return measures (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1989). It may also place greater importance· on relative rather than absolute 
performance. Thus, firm-risk, may influence the perceived difficulty of performance targets as 
well as the size of performance-contingent reward targets. The board's appraisal of firm risk 
can also have implications 'for the·composition of CEO reward, particularly the proportion of 
total reward that is ·performance-contingent. As evidenced by empirical research (for 
example Mishra et a/., 2000) CEOs exposed to high levels .of external risk receive higher 
levels of fixed rewards to offset additional risk. 
Firm risk can also moderate CEO performance evaluations in ways not dissimilar to reward 
design and architecture. Board directors may evaluate CEO exposure to high firm risk more 
sympathetically. CEOs exposed to high levels of risk may receive higher levels of risk 
compensation, in the form of performance-decoupled rewards which in turn attenuate total 
rewards from firm-level performance. In accordance with this exposition, it is possible to 
hypothesise the following: 
H7.2a: There is a significant positive association between firm risk and the level of CEO total 
cash reward 
H7.2b: Firm risk negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between firm-level 
performance measures and CEO total cash reward in such a way that the relationship is 
weaker when firm size is high than when it is low. 
H7.2c: There is a significant negative association between the level of CEO annual incentive 
cash rewards and firm risk. 
H7.2d: Firm risk negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between firm-level 
performance measures and CEO annual cash incentive reward in such a way that the 
relationship is weaker when firm size is high than when it is low. 
It is shown in Chapter Six, that firm risk and firm size, consistent with extant research, 
positively influence the level of CEO total cash reward. From a CEO performance evaluation 
perspective, firm risk and firm size may moderate the extent to which the CEO is paid on the 
basis of firm-level performance. Based on these empirically supported considerations it is 
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reasonable to predict that both firm risk and firm size would have similar effects on CEO cash 
reward, and negatively moderate the relationship. between CEO cash reward, and firm-level 
performance measures. 
7. 3 The Econometric Model and Estimators 
Exhibit 7.1 describes the key variables operationalised in regression analyses. 
A dynamic panel data model is used to examine the main and moderator effects of total firm 
risk and firm size on the relationship between CEO cash reward and firm-level performance. 
The dynamic panel model is encapsulated in the following level equation: 
CEOTota/Cash1•1 a + fJoCEOTota/Cash;. 1-1 + fJ1Size;. 1-1 
fJ,AccounttingReturns;. 1.1 + fJ4MarketReturn;. 1.1 
+ fJ1FirmRisk1 
+ fJ5 Size;. 
+ 
1·/. 
AccountingReturnsi, r-1 + P6 Size;, ,_, * MarketReturn1,,.J + A2Turnover1•1 + J.i; 
+e;,, 
• Where Size is indexed by the natural logarithm of total assets, and FirmRisk by the 
cumulative distribution function of firm returns over the 36 months prior (see 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a for methodology). 
• AccouniingReturn is measured by real ROE. 
• MarketReturn is the vector for two market-return measures: one being the real stock 
returns, which measures returns relative to the risk free rate; the other being a 3 year 
cumulative real stock return measure to account for the possibility of annual incentives 
being based on longer and cumulative performance periods. 
• The model also specifies interactions petween the hypothesized moderators and the 
two firm-level performance variables terms to test the key hypotheses. 
• Turnover is the vector for incoming and outgoing CEO dummy variables to control for 
payments which may be prorated, included severance payments, as well as sign-on 
payments. 
• The equation also controls for unobserved firm-effects through firm dummies, and 
time effects through year dummies. 
This equation is re-estimated using firm-risk as a hypothesized moderator instead on firm 
size. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators and system GMM estimators were used to 
examine the associations among CEO total cash reward, CEO annual incentive cash reward, 
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firm-level performance, and the hypothesized moderators. Again, these estimators were used 
because they are suitable for addressing the complex error structure of dynamic panel models, 
and especially in addressing potential endogeneity. A discussion of the relative merits of 
these approaches was presented in Chapter Five. Here, too, the system GMM is posited to be 
more efficient in estimating this relationship 
Exhibit 7.1. Variables and Measures 
Variables 
Dependent Variables: 
CEO Total Cash Reward 
CEO Annual Cash Reward 
Performance Variables: 
Real Returns 
ROE 
3Yr Real Returns 
Moderators: 
Size 
Finn Risk 
Turnover Variables: 
Incoming CEOs 
Outgoing CEOs 
Instruments for Performance Variables: 
Industry Mean for Real Returns 
Industry Mean for ROE 
7.4 Results 
Measures 
Natural logarithm of the summation of reported. 
incentive and non·incentive cash components 
Natural Logarithm of Reported annual incentive cash 
(price at t +dividend less price at t-1)/price at t-1)) 
ROE=NP AT before abnonnal/(shareholder equity-
outside equity interests) 
Accumulated average return=[( I +~)(I +R1. 1)(1 +R,_2)-
1] where R=retum to stock or TSR. 
Total Assets 
Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) Cumulative 
Distribution Function affirm real returns. The 
measure is between 1 and 0 with I as the maximum 
level of volatility. 
I = first year in the position as CEO and 0 if 
otherwise 
.I= Last year in the position as CEO and 0 if othe~ise 
Mean by industry and year using S&P/ASX sectoral 
indices (n=IO) 
Mean by industry and year using S&P/ASX sectoral 
indices (n=IO) 
Exhibit 7.2 presents a correlation matrix of the all the hypothesised moderator variables 
posited in the theoretical specification of CEO cash reward and performance, along with their 
mean values and standard deviations. These results suggest that firm risk is significantly and 
negatively correlated with lagged and contemporaneous total cash and incentive cash at the 
0.001 level. Also, these estimates suggest that lagged firm size is positively and significantly 
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correlated with lagged and contemporaneous CEO total and annual incentive cash reward at 
the 0.001 level. 
Firm size appears to be a robust predictor of CEO total and annual incentive cash reward. 
Exhibit 7.3 presents the IV and system GMM estimates for the interaction between size and 
firm-level performance measures, on CEO cash rewards. The first two columns report the IV 
and system GMM estimates respectively for CEO total cash reward, while the third and fourth 
present the results for CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
Hypothesis 7 .I a predicted a significant positive lagged association between firm size and 
CEO total cash reward. Support for this prediction appears to be conditional on the 
estimation technique used. Consistent with the results reported in the previous chapter, size is 
a robust positive predictor of CEO total cash rewards, according to the system GMM 
estimates (.8=0.140, p< 0.001), yet a non-significant predictor in the IV specification. The 
Davidson McKinnon specification test reported in Exhibit 7.3 confirms that a IV estimator 
provides comparatively more efficient estimates than an OLS fixed effects estimator 
(F(9.2237J=J.969, p<.05). The null hypothesis for the Hansen J statistic is also supported, 
suggesting the system GMM is not over identified and is efficient in estimating the 
parameters of the model specified. 
Hypothesis 7 .I b predicted lagged firm Size to attenuate the relationship between some or all 
of the firm-level performance measures, and the level of CEO total cash reward. According 
to the results from the system GMM regression, firm size positively moderates the association 
between lagged ROE and the level of CEO total cash reward. In other words, the estimated 
interaction coefficient implies that as firm size increases, the association between accounting 
returns and CEO total cash reward increases. It is noteworthy however, that the main effects 
of lagged and contemporaneous ROE are negative on CEO total cash reward. The IV 
estimator yielded non-significant results, yet directionality of the interaction term was positive 
and thus inconsistent with prediction. On the basis of these results, Hypothesis 7 .I b. is 
rejected. 
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Exhibit 7o3o The Influence of Firm Size on CEO Cash Reward 
Main Effects: 
Size• 1•1 
Interactions: 
Size 1•1* Real Returns 1•1 
Size t- 1* ROE 1-1 
Size t-1 *3Yr Returns 1• 1 
Market Return: 
Real Returnsb ,_ 1 
Real Returnsb 1 
3Yr Retumsb 1•1 
3Yr Retumsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEh 1_1 
ROEb I 
Controls: 
Firm Risk 1 
CEO Total Cash Reward8 1• 1 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash a 
,., 
Incoming CEOsc 
Outgoing CEOsc 
Constant 
Observations 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Davidson McKinnon Test 
of Exogeneity 
Hansen test of 
Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arcllano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
' 'Natural Logarithm 
h Percentage 
cBinary Variable 
:!' <0 .05 
p <0 .01 
000 
p <0 .001 
Total Cash Reward• 
IV GMM 
0.036 0.140*** 
(0.065) (0.017) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) 
-0.002 0.000** 
(0.002) (0.000) 
0.000 3.142 
(0.000) (0.437) 
-0.003 -0.001 
(0.007) (0.001) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) 
0.005 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.001) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) 
0.029 -0.003 
(0.029) (0.001) 
0.001 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) 
0.096 0.226' 
(0.202) (0.095) 
0.265*"'* 0.558*** 
(0.031) (0.047) 
-0.222*** -0.213*** 
(0.058) (0.024) 
0.061' 0.078** 
(0.029) (0.031) 
8.980*** 3.142*** 
(1.227) (0.437) 
2775 2775 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F=I.969' 
/=255.73 
z=2.50** 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Annual Incentive Cash Reward• 
IV GMM 
-0.117 0.063*** 
(0.09) (0.018) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.009 -0.001 
(0.01) (0.004) 
-0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.000) 
0.009 -0.001 
•(0.005) (0.001) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) 
0.017 -0.006 
(0.039) (0.004) 
-0.001 -0.000 
(0.003) (0.000) 
-0.021 -0.047 
(0.264) (0.089) 
0.447*"'* 0.807*** 
(0.043) (0.058) 
-0.052 -0.027 
(0.080) (0.028) 
-0.080' -0.057 
(0.041) (0.030) 
8.648*** 1.108' 
(1.551) (0.498) 
2774 2774 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F=2.172' 
/=185.30 
z=2.30*· 
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While the results suggest that size positively moderates the lagged relationship between 
accounting returns- measured by ROE -and CEO total cash reward, this effect did not persist 
for market-return performance measure; real returns. While estimated coefficients for the two 
market-return measures were consistent with the hypothesized directionality, they were non-
significant. 
Hypothesis 7.lc predicted a significant lagged negative association between firm size and the 
level of inc~ntive reward. Once again, the estimated coefficients for size are inconsistent 
across IV and system GMM specifications. The former yields a negative, albeit, non-
significant coefficient, and the latter a significant positive coefficient. Contrary to prediction, 
the system GMM estimated coefficient implies that CEOs in larger firms receive significantly 
more annual incentive reward. However, this of itself, does not mean that in larger firms, 
incentive cash payments are more performance-sensitive. The results across the two 
specifications presented in Exhibit 7.3 do not furnish support for Hypothesis 7.ld, which 
predicted firm size to negatively moderate the lagged association between CEO annual 
incentive cash rewards and the three firm-level performance measures. 
Exhibit 7.4 reports·the moderating effects of firm risk on the relationship between CEO total 
cash and annual incentive cash reward, and firm performance using the system GMM and IV 
estimators respectively. In terms of the main effects, Hypothesis 7 .2a predicted a positive 
association between the level of CEO total cash rewards and firm risk. The IV and system 
GMM regressions yielded inconsistent estimates. Consistent with the prediction, the 
estimated effect of firm risk on the level of CEO total cash reward was significant and 
positive at the 0.05 level for system GMM, and non-significant and negative for the IV 
estimator. Results from the system GMM suggest that CEOs receive significantly higher 
levels of total cash reward as firm risk increases (/J=O.l46, p < 0.05). 
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Exhibit 7.4. The Influence of Firm Risk on CEO Cash Reward 
Main Effect: 
Finn Risk 1 
Interaction effects: 
Firm Risk 1* Real Returns 
,_, 
Finn Risk ,• ROE ,_ 1 
Finn Risk1*3YrReturns1_1 
Market Return: 
Real Returns~> 1•1 
Real Returnsb, 
3Yr Retumsb 1•1 
3Yr Retumsb, 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb 1•1 
ROEb 1 
Controls: 
Size• •·• 
CEO Total Cash Reward• 1_ 
I 
CEO Annual Incentive 
Cash• •-• 
Incoming CEOs~ 1 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
Constant 
Observations 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
<Davidson McKinnon Test 
of Exogencity 
Hansen test of 
Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
aNatural Logarithm 
bPercentage 
cBinary Variable 
'p<0.05 
.. p <0 .OJ 
... p <0 .001 
Total Cash Reward• 
IV GMM 
0.007 0.146* 
(0.141) (0.074) 
-0.002 0.002 
(0.004) (0.002) 
0.021 0.004 
(0.013) (0.002) 
0.002 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.001 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.00 I) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.0!6 -0.003 
(0.011) (0.002) 
0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.051 0.100*** 
(0.048) (0.023) 
0.311* .. 0.771* .. 
(0.026) (0.062) 
-0.204* .. -0.255* 
(0.039) (0.026) 
O.Q73 .. 0.058 
(0.028) (0.031) 
8.215*** 1.138* 
(0.819) (0.583) 
2775 2275 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F-2.480" 
/-180.78' 
z=2.70** 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Incentive Cash Reward• 
IV GMM 
-0.007 -0.022 
(0.224) (0.143) 
0.005 0.002 
(0.007). (0.003) 
0.021 0.001 
(0.02) (0.003) 
-0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) 
-0.005 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.002) 
0.000 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.003 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.013 -0.002 
(0.018) (0.002) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.003) (0.001) 
-0.!35 0.075* .. 
(0.077) (0.032) 
0.460*** 0.821* .. 
(0.031) (0.049) 
-0.036 -0.044 
(0.062) (0.034) 
-0.054 -0.040 
(0.046) (0.032) 
8.820**.* 0.729 
(1.569) (0.518) 
2774 2274 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
F=3.089*** 
/-167.30 
z=2.24* 
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While firm risk appears to be a significant positive predictor of the level. of CEO total cash 
reward, the results in Exhibit 7.3 suggest that it does not significantly explain variation in the 
level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. Across both IV and system GMM specifications, 
the estimated coefficient for firm risk was negative and non-significant. On the basis of these 
findings, Hypothesis 7.2c is rejected. 
7.5 Discussion 
Overall, the main effects of firm size are consistent with the extant empirical literature, as 
well as with the estimates reported in the previous chapter, which excluded size/performance 
interaction terms in the econometric model. Size matters in terms of the. board's 
determination of CEO cash reward levels across all cash reward components. The fact that 
firm size is a positive moderator of the relationship between accounting return and total CEO 
cash reward suggests that accounting measures are more important foci of board deliberations 
when determining CEO total cash reward compared to market-return measures in larger firms. 
While firm risk is a significant positive predictor of the level of total CEO cash rewards, 
contrary to prediction, firm risk overall does not, significantly nor negatively, moderate the 
relationship between the level of CEO total cash rewards and lagged accounting and market 
performance. Therefore, risk does not appear to have a meaningful attenuation effects on the 
CEO-reward performance relationship, which is also inconsistent with past empirical 
findings. This finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have reported significant 
negative moderating effects of firm specific risk (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Core et a/., 
1999; Merhebi et a/., 2006) .. Nonetheless, the results in the current and foregoing chapters 
suggest that it is important to specify risk as direct determinant Gf CEO rewards. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2002; 2004) mount the compelling argument that boards seek to 
legitimate CEO reward level and composition for self-serving reasons and also seek ways to 
report and disclose CEO rewards in a way that reduces the risk of shareholder outrage. 
Furthermore, high levels of fixed rewards may be legitimised on the basis of providing CEO 
greater retention incentives in high-risk firms. These considerations, in tum, attenuate the 
sensitivity of CEO cash reward to measures of firm-level performance, since fixed cash 
rewards are used to offset CEO risk exposure stemming from firm risk. 
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If CEOs are aware that size is an important focus of board deliberations pertaining to CEO 
cash reward and performance, it is thus reasonable to suppose that CEOs will be provided 
with strong incentives to increase firm size. This, in effect, is further supported by arguments 
that firm size may be considered by the board as being a proxy for organizational complexity, 
and thus CEO task performance complexity (see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). The fact 
that size has a significant influence on CEO. cash reward levels may also help explain the 
concurrent rise in CEO reward and the level of corporate merger and acquisition activity; this 
matter is not pursued further in this study. 
Consistent with .Agency Theory, the hypothesised model presented in Chapter Four, 
recognizes the role of the board to manage and balance CEO-agent risk-bearing with CEO-
agent incentives. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect, consistent with Proposition I, that 
CEO cash reward total levels can be expected to be aligned to, albeit not exclusively, firm-
level performance. 
The foregoing results suggest that, contrary to prediction and the extant research; firm risk 
does not significantly moderate the association between performance and CEO annual 
incentive cash niwards,. nor does it significantly predict the level of: incentive cash 19• The 
relationship between CEO reward and measures of accounting return, and market-return 
performance~ does not appear to vary as a function of either fiml size, or variance in stock 
returns. Furthermore, it appears from these findings that boards reward significantly higher 
levels of CEO total cash reward to offset the additional risk stemming from greater firm risk. 
This proposition is also consistent with extant theory and research suggesting firm risk 
precipitates a trade-off b~tween incentive contracts and <:EO-agent risk exposure. However, 
in contrast to prediction and extant empirical evidence, firm risk was .not found to 
significantly moderate the relationship between CEO incentive cash and firm level 
performance. According to the estimated coefficients, firm risk did not militate against higher 
levels of annual incentive cash. As such, it ·appears that boards view firm size as an important 
19 Specification tests presented at the bottom of Exhibit 7.4 have additional implications on these results. First, 
the Davidson Mackinnon test rejects the nu11 that estimates ~rom both IV and simple fixed effects estimates are 
consistent. This confirms that model parameters would be biased and inconsistent if estimated through a fixed 
effects OLS approach. Hansen )_statistic indicates that the system GMM is DIJI over-identified, and that the, 
system GMM is an efficient and identified multi-equation approach to estimating model parameters. On the 
basis on these tests, the forthcoming chapters will only apply System GMM panel analysis to examine 
hypothesised relationships. 
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basis for determining CEO total cash reward levels and, more specifically, the fixed cash 
reward component. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that boards use increments. in fixed component of CEO total 
cash reward to offset additional CEO,agent risk-bearing stemming from high levels of firm 
risk. From a decision-making perspective, directors· may regard CEO fixed rewards as being 
instrumental in redressing motivational loss associated with poor CEO expectancies to 
accomplish performance targets conditioned on volatile market-return perform~nce. Becker's 
(2006) research provides evidence in support of this proposition by finding that wealthier 
CEOs are more likely to accept higher levels of incentive reward. It follows that if fixed 
reward increases as a proportion of total cash rewards, we should then find that risk, by 
implication, decouples the level of total cash from firm performance. Such a prediction is 
unsupported by our results. 
Accordingly, these results suggest that, inconsistent with Agency Theory, reported incentive 
cash is not a legitimate source of CEO risk bearing, and thus presumably not an important 
condition for CEO performance evaluations and attributions. At the very least, high firm risk 
would presumably inform the board's selection of performance measures and/or its 
assessment of CEO performance. Consistent with Lambert and Larcker (1987), boards in 
such circumstances will place lower importance on stock-market performance, and greater 
weight on measures that reflect more reliably the CEO's actions and behaviours. However, 
according to our results, accounting-based measures do not provide additional or incremental 
explanatory power. Thus, it remains unclear whether boards assess firm risk as a criterion 
against which to judge the efficacy of proposals pertaining to ·cEO ,incentive contracts. It is 
also unclear which firm performance measures boards use to evaluate CEO performance. 
7.6 Conclusion 
Consistent with previous studies, the two-step system GMM results that are presented in this 
chapter indicate that firm size and risk are both significant predictors of CEO cash reward 
levels. It is reasonable to infer from the results that these firm-level factors are important foci 
in board decisions regarding CEO cash reward levels. As expected, the results indicate that 
size is a robust positive predictor of the level of CEO total cash reward, and the level of 
incentive cash rewards. Risk is also a significant positive predictor of the level of CEO total 
cash rewards, yet, against expectations, does not significantly explain variation in the level of 
142 
annual incentive cash rewards. We speculate that this might be because reported performance-
based cash rewards are not considered to be legitimate source of CEO risk bearing in view of 
the results presented in Chapter Six showing that CEO incentive cash reward levels are 
insensitive to various measures of firm-level performance. This may also explain why the 
hypothesised moderating roles of both of these variables are unsupported. The inferential 
results presented in this chapter indicate the importance of operationalising these factors as 
controls in the empirical specification of CEO cash reward and performance. This is the 
approach taken in the following empirical chapters. 
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Chapter Eight 
CEO Ownership as a Moderator of CEO Cash Reward and Performance 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapters Six and Seven, in tandem, examine the influence of firm characteristics on CEO 
cash reward. The previous chapter specifically examines the influence of firm size and firm 
risk on CEO cash reward. The results confirm that firm size and firm risk are important 
determinants of CEO cash reward. 
According to the hypothesised model presented in Chapter Four, CEO equity ownership can 
also be an important locus of the board's management of CEO cash reward and performance. 
In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
equity components, this chapter specifically examines the moderating role of CEO share 
ownership and stock option and/or share holdings, on the relationship between CEO cash 
reward and performance. 
First, this chapter briefly revisits the literature on CEO ownership in order to explicate the 
causal logic underpinning the predictions made. Second, using a system GMM approach to 
dynamic panel analysis, this chapter tests whether CEO share ownership, and participation in 
a stock option and/or share rights plan, moderate the relationship between CEO total cash 
reward and measures of firm-level performance. 
8.2 CEO Equity Ownership: Theory, Evidence and Hypotheses 
There are now myriad forms of equity-based executive L TIPs, our modelling recognises that 
CEOs can participate in two different types of equity ownership. The first is current 
ownership stemming from direct and indirect interests in the company's stock, the other is 
unrealised ownership and by default, capital gain, stemming from participating in long-term 
incentive plans where the denomination is company equity, such as stock options and share 
rights. 
From an Agency Theory perspective, CEO share ownership has been predominantly theorised 
as a proxy for CEO risk bearing, and as an alternative incentive mechanism to CEO 
performance-cash reward to address moral hazard (Fama, 1980). As such, CEO ownership 
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from a board's perspective can diminish the importance of.performance-based cash reward, 
given that ownership provides strong incentive to promote market return performance (see 
Tevlin, 1996, for empirical support). According to Hall and Liebman (1998), lowering the 
'sharing rate' (i.e. the incremental relationship between CEO reward and shareholder gains) 
may provide a stronger incentive effect because ·a high sharing rate transfers undue 
compensation risk to CEO-agents to the point th~t they may avoid high net present value 
projects (see also Conyon and Sadler, 2001). It is important for boards to balance CEO 
performance incentives and CEO risk bearing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These 
considerations have direct iipplications for the extent to which boards align CEO cash reward 
to performance. Boards who consider CEO ownership to be an index of CEO risk bearing 
can be expected to reduce the sensitivity of CEO cash reward to performance (see Tevlin, 
1996). 
However, Becker (2006) provides evidence to the contrary. Rather than CEO ownership being 
an additional source of risk, it is also a signifier of CEO wealth and, hence, may serve to 
lessen CEO aversion to at-risk cash rewards. Accordingly Becker (2006) found that the 
CEO's current wealth position can also moderate the ex ante sensitivity of cash reward to 
performance, such that wealthier CEOs are more likely to accept higher exposure to incentive 
reward. 
Two other Agency Theory postulates are worth noting in relation .to the posited effects of 
CEO ownership on the board decision-making processes underpinning CEO cash reward. 
Firstly, it is suggested that CEO ownership can influence the board's selection of performance 
criteria used to determine CEO cash reward. For example, CEO share ownership, by defau~, 
provides the CEO with incentives to promote market return, and may moderate the board's 
use of alternative performance measures (Lambert and Larcker, 1988). Second, implicit in 
Lambert and Larcker's (1987) arguments, CEO ownership can moderate the relationship 
between CEO cash reward and performance, albeit more indirectly, by precipitating a trade-
off between accounting and market return measures. Lambert and Larcker (1987) suggest 
that boards place differential weight on accounting and market return performance measures 
in the management of CEO performance-based CEO cash reward on the.basis of CEO. share 
ownership. CEO share ownership, consistent with Agency Theory tenets, is assumed to 
provide strong incentives to improve market-performance so that the CEO can maximise their 
capital gains. Finally, Lambert and Larcker (1987) maintain boards - when establishing the 
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performance conditions for CEO cash reward - wiiLspecify non-market measures in situations 
where the incumbent CEO has large shareholdings. 
Sanders (200 I) suggests that CEO ownership, on the one hand, and CEO stock option and/or 
share rights participation, on the other, may have different implications for CEO risk and 
effort preferences. Different types of CEO equity participation can have differential incentive 
and risk effects on the CEO (Bryan et al., 2000; Sanders, 2001). For these reasons, it would 
appear to be appropriate to distinguish between asymmetric and symmetric risk proxied by 
option or share rights plan participation, and equity ownership,- respectively. On this basis, it 
is reasonable to suppose that boards, in their deliberations pertaining to CEO cash reward and 
performance, attach different degrees of importance to each form of ownership. It is therefore 
reasonable to test empirically the following propositions: 
Proposition 5a: The percentage of issued capital held by the CEO is associated with CEO 
total cash and annual incentive cash reward 
Proposition 5b: CEO participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan is associated 
with CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
Finally, the Managerial Power perspective also considers CEO share ownership to influence 
CEO cash reward decisions. According to exponents of this perspective, CEOs with large 
stock holdings may be able to extract greater economic rents camouflaged as reward for 
performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). The posited causal mechanisms implicit in this 
exposition of the process through which owne·rship influences CEO .cash reward, are different 
from the causal logic underpinning the Agency Theory perspective. For our purposes 
however, it is important to recognise that both perspectives predict ownership to play a 
moderating role in the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. Both Agency 
Theory and the Managerial Power perspective predict, more broadly, that CEO share 
ownership, in some way or another, attenuates the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
measures of finn-level performance. We would expect to find, on the basis of their 
theoretical premises, CEO ownership to influence CEO cash reward levels as well as 
negatively moderate the relationship CEO cash reward and performance. These propositions 
are both tested on CEO total cash reward and annual incentive cash reward. In addition, and 
consistent with Sanders (2001) propositions that Board's may appraise different types of CEO 
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ownership differentially, we test the moderating role of both CEO share ownership; and CEO 
stock option and/or share rights participation, s·eparately2 ° Following on from this logic, the 
following hypotheses are advanced: 
H8.1a: There is a significant negative association between the percentage of issued capital 
owned by. the CEO and the level. of CEO total cash reward. 
H8.1 b: There is a significant negative association between the percentage of issued capital 
owned by the CEO, and the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
H8.Jc: The percentage of issued capital owned by the CEO significantly and negatively 
moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and measures of firm-level 
performance in such a way that the relationship is weaker when ownership is high than when 
it is low. 
H8.1d: The percentage of issued capital owned by the CEO significantly and negatively 
moderates the relationship between the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward and 
measures of firm-level performance in such a way that the relationship is weaker when 
ownership is high than when it is low. 
H8.2a: CEOs with option and/or share rights holdings earn significantly different levels of 
CEO total cash, than those CEOs who do not have option holdings. 
H8.2b: CEOs with option and/or share rights holdings earn significantly lower levels of 
annual incentive cash reward. 
H8.2c: CEO participation in an option and/or share rights plan significantly and negatively 
moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and measures of firm-level 
performance in such a way that·the relationship is weaker when participation is high than 
when it is low. 
20 Also, to account for the possibility of ownership moderating the board's choice of performance measures, 
which in turn moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance, an accounting return 
measure will be used alongside a market-return measure. 
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H8.2d: CEO participation in an option and/or share rights plan significantly and negatively 
moderates the relationship between the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward and 
measures of firm-level performance in such a way that the relationship is weaker when 
pa[ficipation is Ngh than when it is low 
8.3 The Econometric Model and Estimator 
The dynamic panel model testing hypotheses relating to the moderating role of CEO equity 
ownership as on the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance, is encapsulated 
in the following'level equation: 
CEOTotalCashu a + f3oCEOTotalCash;, 1-1 + /31Size;, 1-1 + fJ2FirmRisk1 + 
fJ;AccounttingReturns;, 1./ + f34MarketReturn;, 1-1 + f3s CEOOwnership;, 1-1 + 
f36CE00wnership;, 1. 1*AccountingReturns;, 1.1 + fJ,CEOOwnership;, ,. 
J*MarketReturnu.J + }"2Turnoveru + Jli·+ ef.r 
Where Size is indexed by the natural logarithm of total assets, and FirmRisk, indexed by the 
cumulative distribution function of firm returns of 36 months prior (see Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999 for methodology); AccountingReturnis measured by real ROE. 
• MarketReturn is measured as real annual real stock returns. 
• CEOOwnership is the vector for the two variants of. CEO ownership, including a one 
year lag in the percentage of ordinary stock held by the CEO, and a binary variable 
equal to I if the CEO in year t-1 participated in an option and/or share rights plan. 
·These two variables were then interacted separately with each firm-level performance 
measures. 
• The model specifies interaction terms to test the key hypotheses. However, both size 
and risk remain as controls for equity ownership and ownership concentration 
estimates on the basis of their robust effects delineated in the previous chapter, as well 
as their theoretical importance. 
• The model also controls for unobserved firm-effects through firm dummies, and time 
effects through year dununies. 
• Turnover is the vector for incoming and outgoing CEO dummy variables to control for 
abnormalities associated with sign-on payments, termination payments, and salary 
payments covering only part of the report year. 
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All variables and hypothesized moderators and their respective measures are presented m 
exhibit 8.1 
Exhibit 8.1. Variables and Measures 
Var-iables 
Dependent Variables: 
CEO Total Cash Reward 
CEO Annual Cash Reward 
Market Return Variables: 
Real Returns 
ROE 
Moderators: 
Size 
Firm Risk 
CEO Share Ownership 
CEO option and/or share rights plan 
participation 
Turnover Variables: 
Incoming CEOs 1 
Outgoing CEOs 1 
Measures 
Natural Logarithm of the summation of reported incentive 
and non~incentive cash components 
Natural Logarithm of Reported annual incentive cash 
(price at t + Dividend Jess Price at t-1 )/price at t-1)) 
ROE=NPAT before abnormal/( shareholder equity-outside 
equity interests) 
Total Assets 
Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999a) Cumulative Distribution 
Function of firm real returns. The measure is between I 
and 0 with 1 as the maximum level of volatility. 
Percentage of outstanding ordinary shares held by the CEO 
in t-1. This measure aggregates both direct and indirect 
CEO ordinary shareholdings. 
I= CEO had option and/or share rights in t-1, and 0= 
otherwise 
I = first year in the position as CEO and 0 if otherwise 
I= Last year in the position as CEO and 0 if otherwise 
The current chapter and forthcoming chapters use a system GMM approach to parameter 
estimation to examine the relationships between CEO share ownership and stock option/share 
rights participation, CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward, and firm-level 
performance. Again, as discussed in Chapter Five, this estimator is used to address the 
complex error structure of dynamic panel data models, and is more efficient than IV and FE 
estimators in orthogonalising the x-vector (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
8.4 Results 
Exhibit 8.2 reports the system GMM estimated coefficients for CEO total cash reward, and 
annual incentive cash reward. Specification test results for the two regressions are also 
presented. The first test, the Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions is non-significant. 
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The second test, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autoregression" is also non-
significant. Both these non-significant results indicate that the regressions tested satisfy the 
requirement for having valid instruments and no second order serial correlation in the first 
differences. 
Exhibit 8.2. The Influence ofCEO.Share Ownership on CEO Cash Reward 
Total Cash Reward• Total Incentive Cash Reward• 
CEO Share Ownershipc H -0.002 -0.005 (0.001) (0.004)-
CEO Share Ownership 1_1* Real Returns 0.000 0.000 
,_, (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO -Share Ownership 1•1* ROE 1•1 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Market Return: 
ReaiReturnsb 1•1 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Rea!Returnsb 1 0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb 1•1 0.000 
·o.ooo 
(0.001) (0.001) 
ROEb, 0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Controls: 
Firm Risk 1 
-0.018 0.057 
(0.1 II) (0.229) 
Size' 1•1 
0.065··· 0.068 
(0.0 I 9) (0.042) 
CEO Total Cash reward• 1•1 
0.794 
(0.043) 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash• 1•1 
0.818*** 
(0.060) 
Incoming CEOsc 1 
-0.204* .. -O.J I o••• 
(0.042) (0.042) 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
0.085* -0.107* 
(0.043) (0.044) 
Constant 
1.550 .. 0.905 
(0.507) (0.831) 
Observations 2021 2021 
Year Dummies yes yes 
Fixed Effects yes yes 
Hansen test of Overidentifying 
x'-201.73 x'-57.97 Restrictions 
-
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first z-1.26 z-1.91 
diffe.-ences 
--·-
21 See Roodman (2007) for an explication of these specification tests. 
!50 
o NafUral Logarithm 
b Percentage 
'Binary Vari'able 
• p <0 .05 
••p<O.OI 
••• p <0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parenlheses 
According to the e~timated coefficients, based on a system GMM estimation, the main lagged 
effect of the proportion of shares held by the CEO is non-significant on both the level of CEO 
total cash reward; as well as the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward (contrary to 
Hypothesis 8.1a and 8.1b). Jhe results also indicate. th'!! CEO share. ownership as a. 
proportion of total shares outstanding, contrary to Hypothesis 8.1 c, does not significantly and 
negatively moderate the relationship between CEO total cash reward and measures of 
accounting and market return performance. Also inconsistent with prediction, CEO share 
ownership does not significantly and negatively moderate the relationship between CEO 
annual incentive cash reward, and both measures of firm-level performance (Hypothesis 
8.1d). These results suggest that CEO share ownership does not significantly strengthen or 
weaken the relationship between CEO cash reward and measures of firm-level performance. 
Exhibit 8.3 reports the estimated coefficients for CEO stock option and/or share rights plan 
participation, CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward, and measures of firm-level 
performance. Specification test results for the two regressions are also presented. The first 
test, the Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions was non-significant. The second test, 
the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autoregression22, was also non-significant. Both 
these non-significant results indicate that the regressions tested satisfy the requirement for 
having valid instruments, and no second order serial correlation in the first differences. 
According to the estimated coefficients, and based on a system GMM estimation, the main 
lagged effect of CEO participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan is non-significant 
on both the level of CEO total cash reward and the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward 
(contrary to Hypothesis 8.2a and 8.2b). The results also indicate that, contrary to Hypothesis 
8.2c, CEO share ownership as a proportion of total shares outstanding does not significantly 
negatively moderate the relationship between CEO total cash reward and measures of 
accounting (ROE) and market return performance (real returns). Also inconsistent with 
22 See Roodman (2007) for an explication of these specification tests. 
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prediction (Hypothesis 8.2d), CEO share ownership does not significantly negatively 
moderate the relationship between CEO annual incentive cash reward and both measures of 
firm-level performance. These results suggest that CEO share ownership does not 
significantly strengthen or weaken the relationship between CEO total cash reward and 
performance. All of the hypotheses are rejected on the basis of these results. 
Exhibit 8.3. The Influence of CEO Stock Option and/or Share Rights Plan Participation 
on CEO Cash Reward 
CEO Option/Share Rights' 1•1 
CEO Option/Share Rights 1•1*Real 
Returns 1•1 
CEO Option/Share Rights ,_1* ROE ,_1 
Market Return: 
Real Returnsh ,_ 1 
Real Retumsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb 1. 1 
ROEb I 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size• 1•1 
CEO Total Cash Rewarcf' ,_1 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash Reward• 1•1 
Incoming CEOsc 1 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
Constant 
Observations 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Hansen test of Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
____ili_ffcrences 
~atural Logarithm 
hPercentage 
'Binary Variable 
--
Total Cash Reward• Annual Incentive Cash 
Reward• 
0.326 0.002 
(0.399) (0.359) 
-0.002 0.007 
(0.004) (0.007) 
-0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.005) 
0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) 
-0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.005) 
0.000 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) 
-0.596 -0.524 
(0.545) (0.652) 
-0.073 -0.022 
(0.107) (0. 120) 
1.023*** 
(0.196) 
0.958 ... 
(0.187) 
-0.166 -0.004 
(0.090) (0.120) 
0.076 -0.070 
(0.046) (0.061) 
1.184 1.084 
(1.398) (1.782) 
2855 2855 
yes yes 
yes yes 
i-10.17 l-1 1.43 
z-1.92 z- 1.8 I 
!52 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 .OJ 
••• p <0 .001 
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses 
8.5 Discussion 
Ori the basis of the above results, it appears ihat CEO share ownership and participation in a 
stock option and share rights plans does not play an important moderating role in explaining 
the relationship between CEo· cash reward and measures of firm-level performance. These 
results have some important implications for theory and previous research. 
First, the results do not support two pivotal propositions advanced from an Agency Theoretic 
perspective, as to the effects of CEO ownership on CEO cash reward. Earlier it is mentioned 
that Agency Theory regards CEO ownership as an indicator of CEO risk bearing, as well as a 
substitute to executive incentive contracts (see ·Lambert and Larcker, 1987). It is also 
maintained that this supposition prompts tradeoffs between CEO ownership and incentive or 
performance-based CEO cash reward in an attempt to manage CEO risk bearing. 
Even further, CEO ownership is posited to influence the board's selection of CEO 
performance measures, and the relative weight placed on accounting and market return 
measures (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). If CEO ownership affects board decisions aboui 
CEO cash reward in ways purported by Agency Theory, we would expecfCEO ownership or 
CEO participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan to significantly influence levels Of 
CEO cash reward, as well as to negatively moderate the relationship between CEO cash 
reward and firm-level performance measures. These findings do notlend supp~rt to Lambert 
and Larcker's (1987) suggestion that the sensitivity of CEO cash reward to non-market 
performance measures is a negative function of CEO ownership. The foregoing propositions 
are unsupported since the interaction terms and main effects of CEO ownership, and CEO 
participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan is non-significant. 
The results do not support Becker's (2006) findings and suppositions suggesting that the· 
board may regard CEO ownership as signifier for wealth, and as such that the more stock or 
options a CEO has, the more willing they will be to accept additional at-risk cash reward. 
Following this logic we would expect to find i) CEO ownership to positively influence the 
level of annual incentive cash reward, and ii) CEO ownership to positively moderate the 
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relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. 
uncorroborated by results presented in this chapter. 
These predictions are 
Similarly, the Managerial Power. perspective predicts that CEO ownership may negatively 
moderate the relationship .between CEO cash reward and performance. This .prediction is 
predicated on a different set of causal assumptions. This perspective .construes CEO 
ownership as an index of board capture, and as such, that CEOs with larger share holdings 
may be able to extract greater economic rents. Again, the prediction is unsupported by our 
Australian evidence. 
It appears in the Australian context, CEO ownership or CEO participation in ·a stock option 
and share rights plan are not regarded as important bases upon· which boards make-decisions 
about CEO cash reward. Indeed, the extant literature and research provide suggestive support 
for the notion that boards factor CEO ownership into their deliberations regarding the 
performance-sensitivity of CEO cash reward. The results presented suggest otherwise. They 
question the way in which Australian boards construe CEO ownership. If they did construe 
CEO ownership in ways suggested by Agency Theory or the Managerial power approach - as 
indices for agent risk bearing or managerial power- we would find CEO ownership measures 
to significantly influence the performance-sensitivity of CEO cash reward, and the level of 
CEO cash reward at the very least. These results suggest that perhaps the Australian boards 
do not regard CEO cash reward as not a legitimate source of CEO risk bearing, or as a source 
of managerial power. This supposition is also plausible in light of the fmdings presented in 
Chapter Six. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine two forms of CEO ownership - share ownership and 
participation in stock option and/or share rights plans - and to hypothesise how their main 
effects and interactions affect board decisions to align CEO cash reward with measures of 
firm-level performance. 
Drawing from insights afforded by the extant empirical and theoretical literature on CEO 
reward and performance, CEO ownership is cast as an important focus of board deliberations 
in the determination of CEO cash reward. The results presented in the chapter show that 
participation in a stock option/share rights plan and CEO share ownership, do not have any 
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significant main or moderating impact on the level of CEO total cash reward and annual 
incentive cash reward. 
Thus, this chapter shows that CEO ownership and equity participation do not buttress the 
relationship between CEO cash rewards and measures of firm level performance. These 
results may be explained in term of the board's perception of the risks attendant to cash 
incentives, such that boards are disinclined to seek to trade-off risk stemming from CEO 
equity ownership, and risk stemming from CEO cash reward processes. 
The next chapter examines the influence of a different dimension of equity ownership -
namely ownership dispersion and concentration amongst external owners. Specifically, it 
considers the process through which external ownership concentration can influence levels of 
CEO cash reward, in addition to influencing the ex post sensitivity of reported cash reward to 
measures of firm level performance. 
155 
Chapter Nine 
External Ownership Concentration as a Moderator of CEO Cash Reward 
and Performance 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is. to examine the influence of exteJ1!al·9wnerspip concentration 
on CEO cash reward. This chapter first revisits the literature examining the effects of 
ownership concentration on CEO reward. On the basis of this discussion, this chapter then 
explores, through system GMM panel data analysis, the main and moderating ·effects of 
external ownership concentration on the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
performance. The results are then presented and discussed. 
9.2 External Ownership Concentration: Theory, Evidence and Hypotheses 
Agency Theory is predicated on the assumption of ownership dispersion. For this reason it is 
less concerned with the effects of ownership concentration on CEO reward and performance, 
or board decisional processes and governance more generally. 
There is a body .of literature suggesting that external ownership concentration plays an 
important moderating role in the board's management of CEO cash reward and performance, 
and an important boundary condition for CEO reward-performance sensitivity. However this 
literature is somewhat disparate in terms of the. directionality of the m9derating effect of 
external ownership concentration on the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
performance. 
Research undertaken by Tevlin (1996) finds that ownership concentration negatively 
moderated the relationship between CEO cash reward and measures of flfDl-level 
performance. Tevlin (1996) explained these findings in terms of ownership concentration 
reducing the need for executive incentive contracts that are intended to redress CEO 
opportunism. 
Some authors focus more on the effects of ownership concentration on the board governance 
' 
of CEO reward and performance by suggesting that external ownership concentration 
improves board governance. Ownership concentration is said to enhance the board's 
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incentives to engage in diligent monitoring, in addition to enforcing more performance 
contingent reward. To support these suppositions, Hartzell and Starcks (2003) report that 
external ownership concentration has positive moderating. effects on the CEO reward-
performance relationship (see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988 for an earlier example). This 
is because as external ownership increases, the board may perceive that there are greater risks. 
to external scrutiny in terms of their management of CEO cash reward and performance. 
Consequently, boards have increased incentives to provide CEOs with higher levels of reward 
risk, and also to control the growth and level in CEO of total reward. Framed as a risk 
management issue, the board may seek to manage the potential for· outrage from these 
stakeholders by increasing the firm-levet performance-contingency of CEO cash rewards 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). According to both Agency Theory and the Managerial 
Power thesis, shareholders regard CEO pay for performance favourably, and as such it is 
importantfor the board to align CEO cash reward with measures of firm-level performance. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to propose the following: 
Proposition 6a: The percentage of issued capital held by top shareholders is negatively 
associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 6b: The percentage of issued capital held by top shareholders is positively 
associated with CEO annua/.incentive cash reward. 
While the Managerial Power Thesis considers ownership concentration to be an important 
consideration for the board, the exposition of camouflage has different implications for the 
management of the relationship between CEO reward and performance. Bebchuk and Fried's 
(2004) concept of camouflage highlights this point. According to these authors, boards 
actively avoid shareholder outrage by configuring CEO reward in ways perceived favourably 
by external shareholders. According this perspective, ownership concentration does not 
necessarily precipitate CEO reward for performance, but rather precipitate actions that 
obfuscate CEO reward without performance. Following on from this logic, this chapters 
empirically tests the following: 
H9.1a: There is a significant negative association between lagged ownership concentration 
and the level of CEO total cash reward. 
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H9.Jb: Ownership concentration positively and significantly moderates the relationship 
between firm-level performance measures and CEO total cash reward in such a way that the 
relationship is stronger when concentration is high than when it is low. 
H9.1c: There is a significant positive association between the level of CEO annual cash 
incentive reward and lagged ownership concentration. 
H9.ld: Ownership concentration positively and significantly moderates the .relationship 
between firm-level performance measures and CEO annual cash incentive rewara in such a 
way that the relationship is stronger when concentration is high than when it is low. 
In so doing, we will also test, albeit indirectly, Tevlin's supposition that ownership 
concentration serves as a more cost effective substitute for CEO executive incentive contracts, 
such that ownership concentration negatively moderations the relationship between CEO cash 
reward and measures of firm-level performance. 
9.3 The Econometric Model 
Measures of external ownership concentration were. interacted with the firm-level 
performance measures in order to examine whether external ownership concentration 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO cash rewards and firm-level performance. 
The dynamic panel model estimated in the current chapter is described in the following level 
equation: 
CEOTotaiCashu = a + f3oCEOTotaiCash;. ,_, + f3,Size1• 1.J + /32FirmRisk1 + 
f3,AccounttingReturns;. 1., + f34MarketReturn1• 1.J + {35 
OwnershipConcentration,_,_, + /36 OwnershipConcentration1• 1.J • 
AccountingReturns;_,_, +fJ,OwnershipConcentrationu.J *MarketReturnu.J + 
A.2Turnoveru + J1; + E:;,, 
Where: 
• Size is indexed by the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1. 
• FirmRisk, indexed by the cumulative distribution function of firm returns of 36 
months prior (see Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999 for methodology). 
• AccountingReturn is measured by real ROE. 
• MarketReturn is measured as annual real stock returns. 
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• OwnershipConcentration is the vector for twO? measures of_ ownership cOncentration 
that are modelled alternatively. These :measures include the percentage of ordinary 
stock owned by the top shareholder, and the top 20 shareholders in year t-1. 
• Turnover is the vector for incoming and outgoing CEO dummy variables to control for 
abnormalities associated with sign-on payments; termination payments, and salary 
payments covering only part of the report year. 
All variables and hypothesized moderators and their respective measures are presented m 
Exhibit 9.1 
Exhibit 9.1. Variables and Measures 
Variables 
Dependent Variables: 
CEO Total Cash Reward 
CEO Annual Cash Reward 
Market Return Variables: 
Real Returns 
ROE 
Moderators: 
Ownership Concentration 
Turnover Variables: 
Incoming CEOs 
Outgoing CEOs 
9.4 Results 
Measures 
Natural Logarithm of the summation of reported 
incentive and non-incentive cash components 
Natural Logarithm of Reported annual incentive cash 
(price at t +Dividend less Price at t-1)/price at t-1)) 
ROE=NPAT before abnormal/( shareholder equity-
outside equity interests) 
Two measures were used, the first is the percentage of 
stock held by the top shareholder in t-1, the second is 
the proportion of stock held by the top 20 
shareholders in t-1. The rationale for these measures 
was exolained earlier. 
I = first year in the position as CEO and 0 if 
otherwise 
I= Last year in the position as CEO aod 0 if otherwise 
These bivariate correlation coefficients for hypothesised moderators presented in Exhibit 7.1 
(Chapter Seven) indicate that the concentration of common company stock holdings among 
the top I and top 20 shareholders are significant negative correlates of CEO total cash reward 
levels in year t and year t-1, and also with CEO annual incentive cash reward levels in year t 
and yeart-1. 
Exhibit 9.2 presents system GMM results for the interaction between ownership 
concentration, indexed by the concentration of common stock holdings by the top shareholder 
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(ownership Top!), and performan~e on the two cash reward measures. Specification tests. 
indicate that the instruments used are valid, and that the system of equations has not been 
over-identified. 
Contrary to prediction, the estimated coefficients suggest that ownership concentration 
indexed by the percentage of stock owned by the largest shareholder" - does not significantly 
influence the level of CEO total cash reward, nor the level of annual incentive cash reward 
(Hypotheses 9.la and 9.lc). Turning to the interaction terms, the estimated coefficient for the 
lagged interaction between the lagged percentage of total shares outstanding held by the top 
shareholder (ownership top!), and lagged real returns is positive and statistically significant at 
the 0.05.level. The estimated coefficient implies that as the percentage of stock held by the 
largest shareholder increases, the relationship between CEO total cash reward and annual real 
returns strengthens. However, the estimated coefficient for the lagged interaction between 
ownership concentration and the accounting~retum performance measure, ROE, is non-
significant. On the basis of these results, the prediction that ownership concentration 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and performance 
(Hypothesis 9.lb) is supported, albeit conditional on the firm-level performance measure 
used. The effects of the interaction terms on the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward 
are non-significant and do not support Hypothesis 9.1 d. 
23 Initial analyses excluded CEOs who were identified as CEO-founders. Estimated coefficients remained 
substantively unchanged when CEO-founders were included in the sample. 
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Exhibit 9.2. The Innuence of Top Shareholder Ownership Co11centration on CEO Cash 
Reward 
Ownership Toplb 1•1 
Ownership Top1 1•1*Rea1 Returns 1•1 
OwnershipTopl 1•1* ROE,.1 
Market Return: 
Real Returnsb 1•1 
Real Returnsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb 1•1 
ROEb, 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size• 1•1 
CEO Total Cash Reward• 1•1 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 
Reward• ,_1 
Incoming CEOsc 1 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
Constant 
Observations 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Hansen test of Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arcllano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences 
(INatural Logarithm 
6 Percentage 
~Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 .OJ 
u•p<O.OO/ 
Total Cash Reward• 
·0.003 
(0.005) 
0.0001. 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.454*":' 
(0.144) 
0.153* .. 
(0.046) 
0.627*** 
(0.1 I 7) 
-0.228*** 
(0.027), 
0.065 
(0.034) 
0.065 
(0.034) 
2828 
Yes 
Yes 
/~65.30 
z~J.7J 
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses 
Annual Incentive Cash Reward• 
-0.033 
(0.026) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
-0.002 
-0.225 
(1.434) 
0.058 
(0.288) 
0.609*** 
(0.418) 
0.032 
(0.057) 
-0.051 
(0.062) 
4.338 
(2.905) 
2828 
Yes 
Yes 
:r'~7.85 
z~J.88 
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Exhibit 9.3. The Influence of Ownership Concentration Among Top·20 Shareholders on 
CEO Cash .Reward 
Ownership Top20b 1•1 
OwnershipTop20 1•1* Real Returns 1•1 
Ownership Top20 1•1* ROE 1•1 
Market Return: 
Real Returnsb 1•1 
Real Returnsb 1 
Accounting Return: 
ROEb,_, 
ROEb I 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size•,_, 
CEO Total CaSh Reward• 1•1 
CEO Annual Incentfve Cash• 1•1 
Incoming CEOs~ 1 
Outgoing CEOsc 1 
Constant 
Observations 
Year Dummies 
Fixed Effects 
Hansen test of Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences 
I!Natural Logarithm 
bPercentage 
cBinary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 .01 
***p <0 .001 
Total Cash Reward• 
-0.017 .. 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.003' 
(0.001) 
0.049 
(0.282) 
0.125' 
(0.057) 
0.687*** 
(0.1 20) 
-0.190* .. 
(0.041) 
0.07** 
(0.032) 
2.889' 
(1.349) 
2828 
ves 
yes 
x'~9.84 
z~L87 
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses 
Annual Incentive Cash 
Reward• 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.150 
(0.898) 
0.1 II 
(0. 109) 
0.693* .. 
(0. 160) 
-0.069 
(0.050) 
-0.053 
(0.047) 
0.746 
(2.364) 
2828 
yes 
yes 
x'~8.22 
FJ.89 
--
162 
The percentage of common stock held among the top 20 shareholders (ownership Top20) was 
used as an auxiliary measure of ownership concentration. Exhibit 9.3 presents the results for 
the interaction between ownership concentration, indexed by· the concentration of common 
stock holdings by the top 20 shareholders, and performance on the two cash reward measures. 
According to the results for CEO total cash reward the concentration of shareholdings among 
the top-20 shareholders, consistent with Hypothesis 9.1a, has a significant negative effect on 
the level of CEO total cash reward. The estimated coefficient implies that as the percentage of 
shareholdings among the top 20 shareholders increases, the level of CEO total cash reward 
decreases. The results do not support the prediction that ownership concentration ·positively 
moderates the relationship between CEO annual incentive cash reward and measures of firm 
level performance, nor does it exert a significant negative main effect. 
9.5 Discussion 
This chapter set out to test the main and moderating effects of external ownership 
concentration, on the relationship between CEO ·cash reward, and measures of firm-level 
performance in the Australian context. 
Contrary to Tevlin's (1996)· research, this chapter furnishes support for the prediction that 
ownership concentration positively moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward 
and firm market-return performance. The results suggest more specifically, that as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder increases, the relationship between CEO 
total cash reward and annual market return performance significantly strengthens. In other 
words, these results suggest that ownership concentration, indexed by the percentage stock 
owned by the top shareholder, leads to a closer alignment of CEO cash reward to measures of 
firm-level perfoimance. 
findings. 
These results are consistent with Hartzell and Starck's (2003) 
Also, the results indicate that as the percentage of shares held by the largest top 20 
shareholders increases, the level of CEO total cash reward, on average, declines. Both these 
significant findings do not fashion support for the Managerial Power proposition that 
ownership concentration makes little difference to the sensitivity of CEO cash reward and 
performance. In contrast to predictions, both measures of ownership concentration did not 
significantly moderate or influence the level of CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
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These results have some important implications for developing our understanding of 
determinants of CEO cash reward. First, it can be inferred from these results that ownership 
concentration may influence the board's selection of criteria against which to evaluate CEO 
performance for the purpose of determining CEO cash reward. Here Lambert and Larcker's 
(1987) suggestion that ownership concentration influences the relative weight the board 
places on accounting and market return performance is particularly important. While this 
study does not directly test this supposition, the results do lend credence to the notion that 
ownership concentration is an important boundary condition for the relationship between 
market-return performance and CEO cash reward. The results indicate that ownership 
concentration does not moderate the relationship between CEO total cash reward, and 
measures of accounting-return performance. These results suggest that boards, in the context 
oflarge shareholders, are more likely to selectively attend to market-return performance in the 
determination of CEO cash reward. 
The negative impact of ownership concentration on CEO total cash reward, also lends 
credence to the supposition that boards may be less inclined to ratify proposals pertaining to 
fixed cash increments as ownership concentration increases can be explained from a board 
risk management perspective. Therefore it is reasonable to suggest that boards may be more 
inclined to link CEO cash reward to market-return performance in the presence of a large 
block holder or institutional investor. 
It is plausible to suggest that concepts such as social facilitation may play some role in 
explaining these findings. Haslam (2007) discusses this concept in terms of general employee 
performance management, and ~uggests that the mere perceived presence o( others £~n ~~ 
enhance employee performance. It can be suggested that having a significant block holder 
places more pressure on the board to control levels of executive reward, because the 
anticipated disapproval is perceived to be greater (consistent with Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1988). This also accords with the Agency Theory postulate that monitoring (in this case by 
large block holders or institutional investors) can be used as an alternative means of 
minimising self-serving behaviours. 
Finally, since little is known about how governance practices interact with ownership 
concentration/dispersal in determining CEO reward level, structure and outcomes, we have 
used auxiliary analyses to explore these possible associations more closely. Logistic 
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regressions (not reported in this thesis) revealed that boards are more likely to adopt 'best' 
governance practices in the presence of a large external block holder. The results showed that 
the effects of having a non-executive chairperson on CEO cash reward levels are positively 
moderated by the presence of at least one large external block holder. 
9.6 Conclusion 
According to results from the application of system GMM panel analysis, it is found that large 
block holders positively moderate the relationship between 'market-return performance and 
CEO total cash reward. It is further found that the percentage of stock held by ·the top 20 
shareholders, on average, lowers the. level of CEO total cash reward. On the basis of these 
findings it appears that external shareholders are important foci of board deliberations on the 
level of fixed and performance-contingent CEO cash reward levels. Boards in the presence of 
a large block holder will be more likely to promulgate Agency Theoretic notion of CEO 
reward for performance. The following chapter explores the influence of board structural 
characteristics purported to improve board overall effectiveness on the relationship between 
CEO cash reward and performance 
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Chaptel' Ten 
Board Governance as a Moderator of CEO Cash Reward and Performance 
10.1 Introduction 
Taken together, the findings that are presented in Chapters Six to Nine provide evidence that, 
in a priori terms, Australian boards have in recent times been largely ineffectual in managing 
the relationship between CEO cash reward and company performance. The insensitivity 
between reported 'performance-based' CEO cash reward, and measures of company 
performance, casts doubt on the ability and/or willingness of Australian boards to validly and 
reliably measure CEO performance and provide commensurate cash rewards. This is quite 
surprising given that the past decade has witnessed major developments in the area of 
corporate governance regulation and codes of best practice; developments that, in large part, 
have ostensibly been aimed at enhancing overall board monitoring and decision effectiveness. 
Proponents contend that 'best practice' corporate governance initiatives, particularly 
enhancement of director and board 'independence', remain the best means of increasing 
overall board task performance and of negating executive entrenchment and board 'capture'. 
The guiding premise of this final empirical chapter, however, is that corporate governance 
'best practice' prescriptions can only be deemed 'best practice' when they are shown to 
materially improve the board's management of the relationship between CEO cash reward 
and firm-level performance. 
In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to test the empirical validity of board 
'independence' as a criterion-relevant measure of the board's effectiveness in managing CEO 
reward and performance. To this end, system GMM panel analysis is localised to testing the 
moderating effects of board structural characteristics such as board independence at the board 
chair, general board and nomination and remuneration committee levels among the top 500 
Australian listed companies over the period 1999-2006. Specifically, we test whether board 
governance practices promoting 'independence' at the board and committee level, as well as 
at the chair level, do impact on: i) the total CEO cash reward levels; ii) the level of CEO 
performance contingent cash reward; and iii) the sensitivity of CEO cash rewards to measures 
of firm-level performance. The results presented have important implications for the efficacy 
of corporate governance best practice codes to enhance board effectiveness with respects to 
the management of CEO cash reward and performance. 
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10.2 Board 'Independence' and CEO Reward: Theory, Evidence, and Hypotheses 
·Earlier chapters maintain that both the Managerial Power and Agency Theory perspectives 
assume that board independence from management must be preserved or restored in order to 
enhance the board's ability to procure more effective or optimal CEO. reward processes and 
independent judgment and strategic choice. Eisenhardt· (1989). argues that boards should have 
large proportions of outside directors to enhance board decision-making, and to buttress the 
validity and reliability of judgments and decisions. Structural mechanisms that are said to 
enhance the quality and effectiveness of board decisions and judgments include: board 
structtiral independence at the board and committee level; having remuneration and 
nomination committees independent of the CEO; director equity ownership and incentives; 
and having 'independent' board chairpersons. These board governance practices are purported 
to enable better board judgments and monitoring, including making more appropriate reward 
decisions and providing constraints against managerial opportunism, incentive distortion, and 
rent extraction. On this basis, we might expect boards demonstrating a higher degree of 
material independence from salaried executives to be more adept at controlling and managing 
CEO cash reward and performance. Governance practices conducive to heightened board 
independence might also be assumed to positively moderate the relationship .between CEO 
cash reward and firm,level performance. Therefore this chapter empirically tests the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 7o: Boord 'Independence' at the board chair; board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 7b: Board 'Independence' at the board chair, board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO annual(?) cash reward. 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a non-executive dominated remuneration or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO total cash reword 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a non-executive.dominated remuneration or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
Before examining the hypotheses tested in this chapter, it is important to clarify one of the 
chief concepts tested in this chapter, namely the notion of board 'independence' itself. The 
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ASX Council of Good Governance defines an 'independent' non-executive director as 
someone whO is: 
" ... independent of management and free of any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere with- or could reasonably be 
perceived to materially interfere with - the exercise of their unfettered 
and independent judgment." (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2003: 19) 
OECD principles corroborate this logic in suggesting that independent directors are both more 
adept at exercising independent judgment and also better placed to help ensure proper 
compliance with committee charters (OECD, 2004: 25). 
Following on from the discussion in Chapter Four, recent Australian corporate governance 
regulatory interventions and best practice principles intended to improve the :management of 
CEO reward and performance, perpetuate the institutional logic shared by these theoretical 
perspectives. Indeed, corporate governance codes of best practice are predicated on Agency 
Theory prescriptions and assumptions in two ways. First, they perpetuate Agency Theory by 
encouraging boards to' make CEO rewards more performance contingent. Second, they 
perpetuate both Agency Theory and Managerial Power postulates by inculcating board 
governance practices that reinforce director independence from salaried executives. 
Independence is thus considered an axiom to enhance board decision and monitoring 
effectiveness. For example, it is suggested that having a greater presence of independent 
directors at both board and committee level will enable the board to exercise greater 
independent judgment and diligence in relation to executive reward (see ASX Principles of 
Good Governance, 2003). The unstated assumption underlying 'best practice' prescriptions 
is that CEO entrenchment inhibits board decision-making effectiveness. 
Some studies challenge whether having a non-executive director dominated board enhances 
boards' ability to exercise independent judgment with respects to manage the performance 
contingency of CEO reward (see Devers eta/., 2007 for a review, and Deutsch 2005, for a 
meta-analysis) .. Westphal ( 1998) provides evidence in support of this supposition by finding 
that the. CEO will still exert interpersonal influence on the board even when there is a large 
proportion of outside directors on the board. Unfortunately, the extant research does not 
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elucidate how these findings enhance our current understanding of board decision-making 
pertaining to CEO reward and performance. 
The modelling in this chapter utilises five· measures of non-executive director presence ·as 
separate and conjoint explanatory variables. The first of these is the presence of a non-· 
executive' board chairperson; with' a dummy variable equal to I used .if the chairperson is a 
non-executive director, and 0 if otherwise. The second explanatory variable is the percentage 
of board directors who are non-executives. The third variable is the percentage of non-
executive director shareholders on the board. This information was extracted from sections of 
company annual report detailing director equity holdings.24 The fourth variable is the 
pres-ence of a· remuneration committee where non...:executives are -in the majority. A dummy 
variable equal to I is used if the ·firm has a. remuneration committee where the majority of 
members are non-executive directors and. does not include the CEO, and 0 if otherwise. The 
fifth variable is the presence of a nomination committee in which non-executives are in the 
majority and does not include the CEO, and a same binary coding is applied. 25 
Non-executive chairpersons 
Chapter Four maintains that corporate governance regulation has specific .implications for 
board task performance. Board leadership is a recurrent theme in corporate governance theory 
and prescription. It is argued. that combining the role of board chairperson and CEO creates 
the conditions for board complicity or.· capture, and renders board directors beholden to the 
CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Cadbury, 2002; Huse, 2005). Separating these roles are 
proffered as a solution to increasing the board's capacity to monitor the CEO and advance the 
interests of shareholders (Cadbury, 2002). Corporate governance best practice codes and 
prescriptions, both locally and abroad, have reflected these considerations. 
24 The ASX Principles of Good Governance define an 'independent' director as someone who does not have 
substantial shareholders in the company. The measure used in this thesis did not account for the concentration of 
director holdings, but rather captured the incidence of non-executive directors with share holdings. Nonetheless, 
the concentration of holdings among the non-executive directors would be an interesting locus of enquiry in 
more case-specific research, rather than aggregate statistical analysis. 
25 The ASX guidelines encourage board nomination and remuneration committees to have a majority of 
'independent' director ~embers, as well as an ~independent' chairperson. To ease the extraction of data, whether 
or not the chair was non-independent has not been captur.ed in the measure. 
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In the Australian context, independence at the board chair level has emerged as one of the 
most prominent signifiers of good governance. For instance, the ASX principles of good 
governance recommend that 'the chairperson should be an independent non-executive 
director' (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003: 21). Thus, chair non-executive status 
and independence is encouraged on the premise that this structural imposition enables the 
board to 'add value' (2003: '19). Best practice prescriptions also depict independent 
chairpersons as more effective leaders of the board (see ASX Principles of Good Governance, 
2003). 
In summary, chair independence, and particularly the separation of the chair's role from that 
of the CEO, is considered a positive indicator of board effectiveness and task performance. 
What is particularly surprising here is the absence of solid empirical backing for this 
assumption. Indeed, in reviewing the literature, no data are found ~n ihe association between 
CEO reward and performance, and board leadership. 
Nevertheless, according to the logic underpinning these prescriptions, we might expect boards 
demonstrating a higher degree of material independence from salaried executives to be more 
adept at controlling and managing CEO cash reward and performance. Governance practices 
conducive to heightened board independence might also be assumed to positively moderate 
the relationship between CEO cash reward and firm-level performance. It is intuitive to 
expect that enhanced board leadership is in tum associated with: i) lower levels of cash 
reward; ii) increases in the incentive component of total cash rewards; and iii) a closer 
alignment between reported CEO cash rewards and measures of firm-level performance. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 10.1 a: CEOs in firms with a non-executive chairperson earn significantly lower 
levels of total cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10.1b: Having a non-executive chairperson positively moderates the relationship 
between CEO total cash reward and lagged performance in such a way that the relationship 
is stronger when the chairperson is a non-executive. 
Hypothesis 10.1c: CEOs in firms with a non-executive chairperson earn a higher level of 
performance-based cash reward than otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 10./d: Having a non-executive chairperson positively moderates the relationship 
between lagged stock returns and the level of CEO incentive cash reward in such a way that 
the relationship is stronger when the chairperson is a non-executive. 
Hypothesis 10./e: CEOs in firms with a non-executive chairperson earn significantly lower 
levels of total non-incentive cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10./f Having a non-executive chairperson positively moderates the relationship 
between CEO total non-incentive cash reward and real lagged imnual stock• return in such a 
way that the relationship is stronger when the chairperson is a non'executive. 
Non-executive Directors 
As noted in Chapter Three, a meta-analysis by Deutsch (2005) of studies examining the main 
effects of board composition on the level and composition of CEO total reward reports two 
important findings. First, the percentage of outside directors - that is, directors not recruited 
from the ranks of the firm's salaried executives- has no significant main effect on the level of 
CEO total reward. Second, the percentage of outside directors negatively predicts the 
proportion of total CEO reward that is performance-based (for specific examples, see Dalton, 
1998; Westphal, 1998). Despite this, some empirical evidence challenges this postulate by 
showing that having more independent directors is inversely related to CEO total cash reward 
(Lippert and Moore, 1994; Core et a/., 1999). 
Yet here too, despite the absence of conclusive empirical support the ideal of the independent 
non-executive director continues to be entrenched as an indicator of go_od governance and 
board task performance in corporate governance regulation. Independence at the board level 
is purported to enable the board to make 'value adding' decisions and judgments, with the 
ASX's Corporate Governance Council recommending that 'a majority of the board should be 
independent directors' (Principle 2, ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003: !'9). This 
prescription is predicated on the assumption that board structural independence improves 
board effectiveness to discharge its responsibilities at the same time as resisting managerial 
influence. 
Accordingly, with the aim of putting these assumptions to the test, and in line with the reward 
variables considered throughout the thesis, it may be hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis J0.2a: There is a significant inverse relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and the level of CEO Iota/cash reward. 
Hypothesis 10.2b: The percentage of non-executive directors. on the board positively 
moderaies the .relationship between the levels of total CEO cash reward and lagged real 
annual stock -returns in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the percentage is 
high than when it is low. 
Hypothesis 10.2c: There is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and the level of reported CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
Hypothesis 10.2d: The percentage of non-executive directors on the .board positively 
moderates the relationship between the levels of annual incentive CEO cash reward and 
lagged real annual stock returns in such a wcy that the relationship is stronger when the 
percentage is high than when it is low. 
Hypothesis 10.2e: There is a significant inverse relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and the level of CEO total non-incentive cash reward. 
Hypothesis 10.2f" The percentage of non-executive directors on the board positively 
moderates the relationship between the levels of total non-incentive CEO cash reward and 
lagged real annual stock returns in such a w<ry that the relationship is stronger when the 
percentage is high than when it is low. 
Shareholdings by Non-executive Directors 
Following on from the discussion of Australian Corporate Governance in Chapter Four, in its 
conceptualisation of board member 'independence', Australian corporate governance 
regulation does not consider director share ownership to be a valid requirement for, or 
indicator, of board effectiveness. According to the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
(2003: 20), directors are no longer independent when they are substantial shareholders in the 
company. Moreover, while Australian corporations law has long required the reporting of 
director equity ownership, the ASX's voluntary code of practice makes no recommendation 
about encouraging share ownership among directors through target ownership plans. 
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While. this accords with the ideal of director stewardship, it can also be seen as iunning 
counter to agency theory prescriptions for alignment of material, interest between owners and 
those appointed to oversee their interests. Exponents of the managerial power model make a 
comparable argument. For instance, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have criticised the dearth of 
outside director target ownership plans, even though outside director ownership has intuitive 
appeal in terms of providing board-shareholder alignment incentives. It follows that those 
board directors, who have an equity interest in the company, will have a greater interest in 
guarding against managerial opportunism and rent-extraction. 
The view that director ownership negates director independence also runs counter to research 
findings indicating that increasing ownership among non-executive directors militates against 
managerial power and aligns more closely the interests of shareholders and directors. For 
instance, Core eta/. (1999: 387) report that in the UK context a 1% increase in the percentage 
of stock owned by outside directors reduces total CEO reward by $21,183. In other words, 
these findings indicate that increasing ownership among outside directors can potentially 
restore director· incentives to constrain CEO reward and to manage. the CEO reward-
performance relationship more effectively. 
On the basis of these possibilities, it may be proposed that: 
Hypothesis. 10.3a: There is a significant inverse relationship between the percentage of non-
executive director shareholders on the board and the level of CEO total cash reward. 
Hypothesis 10.3b: The percentage of non-executive director shareholders on the board 
positively moderates the relationship between the level of total CEO cash reward and lagged 
real annual stock returns in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the percentage 
is high than when it is low. 
Hypothesis 10.3c: There is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of non-
executive director shareholders on the board and the level of reported CEO incentive cash 
reward. 
Hypothesis J0.3d: The percentage of non-executive director shareholders on the board 
positively moderates the relationship between the level of incentive CEO. cash reward and 
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lagged real annual stock returns in such a wey that the relationship is stronger when the 
percentage is high than when it is low. 
Hypothesis 10.3e: There is a significant inverse. relationship between the percentage of non-
executive director shareholders on the board and the level of CEO total non-incentive cash 
reward. 
Hypothesis 10.3f" The percentage of non-executive director shareholders on the board 
positively moderates the relationship between the level of total non-incentive CEO cash 
reward and lagged reaf·annual stock returns in such a way. that the relationship is stronger 
when the percentage is high than when it is low. 
Non-executive dominated Remuneration and Nomination. Committees 
In Chapter Four it. is observed that corponite governance regulation in the Australian context 
encourages the creation of task-specific board committees dominated by 'independent' 
directors. The standard model of corporate governance now favoured in Australia, the US, 
and the UK, advocates the formation of independent board committees consisting of a 
majority of independent" directors (Cadbury, 2002; see recommendation 9.2 ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003). For the ensuing analysis, all remuneration and nomination 
committees refer to those that are dominated by non-executive directors, and exclude CEOs. 
Having independent audit, nomination, and remuneration committees is considered to 
improve the effectiveness with which the board discharges its duties to shareholders. For 
example, having an independent remuneration co'!lmittee is presumed to improve the board's . 
effectiveness in structuring CEO rewards. By extension, non-executive dominated 
remuneration committees are assumed to be more adept at enforcing optimal contracts 
because they are purportedly more resistant to managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
Consistent with these assertions, in the Australian context, the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council recommends: "The board should establish a remuneration committee chaired by an 
independent director, and consist of a majority of independent directors." (Principle 9, 2003: 
54). Independent remuneration committees are thus assumed to be more adept at managing 
CEO rewards, and, in particular, more adept at aligning providing CEOs with performance 
incentives, and subsequently aligning CEO rewards with performance Principle 9, ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003: 54). 
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Again, however, there is no consistent empirical evidence ·that having a remuneration. 
committee positively moderates the relationship between CEO cash reward and firm-level 
performance (see Conyon and Peck, 1998; Dalton, 1998). These results are consistent with 
those reported by Dalton (1998), who finds that remuneration committee presence per se hads 
no influence on the relationship between CEO reward and performance. 
As such, it is also appropriate to test the validity of these committee-related best practice 
prescriptions. In order to do so, we hypothesise as follows: 
Hypothesis 10.4a: CEOs in firms with a non-executive director dominated remuneration 
commillee earn significantly lower levels of total cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10.4b: Having a non-executive director dominated remuneration commillee 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and lagged 
performance in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the commillee is non-
executive dominated than when it is not. 
Hypothesis 10.4c: CEOs in firms with a non-executive director dominated remuneration 
commillee earn a higher level of performance-based cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10.4d: Having a non-executive director dominated remuneration committee 
positively moderates the relationship between lagged stock returns and the level of CEO 
incentive cash reward in such a way that/he relationship is stronger when it is the committee 
is ·nan-executive dominated than wh!!n it is not. 
Hypothesis 10. 4e: CEOs in firms with a non-executive director dominated remuneration 
commillee earn significantly lower levels of total non-incentive cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10.4f: Having an non-executive director dominated remuneration commillee 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO total non-incentive cash reward and real 
lagged annual stock returns in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the 
committee is non-executive dominated than when it is not. 
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As is the case with remuneration committees, a review of international literature produced no 
data on the relationship between CEO reward and performance, and nomination committees. 
Yet, in best practice prescriptions, the same assumptions are made in regard to the potential 
influence of independent nomination committees. These committees are considered important 
in terms of enhancing board decision by ensuring that the board, in aggregate, has the skills, 
knowledge, experience, and traits to make effective.decisions on all.dimensions of board task 
performance. According to the ASX Corporate Governance Council, independent nomination 
committees are important for the management of board task performance, and ensuring that 
directors have the required competencies and capabilities to discharge their responsibilities 
effectively, and monitoring the effectiveness of board performance more generally (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003: 21 ). 
Accordingly, it can be hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 10.5a: CEOs in firms with non-executive director. dominated nomination 
committee earn significantly lower levels of total cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis 10.5b: Having a non-executive director dominated nomination committee 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO total cash reward and lagged 
performance in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the committee is non-
executive_ dominated than when it is not. 
Hypothesis 10.5c: CEOs in firms with a non-executive director dominated nomination 
committee earn a higher level of performance-based cash reward than otherwise. 
Hypothesis J0.5d: Having a non-executive director dominated nomination committee 
positively moderates the relationship between lagged stock returns and the level of CEO 
incentive cash reward in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the committee is 
non-executive dominated than when it is not. 
Hypothesis 10.5e: CEOs in firms with a non-executive director dominated nomination 
committee earn significantly lower levels of total non-incentive cash reward than otherwise. 
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Hypothesis J0.5f Having a non-executive director dominated nomination committee 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO total non-incentive cash reward and real 
lagged annual stock returns in such a way that the relationship is stronger when the 
Committee is non-executive dominated than when it is not. 
The following sections present the descriptive results and multivariate regression estimates 
testing the hypothesised relationships between measures of board governance best practice 
and CEO cash rewards. 
I 0.3 Econometric Model 
The hypotheses were tested by estimating the dynamic panel econometric model specified 
below, with board governance taken as the vector for all five measures of board-principal 
alignment mechanisms. 
CEOTotaiCashu = a+ fJoCEOTotaiCashu-1 + fJ1Tota/Assetsu-1 + fJ2TotaiRisku + 
fJ,ReaiReturnsu-1 + fJ4lncomingCEOsu + fJsOutgoingCEOsu + 
p{J,BoardGovernanceMeasure;_1.1 +'fJ,BoardGovernance1•1• 
1*Rea/Returns;,1-J + f.l; + e;,r 
Where: 
• Size is indexed by the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1. 
• FirmRisk, indexed by the cumulative distribution function of firm returns of 36 
months prior (see Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999 for methodology). 
• MarketReturn is measured as annual real stock returns. 
• OwnershipConcentration is the vector for two measures of ownership concentration 
that are modelled alternatively. These measures include the percentage of ordinary 
stock owned by the top shareholder, and the top 20 shareholders in year t-1. 
• BoardGovernance is the vector of the five board governance measures. 
• Turnover is the vector for incoming and outgoing CEO dummy variables to control for 
abnormalities associated with sign-on payments, termination payments, and salary 
payments covering only part of the report year. 
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Separate equations were measured for each of these explanatory variables, whilst co-varying. 
out the effects of firm size, firm risk, and performance, as well as turnover episodes. An a 
priori assumption of this thesis is that boards can evaluate CEO performance against 
differential measures of firm level performance .. A. corollary is that accounting return-
measures are commonly used to determine annual cash incentive rewards. It is conceivable, 
for instance, that CEO annual cash incentives can be insensitive to market return performance 
measures but sensitive to annual accounting performance measures. In recognition of this, as 
well as of the possibility. of differential sensitivity among different reward components, and 
consistent with the approach taken in other chapters, the equation above was also estimated 
using an accounting return measure, namely ROE. 
To test the hypothesised relationships, a dynamic panel model estimator .was used. Chapter 
Five presented a detailed rationale for this approach. A two-step system (GMM) approach 
was used on the premise that it is more appropriate for estimating models with lagged 
explanatory variables. This is because the inclusion of a lagged independent variable in the x-
vector, by default, violates classical linear model assumptions regarding the orthogonality of 
the x and disturbance vectors (Sayers, 1989). Results presented in Chapter Six· demonstrate 
through specification tests the efficiency of using a system GMM approach rather than using 
fixed effects or instrumental variable estimators. The results reported in Chapter Six also 
indicated that performance variables are not strictly endogenous. This has intuitive appeal, 
especially considering that unobservable factors such as managerial ability, and other external 
and internal and unmeasured time variant factors, can impact on performance, rendering 
performance variables endogenous to the disturbance error structure. To recap, the relative 
merit of using the system GMM approach is that it controls for the possibility of endogeneity 
from both omitted unobserved effects, and serial correlation (Roodman, 2007). Let us turn 
our attention to the results." 
I 0.4 Results 
26 Hansen test for overidentification of results were presented in the results tables. According to the tests, none 
of the system GMM regressions were over·identified in tenns of their instruments. In all cases, the chi-square 
values are non-significant. 
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In terms of the descriptive analysis, the annual means for the key explanatory variables were 
calculated to ascertain the extent to which the companies sampled demonstrated best practice 
board governance structures at the board and committee level; and, in particular, to establish 
whether there has been a linear trend in the adoption of these best practice principles in recent 
times. 
Exhibit I 0.1 presents the annual incidence of the five selected board governance measures for 
an open cohort of ASX TopSOO firm between 1999 and 2006 inclusive, with the final sample 
being between 424 and 560 firms, depending on the variable concerned. 
In aggregate, the results suggest an increasing trend in the preponderance of non-executive 
chairpersons, the percentage of non-executive directors, and non-executive director 
shareholders, as well as for independent nomination and remuneration committees. As such, 
these descriptive results show an increasing subscription to best practice models of board 
governance, and, in particular, ASX Corporate Governance Council's (2003) 
recommendations. These results are consistent with those of Kiel and Nicholsohn (2003) who 
suggest that relative to the UK and the USA, Australia has shown a demonstrably greater 
adherence to prescriptions for board structural independence. 
From 1999 to 2006, on average there was a seven-percentage point increase in the presence of 
Non-Executive Chairpersons in the sample: from 73% in 1999 to 80% in 2006. Over the same 
period there was a five percentage point increase the presence of Non-Executive Directors 
and the same increase in the percentage of Non-Executive Directors holding shares in the 
firm: from 66% in 1999 to 71% in 2006, and 51% in 1999 to 56% in 2006 respectively. Over 
the same period, the incidence of Non-Executive dominated Remuneration and Nomination 
Committees with a majority of non-executive members rose more sharply still. In 1999, 54% 
of firms reported having a formal remuneration committee; by 2006 this figure had risen to 
78%. Over the same period, there was a 33-percentage point increase in the incidence of 
Nomination committees: in 1999, 18% of firms sampled reported having a formal nomination 
committee; in 2006, the incidence was 51%. The results presented in Exhibit I 0.1 thus 
provide strong evidence of an increasing convergence towards normative models of corporate 
governance. 
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Exhibit 10.1. Annual Means of Board Governance Measures 
Year Non- 1YoNon- 0/o Non- Remuneration Nomination 
Executive Executive Executive Committee Committee 
Chair Directors Director 
Shareholders 
1999 73% 66% 51% 54% 18% 
2000 73% 67% 52% 59% 19% 
2001 75% 67% 52% 61% 17% 
2002 76% 68% 53% 64% 21% 
2003 78% 69% 53% 67% 30% 
2004 77% 69% 53% 72% 43% 
2005 71%27 70% 55% 76% 48% 
2006 80% 71% 56% 78% 51% 
This general trend to greater compliance with best practice prescriptions is undoubtedly 
attributable to the combined influence of more stringent legislative requirements (especially 
following tbe enactment of the CLERP 9 legislation in 2004) and the ASX's proactive role in 
tightening voluntary code expectations. However, it is important to note that the trend 
actually predates the introduction of the ASX Corporate Governance Council's (2003) 
Principles of Good Governance, and suggests that firms responded well to prior corporate 
governance prescriptions embedded in corporations' law, and other relevant reports described 
in Chapter Four. 
Exhibit 10.3 presents the Pearson's bivariate correlation coefficients for all model variables. 
The results suggest that there is little bivariate support for the predicted main effects of the 
five governance measures on all three cash reward measures. It appears that all five 
governance variables are positively correlated (r > 0) with the level of CEO total cash reward, 
the level of incentive cash reward, and the level of non-incentive cash reward both in year t 
and t-1, and negatively related to the proportion of total cash CEO reward tbat is performance' 
based (r < 0). Contrary to prediction, the results in Exhibit I 0.3 suggest that these governance 
27 While it is unclear why this figure is anomalous, it may be speculated that the anomaly may be associated in 
some way with the advent ofCLERP9. 
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measures are also positively correlated with the level of Total Non-Incentive Cash Reward, 
the level of Total Cash Reward. 
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Non-executive Chairpe.rson 
Exhibit 10.3 presents the estimated coefficients testing the moderating effects of having a 
non-executive chairperson at the board level on the relationship ·between four measures of 
CEO cash reward and real annual stock returns. 
Having a non-executive chairperson on the board is widely considered to be an indicator of 
board task effectiveness .. Consistent with this supposition, it was predicted that firms with a 
non-executive chairperson would provide their CEOs with significantly lower levels of CEO 
total cash reward than would otherwise be the case, or at the very least, would have CEO total 
cash reward levels that were significantly more aligned with Jagged annual real returns. The 
estimated coefficients in Exhibit 10.3 are inconsistent with these predictions. It appears that 
having a non-executive chair does not significantly predict the level of CEO total cash reward 
(Hypothesis IO.Ia; p = 0.028, p = 0.314), especially in the direction predicted (p < 0). Nor 
does it positively moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and annual Real 
returns (Hypothesis I 0.1 b; p = -0.001, p = 0.125). It was also predicted that the presence of a 
non-executive chairperson positively predict the level of CEO incentive cash reward 
(Hypothesis I 0.1 c), and positively moderate the extent of reward for stock return performance 
(Hypothesis JO.Jd). Both these predictions are rejected on the basis of the estimated 
coefficients presented Exhibit 10.3. While the estimated coefficients of the main effect and 
predicted moderating effect of having a non-executive chair on the level of CEO annual 
incentive cash reward were in the predicted direction (p > 0; p = 0.031 and p = 0.000 
respectively), the estimate was non-significant (p= 0.398 and p= 0.897 respectively). 
Contrary to prediction (hypothesis IO.Ie) it appears that CEOs receive significantly greater 
levels of Total Non-Incentive Cash Reward when the chairperson in a non-executive director 
(p = 0.998, p <0.05). Moreover, having a non-executive chair does little by way of positively 
moderating the relationship between total-non-incentive cash rewards and lagged real returns 
(p = -0.000, p = 0.424). On the basis of this result, Hypothesis IO.If is rejected. 
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Exhibit 10.3. The Influence of Board Chair Independence on CEO Cash Reward, with 
Real Annual Stock Returns. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non~Executive Chair 1•1 ' 
Non-Executive Chair,_1*Rea1Retum'·1 
Controls: 
Firm Risk' 
Size,.1 • 
Incoming CE01 c 
Outgoing CE01 ~ 
CEO Total Cash Reward 1•1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash Rewar~. 1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash,_1 • 
Real RetumSc b 
Real Retums1•1 b 
Cons~ant 
Observations 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
" Natural Logarithm 
" Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 .01 
••• p <0 .001 
Robust Standard Errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
0.029 
(0.028) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.039 
(0.111) 
0.045 
(0.020) 
-0.228*** 
(0.027) 
0.049 
(0.028) 
0.846*** 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
1.228* 
(0.581) 
2955 
• :1=118.21 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incentin Cash• 
Cash• 
0.031 0.100* 
(0.037) (0.047) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0,035 0.219_ 
(0.119) (0.150) 
0.032 0.187*** 
(0.017) (0.021) 
-0.039 -0.224*** 
(0.026) (0.030) 
-0.037 0.080' 
(0.026) (0.039) 
0.867**• 
(0.036) 
0.369*** 
(0.039) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.957* 4.415*** 
(0.475) (0.567) 
2955 2955 
:1= 117.04 :1=170.97 
Exhibit 10.4 presents the estimated coefficients of the moderating effects of having a non-
executive chairperson on the relationship between all three reward measures and firm 
accounting returns indexed by ROE. According to these estimated coefficients, it appears that 
having a Non·Executive Chair did not have a significant main effect on any of the cash 
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reward measures, nor was there evidence of a positive moderator effect on CEO cash reward-
performance sensitivity. In short, as with market performance, the. presence of a non-
executive chair makes no difference to the degree of reward sensitivity to Jagged accounting 
returns. These results do not furnish support for Hypotheses I 0. Ia-! 0. If. 
Exhibit 10.4. The Influence of Board Chair Independence on CEO Cash Reward, with 
ROE. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non-Executive Chair 1•1 ' 
Non-Executive Chair 1. 1*ROE 1•1 
Controls: 
Firm Risk, 
Size 1•1 . 
Incoming CEO 1 c 
Outgoing CEO, c 
CEO Total Cash 1• 1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash H . 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash 1•1 
ROE, b 
ROE,.1 b 
Constant 
Observations 
Hansen Test ofOveridentification 
• Natural Logarithm 
b Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
**p<O.OJ 
***p<O.OOJ 
• 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
0.029 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.108 
(0.122) 
0.068 
(0.036) 
-0.260*** 
(0.031) 
0.039 
(0.032) 
0.834*** 
(O.o78) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.885 
(0.682) 
2430 
1~83.07 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incentive Cash• 
Cash• 
0.003 0.044 
(0.048) (0.0413) 
0.002 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.062 0.1805 
(0.168) (0.145) 
0.057 0.131*~ 
(0.036) (0.048) 
-0.061 -0.292*** 
(0.035) (0.040) 
-0.092** 0.050 
(0.036) (0.044) 
0.918* .. 
(0.050) 
0.620 
(0.114) 
-0.001 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.124 2.338** 
(0.738) (0.909\ 
2430 2430 
;-:. 83.08 /~91.84 
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Non-executiVe directors. 
Exhibit 10.5 presents the estimated coefficients relating to the moderating effects of the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the ,board on the relationship between the four 
measures of CEO cash reward and real annual stock returns. 
None of the predictions made in relation to the main and moderating effects of the percentage 
of non-executive directors are supported by the estimated coefficients presented in Exhibit 
I 0.5. The percentage of non-executive directors on the board was predicted to have a positive 
main effect on the level of CEO incentive cash reward (Hypothesis 10.2c) and to total CEO 
cash reward (Hypothesis 10.2a), and to negatively predict the level of total cash reward and 
the level of total non-incentive cash CEO reward (Hypotheses 10.2e). All of these 
hypothesised main effects are rejected on the basis of the estimated coefficients presented in 
Exhibit I 0.5. 
Exhibit 10.6 presents the estimated coefficients using ROE as the firm-level performance 
measure rather than real annual stock returns. It appears that the estimates remain 
qualitatively unchanged when a firm-level accounting return measure is operationalised. 
Again, the hypothesis main and moderator effects of having a large percentage of non-
executive directors on the board does not positively moderate the relationship between all 
three cash reward measures and ROE. 
On the basis of corporate governance prescriptions in the Australian context, independence at 
the board level, measured through the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, was 
predicted to positively moderate the relatio-nship between lagged real returns, and the three 
different cash reward measures operationalised. The estimated coefficients reported here do 
not support these predictions. 
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Exhibit I 0.5. 'The Influence of Board Independence on CEO Cash Rew'!rd, with Real 
Annual Stock Returns. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non-executive directors on the board ,_ 1 
NoJ1-cxccutive directors,. 1* 
Real Return ,. 1 
Controls: 
Firm Risk, 
Size 1-1 • 
Incoming CEO 1 c 
Outgoing CEO 1 c 
CEO Total Cash ,_ 1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1•1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash 1•1 • 
Real Returns, b 
Real Returns ,.1 
b 
Constant 
Observations 
I Jansen Test of O"·eridentification 
• Natural Logarithm 
11 Percentage 
'"Binary Variable 
*p<0.05 
**p<O.Ol 
••• p <0 .001 
Robust Standard Errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash• 
b -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
_LO.OOI) 
-0.058 
(0.101) 
0.046*** 
(0.020) 
-0.226*** 
(0.026) 
0.059* 
(0.029) 
0.862* .. 
(0.058) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
1.)2* 
(0.560) 
2960 
.(-122.05 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incentive Cash• 
Cash• 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
JO.OOI) (O.OOU 
0.024 -0.041 
(0.150) (0.128) 
0.032 0.107*** 
(0.023) (0.027) 
-0.043 -0.285*** 
(0.026) (0.034) 
-0.021 0.082* 
(0.028) (0.038) 
0.856••• 
(0,044) 
0.643*** 
(0.079) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
1.141* 2.662*** 
(0.530) (0.731) 
2960 2960 
,(-130.73 .(-141.40 
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Exhibit 10.6 The Innuence of Board Independence on CEO Cash Reward, with ROE. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non-Executive directors on the board 1•1 
b 
Non-executive directOrs.. 1* 
ROE,.1 
Controls: 
Firm Risk, 
Size,.1 • 
Incoming CEO 1 ~ 
Outgoing CEO , c 
CEO Total Cash,_, • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash ,_ 1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash ,_ 1 • 
ROE,b 
ROE,_, b 
Constant 
Observations 
Hansen Test of Overidcntificatlon 
.. Natural Logarithm 
6 Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
*p<0.05 
•• p <0 .OJ 
... p <0 .001 
Robust Standard errors in parenlhesis 
CEO Total Cash• 
·0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.132) 
0.091' 
(0.040) 
-0.233*** 
(0.027) 
0.054 
(0.031) 
0.752*** 
(0.081) 
-0.001' 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
1.774** 
(0.707) 
2836 
y2=88.76 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incentive 
Cash • Cash • 
·0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.049 0.066 
(0.180) (0.153) 
0.075' 0.114 
(0.035) (0.049) 
-0.050 -0.286* .. 
(0.033) (0.035) 
-0.075' 0.075' 
(0.034) (0.037) 
0.874*** 
(0.049) 
0.645*** 
(0.099) 
0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.003) 
0.175 2.476** 
(0.630) (0.814) 
2836 2836 
x2=89.83 x2=96.08 
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Non-executive Director Shareholders 
Exhibit I 0. 7 presents the estimated coefficients testing the moderating effects of the 
percentage of non-executive director shareholders on the board on the relationship between 
the three measures of CEO cash reward and real annual stock returns. 
The results reported in Exhibit I 0. 7 suggest that the percentage of non-executive director 
shareholders on the board does not negatively predict the level of CEO total cash reward (/J = 
-0.000, p = 0.969). On this basis Hypothesis 10.3a is rejected. The percentage of non-
executive shareholders on the board was also predicted to positively moderate the relationship 
between the level of CEO total cash reward and lagged real stock returns (Hypothesis I 0.3b). 
However, the estimated coefficient (/J = 0.000, p = 0.954) is again inconsistent with 
predictions. 
The percentage of non-executive director shareholders on boards was also predicted to have 
significant main effects on the level of annual incentive based cash rewards (Hypothesis 
10.3c). 
Exhibit I 0.8 presents the estimated coefficients relating to non-executive director Shareholder 
presence using ROE as the firm-level performance measure. It appears that the estimates 
remain qualitatively unchanged when a firm-level accounting return measure is 
operationalised. Again, having a large percentage of non-executive director shareholders on 
the board does not positively moderate the relationship between all three cash reward 
measures, and ROE. These results do not furnish support for Hypotheses 10.3a-10.3f. 
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Exhibit 10.7 The Influence of Non-Executive Director Shareholders on CEO Cash 
Reward, with Real Annual Stock Returns. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non-executive director shareholders 1•1 
Non-Executive Director Shareholders 
,_,*Real Return 1.1 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size 1•1 . 
Incoming CEO, c 
Outgoing CEO 1 c 
CEO Total Cash ,_1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1• 1 . 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash 1•1 • 
Real Returns , b 
Real Returns 1., 
b 
Constant 
Observation 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
Q Natural Logarithm 
b Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 ;0} 
***p<O.OOJ 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
b 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.182 
(0.1 06) 
O.OZ8 
(0.0 17) 
-0.207*** 
(0.028) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.841*** 
(0.052) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
1.699** 
10.548) 
2907 
./~121.10 
CEO Annual CEO Non-
Incentive incentive Cash• 
Cash• 
0.000 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
10.001) (0.001) 
-0.131 -0.155 
(0.152) (0.136) 
0.020 0.095*** 
(0.021) (0.028) 
-0.039 -0.256*** 
(0.028) (0.037) 
-0.042 O.Q75 
(0.027) (0.042) 
0.849*"'* 
(0.043) 
0.606*"'* 
(0.088) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
1.474"'* 3.300*** 
(0.5381 (0.834) 
2907 2907 
./~138.95 x'-126.96 
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Exhibit I 0.8 The Influence of Non-Executive Director Shareholders on CEO Cash 
Reward, with ROE 
Board Governance Measure: 
Non-Executive Director Shareholders 1_1 
b 
Non-Executive Director Shareholders 
,_1*ROE,.1 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size,. 1 • 
Incoming CEO 1 e 
Outgoing CEO, " 
CEO Total Cash 1•1 
. 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1• 1 • 
CEO Non-incentive Cash 1•1 • 
ROE 1 b 
ROE,. 1 b 
Constant 
Observations 
Hansen Test of Ove_r_~_c~tification 
il Natural Logarithm 
b Percentage 
"Binary Variable 
*p<0.05 
** p <0 .OJ 
***p<O.OOJ 
Robust Standard errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO 
Total Cash • 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.142) 
0.096' 
(0.042) 
-0.240*** 
(0.027) 
0.052 
(0.030) 
0.702* .. 
(0.092) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
2.159** 
(0.704) 
2800 
x2~80.60 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incenti,ve Cash • 
Cash• 
-0.002 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.067 0.159 
(0.206) (0.141) 
-0.002 0.106' 
(0.002) (0.003) 
-0.060 .-0.274*** 
(0.036) (0.034) 
-0.091' 0.091 
(0.037) (0.039) 
0.832**** 
(0.060) 
0.605*** 
(0.095) 
0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) 
0.000 0.002 
(0.002) (0.001) 
1.150 2.979*** 
(0.886) (0.833) 
2800 2800 
X2~95.32 X2~89.62 
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Non-executive Dominated Remuneration Committees 
Exhibit 10.9 presents the· estimated coefficients testing the moderating effects of having a 
non-executive director-dominated remuneration committee on the relationship between the 
three measures of CEO cash reward and real annual stock returns. 
In line with best practice corporate governance principles, it was predicted that having an 
independent remuneration committee (indexed by having a majority of non-executive 
members) would negatively predict the level of CEO total cash reward (Hypothesis 10.4a), 
and positively moderate the relationship between CEO total cash reward and annual stock 
returns (Hypothesis 10.4b). Contrary to these predictions, the estimated coefficients 
presented in Exhibit I 0.9 imply that CEOs in firm~ with such remuneration committees do not 
receive significantly lower levels of CEO total cash reward (jJ= 0.057, p = 0.108), nor do they · 
necessarily receive total cash rewards that are significantly more sensitivity to lagged real 
stock returns (j3 = -0.001, p = 0.125). 
Further, the results in Exhibit I 0.9 do not furnish support for the prediction that CEOs in 
firms, which have remuneration committees, receive higher levels of incentive cash rewards 
(Hypothesis I 0.4c ). The predicted positive moderating effects of remuneration committee 
existence on the relationship between these. reward measures and lagged real returns 
(Hypotheses 10.4b, d, f) were not supported by the e~timated coefficients presented. Thus 
CEOs in firms with non-executive-dominated remuneration committees do not receive 
significantly different levels of CEO annual incentive cash, and CEO total cash reward. 
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Exhibit 10.9. The Influence of Non-executive Dominated Remuneration Committees·on 
CEO Cash Reward, with Real Annual Stock Returns. 
Board Governance Measure:· 
Remuneration Committee 1•1 ' 
Remuneration Committee 1_1*Real Return 
<·I 
Controls: 
Firm Risk 1 
Size ,_ 1 . 
Incoming CEO,~ 
Outgoing CEO 1 ' 
CEO Total Cash 1•1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1•1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash 1•1 • 
Real Returns 1 b 
Real Returns 1•1 b 
Constant 
Observation 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
a Natural Logarithm 
h Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
*p <0.05 
**p<O.OI 
••• p <0 .001 
Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
0.057 
(0.035) 
·0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.176 
(0.103) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
·0.217"'** 
(0.028) 
0.041 
(0.030) 
0.875*"'* 
(0.053) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
1.321* 
(0.569) 
2958 
/-125.00 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive incentive Cash• 
Cash • 
0.009 0.098* 
(0.046) (0.042) 
0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.223 -o.o<n 
(0.155) (0.121) 
0.010 0.095** 
(0.023) (0.030) 
-0.027 ·0.250*** 
(0.026) (0.035) 
-0.020 0.060 
(0.027) (0.038) 
0.868*** 
(0.044) 
0.660*** 
(0.084) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
1.467** 2.600* .. 
(0.570) (0.722) 
2958 2958 
;:(-126.77 ;:(-135.35 
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Interestingly, the estimated coefficients in Exhibit I 0.9 also show that .CEOs in firms with 
such committees, on average, receive significantly higher levels of total non-incentive or 
fixed cash reward than do CEOs in firms without such committees (jJ = 0.098, p < 0.05). The 
directionality of the coefficient is in the opposite direction 'to that predicted by Hypothesis 
I 0.4e. Finally, the results do not furnish support for the prediction that CEOs in firms with 
remuneration committees receive fixed rewards that are more closely aligned with lagged real 
returns (Hypothesis 10.41). 
Exhibit I 0.10 presents the estimated coefficients using ROE as the firm-level performance 
measure. It appears that the estimates remain qualitatively unchanged when a firm-level 
accounting return measure - ROE - is operationalised. Again, the hypothesised main and 
moderator effect of having a non-executive dominated remuneration committee does not 
positively moderate the relationship between the three CEO cash reward measures and ROE. 
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Exhibit 10.10. The Influence of Non-executive Dominated Remuneration Committees 
on CEO Cash Reward, with ROE. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Remuneration Committee 1-1 ' 
Remuneration Committ~e,_ 1 *RQE 1•1 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size,.1 . 
Incoming CEO 1 e 
-Outgoirig CEO,~ 
CEO Total Cash ,_ 1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1•1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive··cash ,. 1 • 
ROE,b 
ROE 1. 1 b 
Constant 
Observations 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
a Natural Logarithm 
b Percentage 
c Binary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
** p <0 .OJ 
***p<O.OOI 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
... "CEO Total 
Cash • 
-0.013 
(0.051) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0. I 22) 
·o.oss•• 
(0.032) 
·0.202*"'* 
(0.027) 
0.050 
(0.032) 
0.738*** 
(0.077) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
1.838** 
(0.715) 
2838 
/=85.67 
CEO CEO Non-
Incentive. incentive Cash1 
Cash • 
-0.024 0.032 
(0.073) (0.071) 
-0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.057 0.177 
(0.166) (0. I 57) 
0.038 0.149*** 
(0.041) (0.044) 
-0.043 -0.260*** 
(0.033) (0.034) 
-0.081** 0.063 
(0.032) (0.041) 
0.892*** 
(0.059) 
0.545*** 
(0.1 II) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) 
0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.621 2.978** 
(0.772) (1.001) 
2838 2838 
L=95.58 /=94.76 
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Non-executive Director Dominated Nomination_Committees 
Exhibit I 0.11 presents the estimated coefficients testing the moderating effects of having a 
non-executive director dominated nomination committee (indexed by the presence of a non-
executive director majority) on the relationship between three measures of CEO cash reward, 
and real returns. 
It was predicted (Hypothesis 10.5b, d, and f) that having a non-executive director dominated, 
nomination committee would enable the. board to more effectively manage the relationship 
between CEO cash rewards and performance given that such committees are concerned 
primarily with maximizing overall board effectiveness and task performance in relation to 
director and top executive selection. However, as the results in Exhibit I 0.11 show, CEOs 
belonging to firms with non-executive-dominated nomination committees do not receive 
significantly different levels of total cash, annual incentive cash, or total non-incentive cash 
reward, to those CEOs belonging to firms without such committees. Further, the presence of 
such a committee makes no significant difference to the sensitivity of cash reward to lagged 
real returns. Accordingly, none of the hypotheses relating to predicted nomination committee 
effects are supported. 
Exhibit I 0.12 presents the estimated coefficients for CEO cash reward, ROE; and non-
executive dominated nomination committees. Again, against predictions (Hypotheses 10.5 
b,d,f) having a non-executive nomination committee does not positively moderate the 
relationship between any of the CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward, and ROE. 
Against expectations (Hypotheses 10.51), however, CEOs in companies with such nomination 
committees receive significantly greater levels of total non-incentive cash reward than 
otherwise (/3~0.134, p < 0. 05). 
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Exhibit 10.11 The.Innuence of Non-executive Dominated Nomination Committees~on 
CEO Cash Reward, with Real Annual Stock Returns. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Nomination Committee ,_1 ' 
Nomination Committee 1. 1*Real Returns 
,_, 
Controls: 
Finn Risk, 
Size 1•1 • 
Incoming CEO 1 c 
Outgoing CEO, c 
CEO Total Cash ,_ 1 • 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1• 1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive Cash 1-1 . 
Real Returns, b 
Real Returns 1•1 b 
Constant 
Observation 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
Q Natural Logarithm 
"Percentage 
"Binary Variable 
* p <0 .05 
**p<O.O/ 
••• p <0 .001 
Robust Standard errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
0.002 
(0.035) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.042 
(0.102) 
0.059** 
(0.018) 
-0.195** 
(0.025) 
O.o28 
(O.o28) 
0.787*** 
(0.069) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
1.772** 
(0.718) 
2954 
y'-118.12 
CEO~ CEO Non-
Incentive incentive Cash• 
Cash • 
0.059 0.060 
(0.044) (0.039) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.00]) (0 001) 
-0.145 -0."060 
(0.164) (0.134) 
0.019 0.096*** 
(0.023) (0.030) 
-0.016 -0.238*** 
(0.026) (0.036) 
-0.018 0.053 
(0.027) (0.037) 
0.874* .. 
(0.049) 
0.627*** 
(0.087) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0 .. 001) 
1.161 3.036*** 
(0.605) 10.813) 
2954 2954 
l"'-130.44 /-148.94 
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Exhibit 10.12 The Influence of Non-executive Dominated Nomination Committees on 
CEO Cash Reward, with ROE. 
Board Governance Measure: 
Nomination Committee' 1• 1 ' 
Nomination Committee 1. 1*ROE1. 1 
Controls: 
Firm Risk, 
Size,.1 • 
Incoming CEO, c 
Outgoing CEO , ' 
CEO Total Cash 1•1 . 
CEO Annual Incentive Cash 1•1 • 
CEO Total Non-incentive, Cash 1•1 • 
ROE,b 
ROE,. 1 b 
Constant 
Observation 
Hansen Test of Overidentification 
• Natural Logarithm 
b Percentage 
cBinary Variable 
• p <0 .05 
•• p <0 .OJ 
***p<O.OOI 
Robust Standard Errors in 
parenthesis 
CEO Total Cash' 
-0.008 
(0.045) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.123) 
0.072* 
(0.037) 
-0.230*** 
(0.028) 
0.048 
(0.032) 
0.798*** 
(0.094) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
1.373 
(0.780) 
2838 
.1=89.04 
CEO Annual CEO Total Non-
Incentive Incentive Cash• 
Cash• 
-0.071 0.134' 
(0.071) (0.058) 
0.000 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) 
-0.012 0.273 
(0.176) (0.148) 
0.061 0.158*** 
(0.039) (0.036) 
-0.043 -0.269*** 
(0.030) (0.034) 
-0.062* 0.063 
(0.032) (0.039) 
0.907*** 
(0.060) 
0.463 ... 
(0.099) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.021 3.766*"'* 
(0.658) (0.986) 
2838 2838 
.1=91.62 .1=103.96 
Auxiliary analysis examined the incremental expl~natory leverage provided by pooling all 
five governance measures in order to ascertain whether the influence of these factors might be 
combinative rather than individual; that is whether pooling explanatory variables would 
explain variation in CEO cash reward measures above and beyond their simple effects. 
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On the basis of existing research and theory, it is postulated in Chapter Four that boards might 
make tradeoffs among and between primary and secondary alignment mechanisms. For 
example, boards may make a· trade-off between executive ownership and levels of incentive 
CEO cash (see Chapter Eight). The same logic may apply among secondary alignment 
mechanisms. For instance, boards with a nomination committee may consider a remuneration 
committee superfluous. Conversely, boards might seek to minimise the possibility of 
executive entrenchment by implementing the principle of independence holistically, such that 
the combined effects of having a non-executive chair, a non-executive dominated board, non-
executive-dominated committees, and mandatory director shareholding may be exponentially 
greater than would otherwise be the case. 
A linear test can be useful for testing whether variables have greater explanatory power when 
combined (see Wooldridge, 2000). This point will. be revisited shortly, To test this 
supposition, all five governance measures were pooled. together to see if this increased the 
incremental explanatory power of the model, and to examine the relative explanatory power 
Of non-executive director ownership. The estimation approach used has critical implications 
for inferences. It is. important to control for possible additive and substitutive relationships 
among all variables when: estimating an econometric model, even if this requires a system of 
equations to account for these considerations; not accounting for these problems limits the 
extent oflegitimate causal inference. 
A pooled model was tested in order to control for complex relationships among the five key 
governance variables and to ascertain .whether their effects are additive. The value of this 
methodology is that it controls for the possibility. of there being tradeoffs between different 
secondary alignment mechanisms. However, the results from a joint sig~ificance test 
(F(i0•509)=0.36,p=0.964) suggests that pooling the main and interaction effects of all the key 
explanatory governance variables does not add incremental explanatory power to the model. 
A non-significant F statistic indicates that pooling the governance variables does not increase 
the explanatory power of the model (see Wooldridge, 2002). This also suggests that there is 
little reason to suspect that the additive impact of the governance variables is greater than 
modelling these variables in separate equations. 28 For this reason, the results reported in this 
chapter are for separate regressions for each of the key explanatory variables. 
28 In the current chapter, zero-order effects do not furnish preliminary support for tradeoffs among board 
governance measures, nor do Chow test results support the possibility that modelling the additive effects of 
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Controlling for the possibility. of ownership influencing the hypothesised main and interaction 
effects, subsidiary analyses included ownership concentration among the·top shareholder as a 
control variable, in addition to its interaction with performance. This was undertaken on the 
premise that there may be tradeoffs or an additive, or perhaps spurious relationship, between 
board governance and external ownership when it comes to board decision-making on CEO 
reward and performance. However, the inclusion of these measures again did not change the 
coefficients substantially to warrant their inclusion as controls in the modeL The joint 
significance test results indicate that pooling all the governance measures, along with 
ownership concentration measure, did not add incremental power to the modeL 
10.5 Discussion 
The is no doubt that 'best practice' governance prescriptions have assumed greater 
prominence in Australian listed company board governance practice since the late 1990s. The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council's 'Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations', and OECD Corporate Governance principles, in tandem, encouraged 
board structural independence at the committee and board leveL Recent corporate governance 
regulation encourages b~ards to, among other things, have a higher proportion of independent 
directors, appoint independent chairpersons, and establish arms-length remuneration 
committees and nomination committees. More rigorous disclosure requirements in recent 
times alsopressure boards to make CEO rewards more performance contingent. 
The descriptive evidence reported in this chapter indicates a growing trend towards greater 
use of board governance practices conducive to greater director independence in outlook and 
decision-making. However, this chapter. also set out to test whether corporate govern_ance 
codes of best practice encouraging independence at the board and committee.level, as well as 
task-specific committees such as remuneration and nomination committees, have actually 
enabled boards to more effectively manage CEO reward and performance. 
board governan-ce measures provides the model with greater explanatory power. ·It is for this reason that the 
ensuing discussion and analysis is based on results from separate . regressions for each board governance 
measure. 
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The findings presented in this chapter make a unique contribution to .knowledge by 
interrogating whether board governance practices, informed by the ideal of director 
'independence', are necessarily valid and reliable predictors of board task performance, 
specifically in the area of CEO reward and performance management. Have such reforms 
actUally improved the board's effectiveness in managing CEO reward and performance? 
What impacts have increased board structural independence and more rigorous executive 
reward disclosure requirements had on the level and composition of CEO cash rewards? Have 
these reforms had any material effects on the performance-contingency of CEO cash reward? 
The results in this chapter furnish little support for the aforementioned propositions. The most 
striking results to emerge from the data is that board governance practices purported to 
enhance the board abiliiy to make strategic choices and independent judgments are not 
significantly associated with CEO cash reward or with either market or accounting measures 
of reward-performance sensitiviiy. Results also reveal ·thar non-executive director 
shareholderS are no more effective at managing the relationship between CEO reward and 
performance than are their executive counterparts. On the basis of the results presented in this 
chapter, it does not appear that board structunil characteristics significantly enhance the 
board's decisional capabilities in regard to the management of CEO cash reward and 
performance. 
It was predicted that good board governance practices would significantly moderate or 
strengthen the association between· CEO cash rewards and performance. However, such 
practices have been ineffectual in improving the board's effectiveness to structure :more 
optimal and performance-sensitive CEO cash rewards. If we revisit the results reported in 
Chapter Six two key findings emerge. First, the ratio of incentive cash to total CEO incentive 
cash has not increased over time; rather, there has been an increasing trend in all CEO cash 
reward components, in addition to equiiy-based CEO rewards. The inferential results 
presented in· Chapter Six also show ·that reported CEO performance-sensitive cash rewards are 
insensitive to both market-return and accounting-return firm-level performance •measures, 
reportedly used by the board to determine performance'based reward and CEO incentive 
plans. At least with respect to cash reward, the increasing trend in the practice of board 
independence has not translated into a greater relative emphasis on performance contingent 
cash reward. Boards that embody the principles of 'independence' and 'best practice 
201 
corporate governance' are no more effective at managing the relationship between CEO total 
cash reward and performance than are boards that do not. 
These results also seem consistent with research implicitly questioning the efficacy of 
independence at the board and committee level as a mechanism to improve board . task 
performance. A survey-. and interview-based study by Lawler and Finegold (2007) of 768 
United States company directors indicates that non-executive directors experienced acute role 
conflict in having to simultaneously serve the interested of shareholders while maintaining 
camaraderie on the board. The same directors report that non-executive directors who are 
members of a remuneration committee feel compelled to appease the CEO. These findings, 
along with the findings presented in the current chapter and in. the empirical literature (see 
Westphal, 1998; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), raise questions regarding the overall efficacy of 
board independence as an indicator of board effectiveness. Moreover, the results presented are 
consistent with research showing that board and remuneration committee composition are not 
systematically related to CEO reward (Dalton, et a/., 1998). In general, the evidence 
presented in this chapter supports the notion that independence is not a criterion-valid 
predictor of board task performance in the domain. of CEO reward and performance 
management, nor does it positively moderate the relationship between CEO rewards and 
performance. 
One possible explanation for these findings is that the impetus to increase board structural 
independence has been driven by tokenism - by notional .compliance rather then genuine 
commitment. to principle. Bebchuk and Fried's (2004) provocative concept of reward 
'camouflage' may be salient here, especially in highlighting the possibility that boards may 
seek to placate shareholders and negate shareholder outrage by manipulating reward reporting 
to obscure executive rent extractio!l. For example, it is evident from the findings reported in 
Chapter Six that boards are reporting that CEO cash rewards are performance contingent even 
though in reality this does not appear to be so. In this sense, professions of board 
independence and the reported embrace of incentive reward may be little no more than 
instances of 'mimetic isomorphism' as Bender (2004) describes- taken-for-granted 'reforms' 
that have served to negate shareholder outrage through the guise of agency theory based 
board-principal alignment mechanisms. ·This logic may also explain the unexpected positive 
association between the level of non-incentive cash reward and the presence of a non-
executive dominated nomination committee. Although a counter-argument here might be that 
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higher levels of non-incentive cash reward could be considered by the remuneration 
committee to be important to providing longer. term performance and retention incentives. 
It is doubtful that the five measures of good governance tested here do enhance the board's 
ability to 'remunerate fairly and. responsibly' or 'encourage enhanced performance' as 
purported by the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003). Our findings indicate that non-
executive dominated/independent-dominated chairs, boards and committees have not, to date, 
been instrumental in precipitating a greater alignment between CEO rewards and corporate 
performance, at least in the Australian context. 
In sum, the results show that conflating independence with board effectiveness in managing 
the principal-agent relationship is both conceptually problematic and fraught with ·policy 
dangers. We will resume this discussion in the following chapter. 
10.6 Conclusion 
This study is the first Australian study of its kind to rigorously test one of the key principles 
informing corporate governance codes of best practice, namely that board structural 
independence is a necessary means to board effectiveness. According to the normative model 
of corporate governance embedded in Australian corporate governance regulation and codes, 
the greater the proportion of independent/non-executive directors at chair, board and 
committee levels, the lower the likelihood of board capture and complicity and the greater the 
prospect of directors being diligent and effective monitors and managers of executive 
behaviour, contribution and reward. 
This chapter's primary objective is to test the validity of these assumptions using four 
measures of board structural independence, as well as Agency Theory derived measure of 
director-owner material alignment in the form of the incidence of director equity ownership in 
the firm. However, the results show that practices that are purported to enhance the board's 
effectiveness to design CEO rewards and to optimise the linkage between rewards and 
performance, are not achieving their intended effects, nor are they negative predictors of total 
levels of CEO cash reward. Further, the results furnish no support for the proposition that 
greater director independence (indexed by the presence of non-executive directors) positively 
moderates the relationship between cash reward and lagged market and accounting 
performance. 
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Taken together, the results that are presented in the current and foregoing chapters show that 
board structural independence is not, in itself, a valid measure of board effectiveness with 
respect to the management of CEO reward and performance. Australian listed companies 
subscribing to the tenets of best practice board governance are no more effective in managing 
the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance than are those firms that do not 
demonstrate a high level of board structural independence. 
In essence, it appears from the results presented here that the principle and promise of board 
structural independence is, to use the vernacular, 'too good to be true'. At the very least, it is 
appropriate to suggest that in relation to the role of the board in the principal-agent 
relationship, the tenets of 'good' board governance will only be verified when the practices 
prescribed can be proven to have enhanced the board's effectiveness in managing executive 
reward levels, composition, and performance-sensitivity. 
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11.1 Introduction 
Chapter Eleven 
General Conclusion 
As the title of this thesis suggests, this study investigates the performance sensitivity of CEO 
cash reward in Australian public companies over the period 1999 to 2006. The results of this 
study suggest that CEOs in Australian public companies have enjoyed performance 
insensitive total cash reward. Even more surprising is the finding that CEO reported 
performance-based cash reward is insensitive to a range of accounting and market-based 
performance measures purportedly used by boards to determine CEO reward. 
This thesis also set out to examine the extent to which finn, ownership, and board structural 
characteristics explain variation in CEO cash reward, using a system GMM approach to 
estimation. Moreover, it set out to empirically test and critically evaluate various structural 
and economic determinants of CEO cash reward determination identified in extant theory and 
research. One of the most compelling findings to emerge from the study is that the various 
corporate governance structures and practices identified by both Agency Theory and 
Managerial Power Theory as solutions to CEO reward excess and pay without performance 
do not appear to jnfluenc~, nor moderate, these outcomes. These findings suggest that the 
theoretical and applied 'best practice' focus on board structural characteristics as the preferred 
means of improving the board's management of CEO reward and performance is largely 
misplaced. 
The clearest empirical findings to emerge from this study are that finn size and external 
ownership concentration do have a significant influence CEO cash reward determination. 
Another very important and compelling finding to emerge from this study is that the 
entrenched approach to model specification and. parameter estimation in extant empirical 
research limits the extent to which legitimate causal inferences can be drawn. This study 
shows that a system GMM approach to estimation is more efficient in tenns of reducing 
methodological bias and accounting for the complex error structure of a dynamic panel 
model. 
This final chapter revisits the central theoretical and methodological problems that the present 
study has been designed to address. After re- examining the study's conceptual core, this 
205 
chapter assesses. the study's major empirical findings in relation to the research propositions 
raised in Chapter· Four, and extant theory. The chapter then explores the significance and 
implications of the study's findings for corporate governance prescriptions and practice. 
Finally, discussion turns to empirical limitations and areas for further inquiry. 
11.2 Reprising Research Purpose and Approach 
We know from research that CEO total reward, both locally and. abroad, continues to increase 
despite bearing at best a seemingly weak relationship to measures of firm-level performance. 
The only conclusive finding to emerge from the extant research on CEO reward determination 
is that firm size matters in terms of being a robust positive predictor of CEO total reward 
level. 
We also know that theory and corporate. governance regulation considers CEO reward-for-
performance to be a definitive measure of the board's efficacy to manage CEO reward and 
performance. Best practice corporate governance prescriptions have placed greater pressure 
on boards to make CEO reward more performance-contingent. We also know that media 
outrage over allegedly excessive CEO reward packages continues unabated. Nevertheless, we 
know surprisingly little about why CEO total reward still bears such a seemingly weak 
relationship to measures of firm level performance. 
The review in Chapter Two of the extant theoretical treatment of the relationship between 
CEO reward and performance identifies three primary shortcomings in approaches to date. 
The first of these is that both Agency Theory and the Managerial Power perspective do not 
explicate the decision-making processes underpi!llling the CEO reward and performance 
relationship. Neither Agency Theory nor the Managerial Power approaches are, in 
themselves, adequate to the task of explaining the internal and external complexities of 
executive reward determination. The second shortcoming of extant theory is that the 
distinctions between Agency Theory and the Managerial Power perspective have been 
overstated. Under the right conditions, boards are assumed to manage the performance 
contingency of CEO reward efficaciously and at arm's length. Both perspectives proffer 
institutional explanations for the attenuation of the relationship between CEO reward and 
performance, by attributing CEO reward without performance to poor board governance and 
structural arrangements. Structural arrangements, such as having a non-executive dominated 
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board and committees and having a non-executive chair, are purported to improve the board's 
ability to manage CEO reward and performance in an economically rational way. 
Chapter Three highlights two primary shortcomings of the extant empirical research 
examining the relationship betWeen CEO reward and performance. The first of these 
shortcomings is that very little 'rigorous longitudinal research has been undertaken in the 
Australian context to explain the variation in the relationship between CEO cash reward and 
firm performance. Further, recent changes to corporate governance regulation require that 
attention be paid not only to the reward-performance ·relationship per se, but also to the 
possibility that regulatory change may have altered this relationship. The second shortcoming 
concerns the preference in both local and international studies for using a fixed effects 
approach to parameter· estimation, in addition to. the specification of a single and static 
equation model to investigate CEO reward for performance. Chapter Five provides a detailed 
examination ofthese issues and argues that prevailing approaches to model specification and 
parameter estimation limit the inferential validity of conclusions drawn. It argues that the 
widely-cited Jensen and Murphy ( 1990) statistic does not consider the dynamism inherent in 
the CEO reward and performance management process, and thus makes no allowance for the 
complex error structure of a dynamic panel data model (see Sayrs, 1989 for a general 
discussion). Based on these considerations, Chapter Five suggests that the sensitivities 
between executive reward and firm-level performance reported in existing empirical studies 
may be methodologically driven, and reflect a flawed approach to parameter estimation and 
model specification. While an instrumental variables (IV) approach goes some way towards 
ameliorating the problems associated with the commonly used fixed effects approach- most 
notably endogeneity - it tOO suffers from other SOUrCeS of fOntamination, such as 
autoregressive processes arising from having a lagged explanatory variable. In addition to 
these shortcomings, while research has examined the determinants of CEO reward and 
performance, the implications of these findings have not been analysed from a board 
decisional or board capability perspective. 
The present study was designed to address these aforementioned methodological and 
theoretical shortcomings as a way to develop our· current understanding of the management of 
CEO reward and performance. The approach taken in this study makes an important 
theoretical, empirical, and methodological contribution to the extant body of literature by 
examining CEO reward and performance in four main respects. 
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Firstly, it represents the first study to comprehensively examine a range of structural and 
economic factors posited to influence the CEO reward and performance relationship using a 
system GMM approach to dynamic panel analysis. These factors include firm size, firm risk, 
CEO share ownership, CEO participation in a stock option and/or share rights plan, and 
external share ownership concentration. It also considers a range of board structural 
arrangements purported to enhance the performance-contingency of CEO reward. 
Secondly, this is the first study of its kind in Australia to test whether board structural 
arrangements necessarily enhance the board's management of the relationship between CEO 
cash reward and performance. 
Finally, the study is the first to highlight the inadequacies of existing approaches to parameter 
estimation and econometric model specification in this area of enquiry, as well as demonstrate 
the benefits of using an identified multiple equation approach, such as a system GMM 
approach, to the dynamic panel analysis of CEO cash· reward and performance. 
11.3 Key Findings 
Chapter Six opens the empirical discussion by reporting a preliminary examination of the 
relationship between CEO cash rewards and various measures of firm-level performance, 
whilst co-varying out the effects of the contextual variables specified in the preferred model, 
such as firm size, firm risk, external ownership concentration, and CEO share ownership. The 
results reveal a disassociation between CEO .total cash reward and firm-level performance. 
This disassociation was apparent even though a range of firm-level performance measures 
were modelled separately, as well as pooled tpgether to cap~re any additive or substitutive 
effects. The most revealing finding to emerge here is that reported performance-based cash 
reward is insensitive to various measures of firm-level performance. A number of 
explanations were offered as tentative or speculative explanations for this counter-intuitive 
finding. 
Chapter Six also makes an important methodological contribution to research examining the 
relationship between CEO reward and performance. Specification tests demonstrate the 
inadequacy of using a fixed approach to parameter estimation: More specifically, there 
appear to be systematic differences in estimates across fixed effects, IV; and system GMM 
approaches. These inconsistencies may be explained in terms of endogenity biasing estimates 
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in fixed effects and IV approaches. For this reason, a system GMM approach was applied to 
estimate specific causal relationships in the proposed theoretical model in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter Seven examines whether firm risk and firm size influence CEO cash reward 
determination. The results suggest that size and risk do not positively moderate board 
decisions regarding alignment of cash rewards with firm-level performance. 
Chapter Eight explores the influence of two forms of CEO equity participation - the 
proportion of stockheld by the CEO and CEO participation in stock option and/or share rights 
plans- on the relationship between CEO cash reward measures and.firm-level performance. 
The results show that CEO stock ownership and CEO l'articipation in stock options/rights 
' rights plan does not positively moderate the relationship between CEO total cash reward and 
firm performance. Against expectations, neither measure significantly explained variation in 
the level of CEO total cash reward, nor the level of CEO annual incentive cash. 
Chapter Nine examines the main effects of external ownership concentration .on CEO cash 
reward levels, as well as its moderating effects on the relationship between CEO cash reward 
levels and measures of firm performance. The results suggest that external ownership 
concentration is an important basis for board decisions regarding the level of CEO cash 
reward. Results reveal an inverse relationship between ownership concentration among top 
20 shareholders and the level of CEO total cash reward. Consistent with predictions, the 
percentage of stock owned by the top shareholder positively moderated - that is, significantly 
strengthened - the relationship between CEO total cash reward and firm performance. 
Chapter Ten examined whether board governance practices and structures influence CEO 
cash reward determination in ways purported by recent corporate governance codes of best 
practice. One of the most intriguing findings presented in this thesis, especially in the context 
of prevailing best practice assumptions regarding the desirability of board structural 
independence, is that key prescriptions for good board governance practice -·prescriptions 
purported to enhance the board's ability to, inter alia, manage the relationship between CEO 
reward and performance - have no significant moderating effect of CEO cash reward and 
performance. Such results highlight the deficiencies of conceptualising board structural 
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characteristics and, in particular, board structural independence, as valid and 'reliable 
predictors on the board's effectiveness in managing CEO cash reward and performance. 
We will now relate these findings more closely to the study's·initial research propositions. 
11.4 Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Significance 
Chapter Four presents research and theory-based propositions regarding the effects of firm, 
ownership, and board characteristics, on CEO cash reward determination. These propositions 
are also used to formulate and test specific hypotheses in subsequent chapters. We will now 
re-examine these propositions in light of the study's empirical findings and in s'o doing 
discuss the empirical, theoretical, and practical implications of this thesis. 
11.4.1 Firm Characteristics and CEO Cash Determination 
Firm Performance 
Consistent with Agency Theory, this study recognises that CEO cash reward is not used 
exclusively as performan~e incentive mechanism; rather it may be used variously to attract, 
retain, and/or motivate talented CEOs. Thus: 
Proposition I: While CEO reported CEO cash rewards may be sensitive to firm performance 
it is unlikely to be exclusively contingent on firm performance. 
Consistent with this 'line of logic, and the discussion in Chapter Seven, it· is reasonable to 
expect CEO cash reward to be exclusively performance-based, especially considering that 
CEO cash·reward also serves as a mechanism to manage CEO risk bearing. Nevertheless, we 
would expect, at the very least, the level of CEO performance-based cash rewards to· be 
sensitivity to some measure of firm-level performance. In terms of the cash reward measures 
operationalised in this study, it is reasonable to expect that CEO total cash reward to be 
sensitive to, ceteris paribus, performance. We would also have a stronger expectation that the 
purely performance-based component of cash reward to be performance-based and variable 
from year to year. Therefore: 
Proposition 2a: CEO total cash reward' is positively associated with lagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance· 
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Proposition lb: CEO annual cash reward is positively associated with Jagged and/or 
contemporaneous accounting and/or market return performance 
Chapter Six set out to test these propositions. According to the results presented, this study 
does not lend support for Propositions I, 2a, and 2b. 
This may also explain why, after controlling for firm size, CEO cash reward is still 
significantly associated with CEO cash reward in the year prior, even though we would 
expect the reported-performance contingent component of cash reward to be more variable. 
The empirical findings presented in Chapter Six thus lend no support to proposition I; nor do 
they support a systematic relationship between reported performance-contingent cash reward 
and measures of firm level performance posited in proposition 2a and 2b. Indeed, auxiliary 
analyses suggest that CEOs in firms with negative returns in. the· prior year· do not receive 
significantly lower levels of total cash or performance-based cash rewards. This also suggests 
that ex post settling up by the board remains an. Agency Theory ideal rather than established 
practice. 
To investigate whether these results were methodological artefacts, the researcher 
operationalised firm performance in various ways. Based on Lambert and Larcker's (1987) 
insights, it is reasonable to expect CEO cash reward to be sensitive to either accounting-return 
or market-return performance. However, the results indicate that Australian boards do not 
configure CEO cash reward levels in line with lagged firm-level performance. This is despite 
a recent study by Merhebi et a/. (2006), which used 'fixed effects estimates, suggests 
otherwise. The component of CEO total cash reward that. is reported as bejng performance-
contingent is found to be insensitive to a gamut of firm-level performance measures. As 
alluded to earlier, it is .reasonable to expect the reported performance-based component of 
CEO cash reward to be variable from year to year, even though we would expect total cash 
reward, given CEO risk aversion, to be .. sensitive to total reward in the year prior. However, 
as reported in Chapter Six, performance-contingent cash reward is strongly associated with 
performance-based cash reward in the year prior. This finding is inconsistent with extant 
theory. There may be two explanations for this unexpected and counter-intuitive finding. 
First, Australian boards may not use the reported-performance cash reward exclusively as a 
performance incentive mechanism. Rather, it may also be used it to manage and compensate 
CEO risk exposure. A second explanation is that the researcher may have miss-specified the 
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performance vector. It may be the case that corporate performance is not used as a basis on 
which to determine CEO cash reward. Auxiliary analyses also reveals that alternative finn• 
level performance measures are insensitive to CEO cash reward. Therefore it remains unclear 
what measures Australian boards use to determine CEO cash reward. What is clear, however, 
is that boards do not base CEO cash reward decisions purely, or even primarily, on an 
evaluation·of prior accounting and market-return finn-level performance. These findings call 
into question whether the reward decisions made by Australian boards are wholly rational and 
positivistic in nature. 
There are other possible explanations for the lack of sensitivity between CEO cash reward and 
performance that were investigated as part of preliminary and auxiliary analysis. The first of 
these is that Australian stock market condition ·in the time period covered varied such the 
stock market was both bullish and bearish. Therefore, consistent with Agency Theory 
postulates regarding CEO risk management, it is reasonable to expect that these variegated 
market conditions may have moderated CEO reward-performance sensitivity in such a way 
that the relationship is weaker when conditions are bearish and ·stronger when they are bullish 
(See Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Mishra et a/., 2000). Put another way, it may be that 
CEO.cash incentives are 'sticky downwards'. Given that over the studied period the market· 
was both bullish and bearish, it is reasonable to expect pooling to dilute sensitivity. However, 
to account for this in all model specifications, year dummies were operationalised to co-vary 
out time effects. 
These possible explanations were also investigated through two other means. The first, the 
main and moderating effect of total finn risk measure· were exa~ined. The results suggest 
that total risk, including finn systematic risk, is a negative determinant of CEO cash reward, 
but not a significant moderator of CEO cash reward-performance sensitivity. These results do 
not lend full support to Agency Theory postulates that risk negatively moderates CEO 
reward-performance sensitivity, and are inconsistent with previous empirical research 
(Aggarwal and .Samwick, 1999a; Merhebi et a/., 2006; Mishra et a/., 2000). Finally, a 
dummy variable for finns with negative returns over the period was modelled to investigate 
whether CEO cash reward is asymmetrically sensitive to performance. The results were non-
significant, suggesting that CEO cash reward over the period is not asymmetrically sensitive 
to performance. 
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Another explanation for the findings presented in Chapter Six is that CEO-specific 
characteristics - for example age, experience, and functional background - may explain the 
lack of CEO reward-performance sensitivity. To investigate the impacts of these human 
capital explanations outlined in Chapters Two and Three, various unreported preliminary 
analyses were conducted. None of these analyses provide compelling support for human 
capital explanations for reward without performance. First, CEO unobserved fixed-effects 
were accounted for using CEO dummy variables. With or without these variables, estimates 
remained qualitatively unchanged. Finally, it investigates the influences a number of other 
CEO characteristics on CEO cash reward; these include whether the CEO was the founder of 
the company, and also whether they were internally or externally appointed. The results are 
statistically non-significant and inconsistent with previous research (for examples see 
Decktop, 1988; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Lilling, 
2006; Lippert and Porter, 1997). 
Firm Size & Risk· 
While the empirical findings are discordant with Propositions I, 2a, and 2b, they suggest that 
boards do base their decisions in part on firm size and firm risk. Chapter Seven examines the 
influence of economic and firm characteristics on CEO cash reward, and the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: Firm size is positively associated with CEO total cash, and annual incentive 
cash reward. 
Proposition 4a: Firm risk is positively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 4b: Firm risk is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
Using an identified system GMM estimator, it is found that both firm size and firm risk are 
positive predictors of both CEO total cash reward and the level of CEO annual incentive cash. 
These findings lend support to propositions 3 and 4a. Contrary to proposition 4b, firm risk 
does not significantly influence CEO annual incentive cash reward, even though extant theory 
would predict otherwise. As suggested above, it may be that these findings are attributable to 
the possibility that annual incentive reward is not exclusively a performance incentive and 
thus risk transfer mechanism. 
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It can be inferred from these findings that firm ~ize and firm risk are important foci in board 
deliberations pertaining_to CEO total cash reward. In line with expectations, the r~sults imply 
that the larger the firm, and the greater the variance in firm stock returns, the more cash 
reward CEOs receive. Surprisingly however, firm size and firm risk do not appear to 
significantly moderate the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. The 
extant literature offers an explanation that board's may consider firm risk and firm stze 
proxies of CEO risk exposure and, in an effort to manage CEO risk exposure, provide greater 
levels of fixed cash reward. Assuming that board regard both firm size and firm risk to be 
indices of CEO risk bearing, on the basis of these results, it is appropriate to suggest that, as 
far as cash rewards are concerned,· Australian boards may be better at managing rewards for 
retention purposes than for rewarding prior performance. 
11.4.2 Ownership Characteristics and CEO Cash Determination 
CEO Ownership 
Chapter Eight investigates the influence of CEO stock ownership on CEO cash reward 
determination, and tests the empirical validity of the following propositions: 
Proposition 5a: The percentage of issued capital held by the CEO is associated wLfh CEO 
total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
Proposition 5b: CEO participation in a stock optiorz. andlor,share rights plan is associated 
with CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
While Lambert .and Larker (1987) posit that CEO share ownership influences the board's 
appraisal of CEO performance - and hence the determination .of CEO reward - the findings of 
this study lend no support to this line of logic. Indeed, the results indicate that CEO share 
ownership, and/or stock option and share rights plan participation, do not significantly 
determine, nor moderate, the relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. On 
this basis, the current study does not furnish support for propositions 5a or 5b. 
These findings contradict the suggestion frequently made in the literature that boards make 
tradeoffs between cash and equity-based incentives (Lambert and Larcker, 1987), especially 
when CEO reported performance-based cash rewards are found to be insensitive to both 
market and accounting performance measures. The performance insensitivity of performance-
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based rewards perhaps explains why these measures did not exert a significant influence on 
CEO cash reward in ways predicted. It may also be the case that CEO share·ownership, and 
share option/share rights participation, are not important foci of board decisions because cash 
reward may not be seen by the board as a legitimate source of risk transfer. 
External Ownership 
Chapter Nine examines the extent to which ownership concentration explains variation in 
CEO cash reward, and tests the following: 
Proposition 6a: The percentage of issued capital held by top shareholders is negatively 
associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 6b: The percentage of issued capital held by top shareholders is positively 
associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
The results in Chapter Nine indicate that, besides being sensitive to firm risk and firm size, 
the percentage of coinpany stock owned by the top shareholder, and also the proportion of 
equity owned by the top 20 shareholders, influences CEO cash reward. The results lend 
support to proposition 6a, but not to proposition 6b. Ownership concentration negatively 
predicts both CEO total cash and annual incentive cash reward. According to the estimated 
coefficients, CEOs in companies with a higher concentration of ownership among top 
shareholders, receive significantly lower levels of total cash and annual incentive cash reward. 
The results indicate that the percentage of stock held by the top shareholder, whether they be 
a large private block holder or an institutional investor, positively moderates the alignment of 
CEO cash reward and market-return performance; that is, the performance-contingency of 
cash reward received by the CEO is significantly greater in companies with large external 
block holders. This highlights the potential benefits of having large block holder 
representatives on the board. These findings, along with the findings regarding firm risk and 
firm size, are consistent with the hypothesised model presented in Chapter Four which 
suggest that external ownership, firm risk, and firm size are all important determinants of 
CEO cash reward. 
11.4.3 Board Characteristics and CEO Cash Determination 
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The dominant approach in both governance theory and practice is to cast board structural 
characteristics as critical intervening variables in the board's effectiveness to procure 
executive performance incentives and concomitant awards. 
Both Agency Theory and Managerial .Power Theory assume that under the right conditions, 
boards have the capabilities to achieve optimal contracting by means of rational decision-
making. The Managerial Power approach contends that structural and situational 
characteristics influence the relative power of the board and the CEO in ways that limit the 
board's ability to make rational and strategic choices in the design and determination of CEO 
cash rewards. In keeping with .these assumptions, Chapter Ten .tests the following 
propositions: 
Proposition 7a: Board 'independence' at the board chair, board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO total cash reward 
Proposition lb: Board 'independence' at the board chair, board, and committee level is 
negatively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a ·non:..executive dominated remuneration or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO total cash reward. 
Proposition 8a: The presence of a non-executiVe dominated remuneration· or a nomination 
committee is negatively associated with CEO annual incentive cash reward. 
However, the results do not necessarily, nor exclusively, validate the Managerial Power 
notion that CEO cash reward without performance reflects the board's socio-political 
orientation to the decision-making process. These findings thus do not support propositions 
7a, 7b, 8a, 8b. 
Chapter Ten reports results that suggest that non-executive dominated boards, committees and 
chairs are no more efficient in managing the relationship between CEO cash reward and firm 
' 
level performance than are boards that do not subscribe to the principles of .independence. 
Such findings suggest that there is merit in interrogating the postulates and prescriptions of 
216 
both Agency Theory and Managerial Power Theory. The results caution us. against viewing 
'independence' as a valid signifier of board competence and board effectiveness. The findings 
demonstrate that board governance best practice is not necessarily· a remedy to CEO 
entrenchment or board capture. Nor do these practices, individually, or in combination, 
necessarily improve the board capabilities to optimise CEO reward and performance. On the 
basis of these findings it seems fair to suggest that corporate governance 'best practice' 
prescriptions can only be deemed 'best practice' when they are shown to materially improve 
board task performance. 
These findings carry important implications for governance theory and regulatory practice. 
As noted. throughout this study, both Agency Theory and the Managerial Power perspective 
assume that CEO reward without performance can be explained in terms of deficient 
structural arrangements on the board. However there is no intuitive reason to expect that 
board independence -. nor board structural characteristics more broadly - will enable the 
board to manage and control CEO cash reward and performance, on the basis of objective 
judgments and strategic choices, especially in view of the forgoing propositions. In other 
words; boards that practice 'independence' at the committee, board, and chair level are not 
less prone to making unreliable and invalid performance appraisals and reward decisions. The 
results reported. in this thesis lend credence to the suggestion that Board 'independence' at the 
chair, full board and committee level may not be ·a valid indicator of board effectiveness in 
managing CEO reward and performance, arid should not be conflated with board competence 
to manage and control CEO cash reward and performance on the basis on strategic choice and 
due diligence. 
The results in Chapter Ten suggest that, contrary to prevailing theoreticaL and policy 
prescriptions, practicing board 'independence' is ineffectual in enabling boards to increase the 
degree of alignment between CEO reward and firm performance. These findings prompt a 
shift in focus in corporate governance prescriptions away from board structural 
characteristics. We will revisit this point shortly. 
11.5 Limitations 
A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the current study. As suggested in Chapter 
Five, reliable time-series data on the estimated annual value of CEO equity-based reward in 
Australian companies is not available for the period studied. However, this is not considered 
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to represent error in variables nor a source of contamination. CEO cash .reward has been 
taken as a signifier of CEO total wealth rather than a direct and comprehensive measure of 
that wealth. Excluding the value of equity-based results does not bias the estimated 
parameters; it merely limits the extent to which inferences and generalisations can be made 
regarding CEO total reward and performance .. Nonetheless, unlike most other Australian 
studies, which have simply ignored the growing role of equity-based reward, this study 
endeavours to operationalise equity-based incentives by considering reported net balance date 
holdings of shares, options and rights. 
Another source of uncertainty in the current study is the method used for measuring external 
ownership concentration. It may be argued that the operationalisation of this factor was 
oversimplified and did not capture different types of external ownership. Hartzell and Starks, 
(2003) examined the specific effect of institutional ownership on CEO reward and reported a 
significant negative main effe<l'l (for a similar study see David et a!., 1998). Thus it is 
conceivable that different types of ownership will have differential effects on CEO reward 
levels and composition. This study attempts to account for dispersion and concentration of 
share ownership by means of two measures; that is; the proportion. of equity owned by the 
single largest shareholder, and the proportion of equity owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
Such a measure however runs the risk of ignoring different types of ownership. Although, 
preliminary analyses in this study did control for the possibility that that CEO-founders may 
be among a company's cadre of top shareholders. 
While the measure of equity concentration focuses on the presence of large external block 
holders, it is quite possible that CEOs themselves may also be major equity holders. A 
possible avenue for future research ·would thus be to follow the approach used by Tevlin 
(1996) and include a dummy variable for whether the CEO is himlherselfa major block 
holder. 
Another weakness is that CEO entrenchment on the board was not measured directly. The 
study would have been more robust had it operationalised measures of CEO entrenchment per 
se, rather than the obverse; that is, purported measures of board control. However in part this 
is attributable to the methodology, and in part to the corporate governance regulation. It was 
difficult to measure CEO entrenchment when no consistent measurement and concepts exists. 
In the current corporate governance climate, it is more intuitive to operationalise measures of 
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purported board control, such as those operationalised in Chapter Ten, which are generated 
from best practice governance prescriptions. 
Aggregate statistical analysis does not enable the researcher to examine director perceptions 
·and attitudes toward CEO reward and performance management. This method is not 
conducive to ascertaining the extent of CEO entrenchment on the board or normative 
pressures on the board to be conciliatory to the CEO. It is difficult to gauge the extent of 
interpersonal influence the CEO had over the board from aggregate statistical analysis. The 
factors in the model in Chapter Four; which include mechanisms for board a·nd CEO 
alignment, are difficult to measure directly. Nevertheless, aggregate statistical analysis serves 
its purpose in testing the research propositions underpinning the structural and economic 
model of CEO cash reward determination· presented in Chapter Four. Further, case-specific 
research could then be used to build the model, and to generate context specific best practice. 
11.6 Areas for Further Research 
This thesis uses aggregate statistical analyses to examine the effects of firm, ownership, and 
board structural characteristics; on outcomes of CEO cash reward determination. In this 
regard, the role of board decisional processes underpinning CEO cash determination can only 
be loosely inferred. This thesis presents findings that challenge the Agency Theory and 
Managerial Power preoccupation with board structural characteristics as boundary conditions 
fair, reasonable, and performance-contingent CEO cash reward. 
As Chapter Three observes, and on which Chapter Five elaborates, the approaches to both 
model specification and parameter· estimation entren.ched in.the existing research are highly 
·problematic, and conceivably limit knowledge development ·in the area of CEO reward and 
performance. Specification tests conducted for the study. indicate that endogeneity may be a 
major source of bias in fixed effects estimates of CEO reward· and performance. On this 
basis, it is argued that the Jensen and Murphy (1990) specification - for so long an entrenched 
feature of empirical modelling in the field - has weaknesses that necessarily compromise 
studies that replicate the approach used, not the least of these being a failure to take account 
of endogeneity, serial correlation, and higher-order autoregression (see Blundell and Bond, 
1998, for a discussion of these potential sources of contamination when estimating dynamic 
panel models). This highlights the importance of using estimation approaches that are suited 
to dynamic panel models. 
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The extant theory and research tends to·oscillate between the assumptions that boards either 
have an economic·rationaJ orientation or a socio-political orientation to .the decision-making 
process. Both sets of assumptions, while plausible, ignore the third possibility that directors 
may have the intention to make economic-rational decisions and strategic choices but lack 
sufficient information and capabilities to do so. Such deficiencies would necessarily 
compromise boards' ability to adhere to Agency Theoretic principles of optimal contracting. 
These observations point to a further promising avenue for both research and theory-building 
on CEO reward and performance management processes, namely closer examination of the 
decision-making processes involved in board deliberations on senior executive reward 
determination. To this end, I wish to propose a preliminary behavioural model of CEO cash 
determination; a model that emphasises the additional explanatory potential of cognitive-
behavioural factors as opposed merely to the economic and institutional factors that have thus 
far dominated local and international research in this field. 
The proposed alternative model is detailed in Exhibit 11.1. The principal benefit of 
introducing this model is that it may be used to explore the processes through which the firm, 
ownership, and- board characteristics studied in this thesis, can influence CEO cash 
determination and performance sensitivity. A more complete understanding of CEO cash 
reward determination requires attention to be paid to board decisional processes and 
capabilities. The model is purely descriptive in its specification of the board's management 
of CEO reward and performance. Consistent with the practical realities of CEO cash reward 
determination (see Ellig, 2003), boards make a number of critical decisions and choices 
relating to the terms and conditions of performance or incentive-based cash incentive plans. 
The model outlines the task specific requirements of the board in phase one. It implicitly 
assumes that the board deliberations at this phase also encompass the formulation of a 
strategy for the ongoing maintenance and implementation of these plans. After all, phase four 
requires the board to disclose CEO cash rewards, and the basis on which they were 
determined. 
Exhibit 11.1 overviews a proposed process-oriented model of the board's management of 
CEO cash rewards and performance by encapsulating the decision-making process underlying 
the determination of CEO cash rewards. The model decomposes this decision-making process 
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into four critical task-specific phases of the board decisional process. Here it is important to 
note that while the model distinguishes between different phases of decision-making, it is 
equally plausible that decision-making between these phases may be temporally contiguous. 
In the first phase, the board ratifies proposals pertaining to the composition of CEO cash 
rewards, and the elements of cash incentive plans. According to Ellig (2003: 5()8-9), the 
board is required to make a number of choices regarding the specification of CEO 
performance. It must determine the measures that will be used to evaluate CEO performance, 
as well as what targets will be set in relation to those chosen performance measures. Ellig 
(2003) suggests that boards are also required to delineate target cash awards in relation to the 
achievement ofthe performance targets specified. 
In the second phase of decision-making, the board evaluates CEO performance against the 
plan's specified performance measures and their attendant targets in the specified 
performance period. It is salient to note that the board may rely on the specified incentive 
plan and all its elements to varying extents -a point we will revisit shortly. 
In the third phase, the board may revise fixed cash rewards, and determine the performance-
based cash rewards to be awarded to the incumbent CEO. 
In the fourth and final phase the board disclose their cash reward decisions and the fashion in 
which their deliberations amounted to these outcomes. 
The model suggests that noi only is CEO cash rewards an outcome of board decision-making 
process, but also that board decisions may be moderated by a multitude of factors. Firm-
specific factors such as the variance of firm performance and size, external ownership, 
corporate governance regulation, and CEO ownership and risk preferences, are potentially 
foci of board deliberations at each task-specific phase. As suggested, the Board may 
selectively attend to, and place differential importance on, these factors in their deliberations 
at each phase. 
Both are also posed as a means of reframing current theorising and research on the nature and 
implications of corporate governance practices and processes- particularly in relation to the 
determination of executive reward. The board decisional model poses naive assumptions 
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about effectiveness of boards to manage CEO reward and performance given the socio-
political context of this process. Rather than being taken as a direct indicator of board 
effectiveness, board structural independence is cast as an important moderating construct in 
the integrative model introduced. 
According to the model, rather than being ·important foci of board deliberations pertaining to 
CEO cash reward and performance, board governance practices can potentially affect or 
impact on the board's ability to make choices ·at each phase of this decision-making process. 
This is indicated by the posited directionality of the relevant arrow in Exhibit 11.1 and,.in this 
respect, is consistent with the institutional logic and structural determinism implicit in Agency 
Theory and Managerial Power prescriptions. Critically, however, the proposed model 
suggests that institutional-structural influences are mediated rather ·than direct. For instance, 
whether or not director independence at the chair, board and committee levels will enhance 
the board's effectiveness to ii) formulate optimal incentive plans; ii) measure CEO 
performance validly and reliably; and iii) reward on the basis of valid and reliable 
performance evaluation will depend, in tum, on how directors think arid behave in relation to 
such matters. 
The underlying causal logic and system of causal relationships can be extrapolated to develop 
other specific process-oriented models of board task performance which encompass the 
determination of fixed cash rewards, equity-based rewards, and non-cash rewards. The model 
proposed is intended to enable both scholars and practitioners to gain a better understanding 
of CEO reward and performance. It permits the formulation of prescriptions that will actually 
enable boards to make more rigorous and stnitegic decisions in the management of CEO 
reward and performance. 
It is reasonable to speculate on the basis of results presented in this thesis that there is merit in 
refocusing attention in research, on board-level decision-making processes so as to clarity the 
critical capabilities a board may need to possess in order to manage and control CEO reward 
and performance through strategic choice and objective judgment. While the results of the 
large-sample analysis applied in this study support such a reorientation in research focus, 
small-sample case study investigation may help to elaborate the nature of decisional 
capabilities and processes further still. Specifically, case study research may be fruitful for 
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elucidating context-specific best practices that render the board more effective in controlling 
and managing CEO reward and perform~nce. 
As the findings of this study suggest, it is not enough to tum to purely economic or ·socio-
political explanations for CEO cash reward and performance that bypass the underlying 
decisional processes. The insensitivities .between CEO cash reward and performance may 
reflect inefficiencies in the decision-making process that. are not explained by existing 
accounts. It is equally plausible that boards may simply lack sufficient information to ensure 
that CEO cash reward and performance are aligned. 
What is missing here, however, is a theoretical specification of CEO cash reward and 
performance management which localises analysis and research to board decisional processes. 
More simply, reward without performance may be explained in terms of a lack of board 
capability to procure effective executive performance incentives, to identify criterion-relevant 
measures of CEO performance in order to make more accurate performance attributions, and, 
in tum, to make more appropriate and relevant CEO cash reward decisions. It is equally 
plausible that the observed lack of cash reward-performance sersitivity is attributable to 
inefficient board decisional processes rather than to the absence of board structural 
independence. 
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Exhibit 11.1 An Integrative Process-oriented Model of CEO Cash Reward and Perfromance Management 
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Reward decisions are not necessarily the outcome of a series of strategic choices and strategic 
planning and decision-making. Thus this thesis suggests that prescriptions need to be 
localised to the board's capabilities to control and manage CEO cash reward and 
performance. For example, it may be suggested that enhancing board capabilities in this 
specific area of board task performance requires developing capabilities in the following areas 
that coincide with the model: 
i) Enabling boards to select valid. measures and indicators of CEO performance, and to 
understand that the choice of measures will influence the extent to which they can 
attribute firm-level performance to the CEO's decision and strategic management of 
the company.29 
ii) Enabling strategic thinking and planning pertaining to CEO reward and performance, 
which involves interrogating reward proposals, ascertaining whether there is any 
scope for incentive distortion, and if so identifying what checks can be build into the 
system to discourage this. 
iii) Enabling the board to interrogate the validity and reliability of performance measures 
and other information sources provided by external consultants (such as market 
surveys). 
iv) Enabling the board to recognise that the terms, conditions and nature of performance 
hurdles should be directed to optimising performance incentives whilst constraining 
incentive distortion and manipulation. 30 
v) Enabling the board to recognise any deficits in terms of these capability requirements 
and select appropriate external advice and measure of redress. 
29 
rhere has been a flood of literature on minimising measurement error in performance appraisals in both 
human resource management and applied psychology fields (for examples, see Cascio and Aguinis, 2005; 
Shields, 2007). 
30 Boards could also be guided to build constraints and conditions into CEO cash incentive plans that circumvent 
CEO influence and incentive distortion and design plans in ways to create real performance incen'tives. 
Clawback clauses, negative discretion formulae, more challenging performance hurdles can act to restore 
performance incentives by transferring real risk to CEO agents. One explanation advanced for the unexpected 
non-significant moderator effect of firm-specific risk is that performance-based cash rewards may not be viewed 
by the board as a legitimate source of risk trahsfer. This may also explain why CEOs with larger share holdings 
{and thus a great exposure to downside risk), receive greater levels of reported-performance-based CEO cash 
rewards. · 
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To enable boards to make more effective decisions to control and, manage CEO cash reward 
and performance, it is important to enable them to recognise .the implications of their 
decisions ·for CEO task performance and for the strategic management of the company. For 
example, is rewarding CEOs on the basis of mergers and acquisitions necessarily in the long-
term interests of the company? 
Any intervention to improve these capabilities needs to be premised on a cogent 
understanding of the dynamic decision-making processes of which CEO cash. rewards are an 
outcome. For example, interventions could target each phase of the decision-making process 
encapsulated in the proposed decisional model, with a view to generating guiding principles 
to help boards control and manage CEO reward and performance more effectively. A similar 
logic can be extrapolated to the determination ofequity-based reward plans, where it is also 
plausible to assume that that CEO cash reward levels may be an important foci or moderator 
of board decisions. 
Further work is also warranted to establish whether managerial power attenuates the 
association between CEO reward and performance. It is recommended that further qualitative, 
work be undertaken to investigate the socio-political dimension of reward determination and 
to elucidate board perceptions of this decision-making process and the basis on which 
directors judge the.efficacy of related proposals put forward for board approval. Here too, a 
case study approach may shed light on whether and how boards constrain 'rent extraction' to 
determine, for example, whether they use negative discretion formulate for performance-
based awards, or the prevalence of clawback clauses for CEO equity~based rewards. Further, 
case study research would enable the development of a board capability framework 
specifically relating to the management and control of CEO cash reward and performance. 
Qualitative research here would usefully supplement and extend the analysis. Indeed, 
knowledge on CEO reward and performance would strongly benefit from a mixed methods 
and multidisciplinary approach. Aggregate statistical analysis may not be easily amenable to 
the distillation of behavioural and socio-political factors that are hypothesised to influence the 
reward determination process. Qualitative research methods can- serve as an important 
complement to quantitative research methods by elucidating through in-depth interviews for 
example, the role of organisational power and politics in affecting the CEO reward 
determination process, as well as the specific criteria used to evaluate performance. 
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Finally, future research in this area and indeed other areas of management research would 
greatly benefit from giving due consideration the assumptions underlying the specification of 
econometric models, in addition to parameter estimation. Besides having important 
implication for future research, this study has some important practical implications. 
11.7 Conclusion 
.This chapter. has reviewed the study's key empirical findings and conceptual contributions. It 
has delineated the study's chief contributions to research-based knowledge on CEO reward 
determination. 
The results of this study suggest .that CEOs in Australian public companies have enjoyed 
performance insensitive total cash reward. Even more surprising is the finding that CEO 
reported performance-based cash reward is insensitive to a range of accounting and market-
based performance measures purportedly used by boards to determine.CEO reward. 
This thesis also set out to examine the extent to which firm; ownership, and board structural 
characteristics ·explain variation in CEO cash reward, using a system GMM approach to 
estimation. Moreover, it set out to empirically test and critically evaluate various structural 
and economic determinants of CEO cash reward determination identified in extant theory and 
research. One of the most compelling findings to emerge from the study is that the various 
corporate governance structures and practices identified by both Agency Theory and 
Managerial Power Theory as solutions to CEO reward excess and pay without performance 
do not appear to influence, nor moderate, these outcomes. These findings suggest that the 
theoretical and applied 'best practicE(' focus on board structural characteristics as the preferreg 
means of improving the board's management. of CEO reward and performance: is largely 
misplaced. 
The clearest empirical findings to emerge from this study are that firm size and external 
ownership concentration do have a significant influence CEO cash reward determination. 
Another very important and compelling finding to emerge from this study is that the 
entrenched approach to modeL specification and parameter estimation in extant empirical 
research limits the extent to which legitimate causal inferences can be drawn. This study 
shows that system GMM approach to estimation is more efficient in terms of reducing 
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methodological bias and accounting for the complex error structure of ·a dynamic panel 
model. 
This sl1ldy thus makes a significant con'tribution to extant· empirical research and theory 
examining the association between CEO 'reward and performance. First, the study finds that 
CEO cash reward in the Australian context is insensitive to a range of performance measures 
reportedly being used in the management of CEO short term and long-term incentive plans. 
One of the more important findings to emerge from this study is that the reported 
performance-sensitive component of CEO cash reward is insensitive to different measures of 
firm level performance. These empirical findings contradict recent research conducted by 
Merhebi eta/., (2006) in which Australian boards are alleged to be diligent in managing the 
relationship between CEO cash reward and performance. These inconsistencies in findings 
also call into question whether such inconsistencies are in part method-driven. The current 
study identified a number of shortcomings associated with the application of a fixed effects 
approach to the estimation of the dynamic relationship between CEO cash reward and 
performance used by these authors. The criticisms levelled against the adequacy of the 
prevailing approach to model specification and parameter estimation of the relationship 
between CEO reward and performance, prompted the use of more sophisticated panel data 
techniques. 
While theory and best practice prescriptions have continued to centre on board structural 
characteristics - most notably, board independence - as predictors of board monitoring and 
decisional effectiveness, there is no evidence that these prescriptions have led to CEO cash 
rewards becoming more performance-contingent. In essence, Jhe widely . embraced 
assumption that boards exhibiting greater structural independence may be more effective 
'stewards' of owner interests may be 'too good to be true'. 
While this thesis, like all such studies, does have a number of empirical constraints, it 
nevertheless suggests that a more complete understanding of CEO reward determin~tion 
requires that greater attention be paid to board decision-making processes and capabilities 
pertaining to the management of CEO cash reward and performance; that is, to the perceptual 
and cognitive processes antecedent to reward outcomes, as opposed to either the board's 
nominal structural characteristics or prior firm performance per se. 
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It is also hoped that the approach taken here will motivate other researchers to build on and 
further refine the explanatory model applied. Indeed, the underlying causaUogic and system 
of causal relationships depicted in the proffered model is capable of being extrapolated to 
develop other •specific behavioural models of board task performance which encompass the 
determination of fixed cash rewards, equity-based rewards, and non-cash rewards. The model 
proposed is intended to enable both scholars and practitioners. to gain a better .understanding 
of CEO reward and performance, and to formulate prescriptions which will actually enable 
boards to make. more rigorous and strategic decisions in the management of CEO reward and 
performance. 
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